Iacobucci

The appellant challenged the institutional independence and impartiality of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, arguing that the Canadian Human Rights Commission's power to issue binding guidelines and the Tribunal Chairperson's power to extend members' terms compromised procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's main function is adjudicative but it also serves to implement government policy, warranting a lower standard of independence than a court.

The Court found that the guideline power is a form of law that does not fetter the Tribunal improperly, and the power to extend appointments does not threaten security of tenure or impartiality.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for a 1978 murder.

After years of gradual release, he resumed substance abuse and the Review Board ordered his continued detention at a psychiatric hospital, finding him a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's order as unreasonable and directed an absolute discharge, while refusing to admit fresh evidence of recent violent behaviour.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not unreasonable given its expertise and the evidence of the respondent's resumed cocaine use.

The Court also held that the fresh evidence should have been admitted in the interests of justice.

The appellant father challenged provisions of the British Columbia Vital Statistics Act that allowed a mother to arbitrarily 'unacknowledge' a father on a birth registration, thereby excluding his particulars and preventing him from participating in choosing the child's surname.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions violated section 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of sex, as they exposed fathers to arbitrary exclusion without recourse.

The Court found the infringement was not justified under section 1, as the legislation did not minimally impair fathers' rights.

The provisions were declared unconstitutional, with the declaration suspended for 12 months.

The annuitants invested in an RRSP with Desjardins Trust, which deposited the funds in the Caisse and issued non-negotiable deposit certificates.

The annuitants later borrowed from the Caisse, granting a movable hypothec with delivery on the RRSP funds as security, and handing over the certificates.

The annuitants then made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The trustee rejected the Caisse's claim as a secured creditor, arguing that a non-negotiable instrument could not be the object of a pledge.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a movable hypothec with delivery on a claim not represented by a negotiable instrument is valid under the Civil Code of Québec if the debtor transfers effective control of the claim to the creditor, the title is handed over, and the hypothec can be set up against the debtor of the claim.

The appeal was allowed.

The Minister of Labour appointed retired judges to chair compulsory arbitration boards for hospital and nursing home labour disputes under s. 6(5) of the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act.

The unions challenged the appointments, arguing the Minister was required to select arbitrators from a mutually agreed roster and that retired judges lacked labour relations expertise and independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Minister was not restricted to a specific roster and retired judges as a class were not biased, the Minister's appointments were patently unreasonable because he expressly excluded the relevant criteria of labour relations expertise and broad acceptability within the labour relations community, which were essential to the legislative scheme.

The respondent Police Complaint Commissioner brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis of mootness.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, finding that the appeal had become moot and there were no circumstances justifying hearing the appeal under the Borowski criteria.

The appeal was quashed with no order as to costs.

The insureds' residence was broken into and property was stolen.

They brought an action against their insurer under their multi-peril homeowners' insurance policy more than one year after the break-in.

The insurer argued the claim was statute-barred under the one-year limitation period for fire insurance in Part 6 of the British Columbia Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that multi-peril policies fall under the general provisions of Part 2 of the Act, which provides a longer limitation period, and thus the claim was not statute-barred.

The appellant's hotel was damaged by fire, and it claimed for loss under its all-risks insurance policy.

The claim was made more than one year after the loss but within one year of filing proof of loss.

The insurer argued the claim was statute-barred under the one-year limitation period in Part 5 (Fire Provisions) of the British Columbia Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that multi-peril policies do not fit within the outmoded categories of Part 5 and are therefore governed by the general provisions of Part 2, which provides a limitation period of one year from filing proof of loss.

The Court also held that the insurer could not contractually impose a harsher limitation period than that provided in Part 2.

The appeal was allowed.

The parties separated after 14 years of marriage and executed a comprehensive separation agreement that included a full and final release of spousal support.

The wife later applied for spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the strict threshold from the Pelech trilogy no longer applies under the 1985 Divorce Act.

Instead, courts must apply a two-stage test, examining the circumstances of the agreement's formation and whether it still reflects the parties' intentions and substantially complies with the Act's objectives at the time of the application.

Applying this framework, the Court upheld the separation agreement and dismissed the wife's claim for spousal support.

The accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault but convicted at trial of the included offence of aggravated assault.

The trial judge had a reasonable doubt about the sexual nature of the assault because of possible prior consensual sexual activity or how the complainant became undressed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by considering legally irrelevant factors.

Applying the objective test from Chase, the Court found the assault was sexual in nature, set aside the acquittal, and entered a guilty verdict for aggravated sexual assault.

The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries of life to a child.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings due to a 21-month delay between the appellant's arrest and the trial date.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the delay did not infringe the appellant's right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons found the respondent physician guilty of infamous conduct for having a sexual relationship with a patient, based primarily on credibility findings.

The reviewing judge set aside the decision, finding the evidence was not 'clear and cogent'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the College's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the reviewing judge conflated the standard of proof with the standard of review.

Applying the pragmatic and functional approach, the appropriate standard of review for the Committee's credibility findings was reasonableness simpliciter.

The reviewing judge erred by substituting her own view of the evidence, and the Court of Appeal erred by applying the 'clearly wrong' test to the reviewing judge's decision rather than determining if she applied the correct standard of review.

The respondent lawyer engaged in egregious professional misconduct, including lying to clients and forging a court decision.

The Law Society's Discipline Committee ordered his disbarment.

The Court of Appeal substituted a sanction of indefinite suspension, applying a standard of reasonableness that it said was 'closer to correctness'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Law Society's appeal and restored the disbarment.

The Court held that there are only three standards of review (correctness, reasonableness simpliciter, and patent unreasonableness) and that the reasonableness standard does not 'float' along a spectrum.

Applying the pragmatic and functional approach, the appropriate standard was reasonableness simpliciter.

Since the Discipline Committee's decision was supported by tenable reasons grounded in the evidence, it was not unreasonable and the Court of Appeal erred in interfering.

The appellants and respondent formed a partnership to create children's books featuring the character Caillou.

A dispute arose over the interpretation of a licence contract, and the matter was referred to arbitration.

The arbitrator ruled that the parties were co-authors and that the appellants held the reproduction rights.

The Superior Court dismissed a motion to annul the award, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that copyright ownership was a matter of public order and could not be arbitrated under the Copyright Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the arbitration award.

The Court held that section 37 of the Copyright Act does not preclude arbitration, and that copyright ownership is not a matter of public order that falls outside arbitral jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge inadequately instructed the jury on section 21(1) of the Criminal Code and erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on his prior testimony from another trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions lacked clarity and that the cross-examination violated section 13 of the Charter, as there was a realistic danger the prior testimony could be used to incriminate the appellant.

A new trial was ordered.

The respondents' positions in the Alberta public service were privatized, and they accepted employment with a new private association.

A letter of intent between the government and the union stated that employees accepting such employment would not be entitled to severance pay under the collective agreement.

The respondents brought a civil action seeking a declaration of entitlement to severance pay, alleging their resignations were procured under duress.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement.

Therefore, the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator, and the civil action was properly struck.

The respondent employees were transferred from the Ottawa Police Force to the City of Ottawa.

They alleged that prior to the transfer, the City entered into a pre-employment agreement guaranteeing they would retain their previous terms and conditions of employment.

After the transfer, they were placed under a collective agreement with reduced benefits and brought an action for damages.

The City moved to strike the claim, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute concerned a pre-employment contract, not the collective agreement, meaning the courts had jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the factual dispute regarding the existence of the contract could not be resolved on a preliminary motion to strike.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal upholding the accused's acquittal on dangerous driving counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that while there was evidence upon which a trier of fact could make a finding of dangerous driving, the failure to do so did not amount to an error of law.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal finding an Internet lottery scheme unlawful under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the Chief Justice of Prince Edward Island.

The Information Commissioner appealed a refusal by the RCMP to disclose historical postings and employment information of four RCMP officers requested under the Access to Information Act.

The RCMP claimed the records were exempt as 'personal information' under the Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the information constituted personal information relating to employment history, it fell within the exception for information relating to the position or functions of a government employee.

The Court ruled that this exception applies retroactively to past positions and ordered the disclosure of the officers' historical postings, ranks, years of service, and anniversary dates.