Iacobucci

The appellants, Francophone parents in Nova Scotia, sought an order directing the Province to provide French-language secondary school facilities under s. 23 of the Charter.

The trial judge found a violation and ordered the Province to use its 'best efforts' to provide the facilities by specific dates, retaining jurisdiction to hear progress reports.

The Province appealed the retention of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeal struck it down based on functus officio.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's reporting order was an 'appropriate and just' remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, meaningfully vindicating the parents' rights in the context of historical delay and assimilation, without unduly departing from the judicial role.

A recreation instructor was convicted of sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision and was subsequently dismissed by the City of Toronto.

The union grieved the dismissal, and the arbitrator allowed the relitigation of the sexual assault allegations, ultimately finding the employee was dismissed without just cause.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator's decision to allow relitigation of the criminal conviction was an abuse of process.

The Court ruled that the criminal conviction must stand with all its legal effects, and the arbitrator's failure to give it full effect rendered the decision patently unreasonable.

Two government employees were dismissed after being convicted of sexually assaulting people under their care.

The appellant union grieved their dismissals, and the grievance settlement board ruled that the criminal convictions were only prima facie evidence of guilt, allowing the union to lead rebuttal evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the doctrine of abuse of process bars the relitigation of the employees' guilt for the offences for which they were convicted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) investigated Philip Services Corporation for inadequate financial disclosures.

During the investigation, the OSC compelled documents and testimony from Deloitte & Touche LLP, Philip's auditors.

The OSC subsequently commenced proceedings against Philip and its officers and ordered the disclosure of the compelled material from Deloitte to Philip, finding it in the public interest to do so.

Deloitte appealed the disclosure order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the OSC's decision to order disclosure was reasonable.

The OSC properly applied the Stinchcombe relevance standard and balanced Deloitte's privacy interests against the respondents' right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault after a 14-year-old complainant became pregnant and had an abortion.

The police obtained a DNA warrant to seize a blood sample from the appellant to compare with the fetal tissue.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the DNA warrant provisions in the Criminal Code, arguing they violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provisions, finding they strike an appropriate balance between the public interest in law enforcement and the individual's right to privacy and bodily integrity.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's reliance on the Crown's DNA expert evidence.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that overturned the accused's convictions for sexual offences and entered acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal did not intend to impose a strict rule of law requiring expert evidence to corroborate a change in a child's behaviour in all circumstances.

However, the Supreme Court agreed that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering the trial judge's verdict unreasonable.

The respondent, a registered Indian, was charged under the Forest Practices Code for cutting Crown timber.

He raised an aboriginal right defence before the Forest Appeals Commission.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 precluded the province from conferring jurisdiction on the Commission to determine aboriginal rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a province can validly empower an administrative tribunal to decide questions of constitutional law, including aboriginal rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, arising incidentally in the course of its statutory mandate.

The Court found that the Code granted the Commission the power to decide questions of law, which presumptively includes the power to apply the Constitution.

The appellants suffered physical and sexual abuse while placed in two successive foster homes by the government.

They sued the government for direct negligence, vicarious liability, breach of non-delegable duty, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government was directly negligent in its placement and supervision of the children, it was not vicariously liable for the torts of the foster parents, nor did it breach a non-delegable or fiduciary duty.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeal because the appellants' claims were statute-barred under the Limitation Act, as they had acquired sufficient awareness of the facts to start the limitation period running more than two years before commencing their actions.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that ordered a new sentencing hearing for the respondent.

The sentencing judge had declared the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence without considering the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

Applying the companion case of R. v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a sentencing judge must consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring an offender dangerous.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new sentencing hearing was confirmed.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The predicate offence occurred before the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Johnson, held that the sentencing judge was required to consider the long-term offender provisions before declaring the accused a dangerous offender.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The applicant Indian bands brought motions to vacate a unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegation stemmed from the fact that the judge who authored the reasons had been the federal Associate Deputy Minister of Justice over 15 years prior, during the early stages of the litigation.

The Court dismissed the motions, finding that the judge's prior involvement was limited to a supervisory and administrative role, he had no recollection of the file, and a reasonable, right-minded person would not apprehend bias given the passage of time and the nature of his involvement.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that ordered a new sentencing hearing for an offender who had been declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

The sentencing judge had not considered the new long-term offender provisions, which came into force after the predicate offence was committed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was required to consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring the offender dangerous, even though the predicate offence was committed prior to the enactment of those provisions.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering a new sentencing hearing for an offender who was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

The sentencing judge had not considered the newly enacted long-term offender provisions because the predicate offence occurred prior to their enactment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge must consider the long-term offender provisions prior to declaring an offender dangerous.

Furthermore, under s. 11(i) of the Charter, the offender is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment, requiring the judge to consider the long-term offender provisions even for offences committed prior to the amendments.

The accused was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term for a predicate offence committed prior to the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The sentencing judge held that the long-term offender provisions were not available.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, applying its companion decision in R. v. Johnson, holding that the sentencing judge was required to consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring the accused a dangerous offender.

The respondents, members of a Métis community near Sault Ste.

Marie, were charged with hunting a moose without a licence and possessing game in contravention of the Game and Fish Act.

They argued they had an aboriginal right to hunt for food under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada modified the Van der Peet test to account for the post-contact ethnogenesis of the Métis, establishing a pre-control test.

The Court found that the Sault Ste.

Marie Métis community had a historically continuous practice of subsistence hunting, and the respondents were accepted members of this community.

The provincial hunting regulations unjustifiably infringed their aboriginal right to hunt for food.

The appellant, a Manitoba Métis, was convicted of hunting deer out of season on unoccupied Crown land.

He appealed his conviction on the basis that, as a Métis, he was immune from conviction under provincial wildlife regulations because he had a constitutional right to hunt for food under paragraph 13 of the Manitoba Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA), which protects the hunting rights of 'Indians'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the term 'Indians' in paragraph 13 of the NRTA does not include the Métis, based on the historical context, the language used at the time of enactment, and the provision's objectives.

The accused had an 18-month relationship with the complainant, during which they engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse.

Five months into the relationship, the accused learned he was HIV-positive but failed to disclose this to the complainant.

The complainant later tested positive for HIV.

The Crown conceded it was possible the complainant was infected before the accused learned of his status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused could not be convicted of aggravated assault because the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his post-knowledge conduct endangered her life, as she was likely already infected.

However, the Court upheld his conviction for attempted aggravated assault, finding he had the requisite intent and took more than preparatory steps.

A probationary employee was discharged shortly after returning from maternity leave.

The collective agreement provided that probationary employees could be discharged at the sole discretion of the employer and such discharge was not subject to grievance procedures.

The employee filed a grievance alleging discriminatory discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the substantive rights and obligations of the Human Rights Code and other employment-related statutes are implicitly incorporated into all collective agreements.

Therefore, an arbitrator has the jurisdiction to hear a grievance alleging discriminatory discharge, even for a probationary employee.

The respondent, an Ontario insurer, paid statutory accident benefits to Ontario residents injured in a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia.

The respondent sought indemnification from the appellant, a British Columbia insurer, under section 275 of the Ontario Insurance Act.

The appellant argued the Ontario legislation could not constitutionally apply to it.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the superior court, not an arbitrator, should determine the constitutional applicability of the statute.

The Court further held that the Ontario Insurance Act was constitutionally inapplicable to the out-of-province appellant because there was an insufficient connection between Ontario and the appellant to justify the extraterritorial application of the provincial regulatory scheme.

The respondents, who were non-sitting justices of the peace, challenged the constitutionality of legislative amendments that required all justices of the peace exercising judicial functions to meet new qualifications set by an independent Judicial Council.

The respondents did not meet these qualifications and were removed from office, though offered administrative positions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the principle of judicial independence applied to their office, the legislative removal did not violate their security of tenure.

The reforms were a good faith effort to improve the qualifications and independence of the office, and thus the removal was not arbitrary.