Heather A. McGee

The applicant, Ms. Wang, sought costs after successfully obtaining a comprehensive parenting order and a detailed summer schedule for the child, following the respondent's (Dr. Tang) unilateral suspension of parenting time.

Ms. Wang sought full costs of $9,661.50.

Dr. Tang argued for divided success or deferral of costs.

The court found Ms. Wang was the successful party on the dominant issue and that Dr. Tang's litigation conduct was unreasonable, particularly his refusal to mediate.

Despite Ms. Wang's inadequate Bill of Costs and lack of an Offer to Settle, the court awarded partial costs of $6,780 to Ms. Wang, considering the principles of indemnification, settlement encouragement, and discouraging inappropriate behaviour.

The applicant sought child support, spousal support, equalization, and vesting of the matrimonial home due to the respondent's non-compliance and failure to participate in the uncontested trial.

The court imputed income to the respondent, awarded lump sum spousal support due to a history of non-payment, and granted a vesting order for the matrimonial home to satisfy the total financial obligations, including child support arrears, spousal support, equalization payment, and costs.

The respondent, Ms. Harron, brought a motion for orders concerning parenting and financial support for the two younger children of her common-law relationship with the applicant, Mr. Hoy.

Mr. Hoy brought a cross-motion for joint decision-making and a shared parenting arrangement.

The court granted Ms. Harron sole decision-making responsibility, ordered Mr. Hoy to pay table child support based on his CPP disability income, and directed that the CPP children's disability benefit be paid directly to Ms. Harron.

The court also adopted Ms. Harron's proposed parenting schedule and denied Mr. Hoy's requests for shared transportation costs and Section 7 expenses due to his modest means.

The court declined to rule on Mr. Hoy's prospective relocation claim.

This decision addresses cross-motions concerning parenting time and decision-making responsibility for a 15-year-old child.

The father sought to suspend the mother's parenting time, gain sole decision-making, and dispense with the mother's consent for various matters, citing past conduct.

The mother sought to restore weekend parenting time and alternating weeks during the summer.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding his requests disproportionate and noting his lack of willingness to support the child's relationship with the mother.

The court granted the mother's motion, ordering a specific parenting schedule, including adjustments for the father's pre-planned summer activities, and emphasized the need to resolve outstanding financial issues, including the sale of the matrimonial home.

This costs endorsement arises from a successful motion by Prem Kumar Kapila, an added respondent, to be removed from a family law proceeding initiated by his son, Sahil Kapila, against his former daughter-in-law, Rubi Chhina.

Prem sought full recovery of his costs from Rubi, who had named him as a party without proper claims.

The court awarded Prem $10,250 plus HST in costs, finding Rubi's reliance on former counsel's advice and her claim of modest means insufficient to deviate from the cost consequences of Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court emphasized Prem's offer to settle and Rubi's control over significant funds as factors supporting the award.

The applicant, Sahil Kapila, brought a motion to remove his father, Prem Kumar Kapila, as an added respondent in a matrimonial dispute with his former spouse, Rubi Chhina.

Rubi had added Prem, making various claims including domestic violence, trespass, rent/utilities, and trust claims over property and funds.

The court found that Rubi's claims against Prem did not disclose a reasonable cause of action under Rule 7(3) of the Family Law Rules, nor did they meet the threshold for adding a party under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion to remove Prem as a party, thereby also dismissing Rubi's cross-motion seeking financial disclosure and freezing of Prem's assets.

The plaintiff, Maxpro Management Services Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Global Transauto Inc., Djamilya Kar, and Mido Salik, for breach of a fuel card agreement and personal guarantee.

The defendants failed to appear for the motion and did not pay previously ordered costs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the breach of contract and contractual interest.

The court also pierced the corporate veil to hold Mido Salik jointly and severally liable with Global Transauto Inc. and Djamilya Kar, based on his misrepresentations and control over the corporation's actions, despite his denial and Ms. Kar's conflicting affidavit.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion seeking to return his three-year-old son to Brampton after the applicant mother relocated to Scarborough for subsidized housing.

The mother had been living in a shelter and accepted the housing offer due to limited options.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding it was not urgent and that the mother's relocation was a reasonable, child-focused decision given her dire housing circumstances.

The court emphasized the importance of problem-solving and settlement efforts before litigation, especially before a Case Conference.

Costs were awarded against the father for unreasonable litigation conduct and lack of candour in his materials.

This costs endorsement followed a trial of an issue where the Separation Agreement was set aside (Applicant's primary claim) and the date of separation was determined (Respondent's alternative position).

The Applicant, M.H., sought full costs recovery, while the Respondent, O.K., argued for no costs due to divided success and M.H.'s unreasonable conduct.

The court found M.H. to be the significantly more successful party on the dominant issue of setting aside the agreement, especially given her Rule 18(14) Offer to Settle and O.K.'s complete failure to make any offer.

Despite some unreasonable conduct by M.H. (financial disclosure, inadmissible evidence) leading to a modest reduction, and O.K.'s success on the ancillary separation date issue, M.H. was awarded substantial costs.

The court drew an adverse inference against O.K. for failing to provide his own Bill of Costs.

The trial determined whether a 2015 Separation Agreement should be set aside as a sham under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, and if so, the parties' separation date.

The court found the Agreement to be a sham because the parties were not separated, did not intend to separate, and did not intend to be bound by its terms when it was signed, using it primarily for tax advantage.

Consequently, the Agreement was set aside.

The court determined the actual date of separation to be December 18, 2019, when the husband physically left the matrimonial home and formed the intention to separate, rejecting the earlier date claimed in the Agreement and the later dates proposed by the wife.

The plaintiff, Giang Long Nguyen, invested $100,000 in a trucking business venture with the defendants, Abdelraheem Adas and Krystalynn Kaur Manu (common-law spouses).

The defendants misrepresented their intentions, using the funds for personal expenses and a failed real estate investment.

A default judgment was initially obtained against both defendants, but later set aside for Mr. Adas.

At trial, the court found Mr. Adas liable for breach of fiduciary duty and civil fraud, concluding that he misused the funds and deliberately misled the plaintiff.

The court ordered Mr. Adas to repay the $100,000 jointly and severally with Ms. Manu, plus prejudgment interest.

This motion concerned a dispute between separated parents over their three-year-old daughter's parenting schedule and daycare placement.

The applicant father proposed a 2-2-3 parenting schedule and placement at Bright Beginnings Child Care, while the respondent mother sought a more complex schedule and placement at Saugeen Shores Childcare Centre.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test and considering the AFCC Parenting Guidelines, granted the father's requests for both daycare placement and parenting schedule, finding his proposals offered greater stability, predictability, and balanced travel time for the child.

This is a trial decision concerning the allocation of garnished funds owed by the respondent to the applicant.

The parties had multiple outstanding debts from a prior divorce order, including child support, spousal support (lump sum and arrears), and property equalization payments.

The respondent argued that garnished funds should first be applied to spousal support due to its priority under the Creditors' Relief Act.

The court held that the Creditors' Relief Act's priority provisions apply to multiple creditors, not to the allocation of undifferentiated payments from a single debtor to multiple debts owed to the same creditor.

Applying the common law principle of apportionment, the court ruled that the applicant, as the creditor, had the discretion to allocate the garnished funds to maximize her recovery, specifically by applying them first to the property-related debts, allowing the lump sum spousal support to be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) and thus survive potential bankruptcy.

The Applicant, Ms. Diamond, sought full recovery of $348,624 in legal and expert fees following her success on key issues of spousal support, income for support, and pension division after an 11-day trial.

The Respondent, Mr. Berman, argued for divided success and sought $74,623 in costs.

The court addressed Mr. Berman's excessive costs submissions, affirming the importance of page limits.

It found Ms. Diamond entitled to costs due to her overall success and Mr. Berman's unreasonable litigation conduct, including his self-representation for much of the proceeding and rigid positions.

However, the court declined to award Mr. Berman costs and reduced Ms. Diamond's claim, finding her unreasonable in failing to accept a mid-trial severable offer regarding pension division.

The court also established a general principle against recovering costs for multiple counsel.

Ms. Diamond was ultimately awarded $180,800 in costs.

The respondent sought leave for an urgent motion regarding parenting issues, specifically make-up time, alleging the applicant intermittently withheld their children.

The applicant opposed, providing evidence of the respondent's breaches of agreed-upon COVID-19 social distancing protocols and a unilateral reduction of child support.

The court found that the request for make-up time did not meet the threshold for an urgent or pressing issue, emphasizing the children's best interests and the moving parent's disregard for agreements and children's concerns.

The motion for leave was dismissed, and parties were encouraged to negotiate or mediate a temporary parenting plan and consider a Rule 15 Motion to Change.

The Children and Family Services for York Region (Society) sought a temporary order for the respondent father, J.M., to have supervised access to the child, J., twice weekly.

The respondent mother, C.F., opposed this, requesting access be deferred until Society offices reopened and then be supervised by two CAS workers, specifically excluding family members or friends.

The father consented to the Society's motion but requested an additional term regarding future access discretion.

The court found that the COVID-19 closure of CAS facilities constituted a material change in circumstances.

Applying a contextual analysis, the court determined that the Society's proposal for supervision by approved paternal aunts, remotely monitored by a FIT worker, sufficiently mitigated the risk of harm to the child and promoted the child's best interests, protection, and well-being.

The Society's motion was granted, and the mother's motion was dismissed.

The applicant, John Maximo Clemente, brought a 14B motion for leave for an urgent Case Conference regarding access issues for his three-year-old son, "D".

The respondent, Rachel Sara O’Brien, opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the meaning of "pressing" as per the May 19, 2020 Notice to the Profession, concluding it requires a threshold no less than that for an urgent motion under Rosen v. Rosen.

The court found that the applicant had not seen his son since an altercation in November 2019, which led to criminal charges and a recognizance prohibiting contact with the respondent.

The court determined that the applicant's request did not meet the test for either an urgent or pressing issue, as there were no immediate health, safety, or economic concerns for the child, and the applicant had not engaged in genuine settlement discussions or explored available options for supervised access.

The motion was dismissed, and the parties were encouraged to engage in out-of-court discussions.

The applicant sought an urgent case conference to establish supervised access to her children and to obtain a section 30 CLRA assessment.

The court denied the urgent motion, finding that the applicant failed to meet the urgency test, particularly given the long period of no contact with the children and the lack of evidence regarding available supervisory services or assessors during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized that the issues were not urgent as defined by the Notices to the Profession and lacked practical feasibility.

The applicant sought an urgent motion to address the respondent's withholding of parenting time for their son, alleging a significant breach of a final joint custody order.

The court found the situation met the urgency criteria established during the COVID-19 pandemic, allowing the motion to proceed in writing.

A timetable was set for the respondent's materials and any reply, with parties encouraged to file a proposed draft order for make-up access.

The applicant father sought an urgent motion for resumption of parenting time, alleging the respondent mother breached a prior order by withholding their child due to COVID-19 concerns.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion for an urgent order to suspend access, citing the child's vulnerability to the virus.

The court found both motions urgent, applying the test from Thomas v. Wohleber.

While acknowledging the mother's past gatekeeping behavior and finding her in contempt previously, the court emphasized the importance of children maintaining contact with both parents during the pandemic.

The court did not grant immediate police enforcement or suspension of access but ordered a teleconference Case Conference with the Ontario Children's Lawyer (OCL) to facilitate resolution and strengthen the father-daughter relationship.