Gloria E. Ichim

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making a Crown wardship order with no access by either parent.

The child was apprehended at eight weeks old along with three older siblings due to expressed fears of violence by the appellant's then partner.

The child had been in the custody of prospective adoptive parents for approximately four years at the time of appeal.

The appellants sought to challenge the Crown wardship order and the no-access provision.

The appellants effectively abandoned the Crown wardship challenge and focused on the access issue.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence including a CAS worker's affidavit and video recordings of access visits, but also admitted an affidavit from Dr. Kathy Keefe regarding open adoption, though with reservations about its foundation and timing.

The Court upheld the no-access order, finding that the appellants failed to meet the statutory test requiring that the relationship be meaningful and beneficial to the child and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

A mother appealed a Crown wardship order made without access to her child.

She moved for interim access pending the hearing of her appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The child had been apprehended at eight weeks of age and remained in foster care for approximately three and a half years.

The trial judge found the child was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health issues, lack of insight into the child's needs, and exposure of the child to domestic conflict.

The Superior Court appeal judge dismissed the mother's appeal and found that continued access was neither meaningful nor beneficial to the child and impaired the child's adoption prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for interim access, finding no substantial ground of appeal and determining that access was not in the child's best interests pending the appeal.

The appellant, K.F., appealed a Crown wardship order concerning her child, Z.A.F. The appeal raised issues of systemic delay in child welfare proceedings, alleged misfeasance by the Children's Aid Society, the standard of appellate review, the weight given to expert evidence (Dr. Amin's parenting capacity assessment), and access to the Crown ward.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge.

It emphasized that criminal law delay principles do not apply to child welfare cases and that continued access by the parent would impair the child's future opportunities for adoption.

The payor father brought a motion to change a 2012 child support order, citing a loss of employment and inability to pay.

The mother sought to impute an income of $25,000 per year.

The court found that the father had made reasonable efforts to find employment despite facing multiple impediments, including a criminal record and lack of mobility.

The court suspended periodic child support for seven months to allow the father to find employment, after which an income of $25,000 would be imputed and support obligations would resume.

The appellants appealed a Crown wardship order without access regarding their two children.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify the mother as Indian or native, failing to apply Gladue principles, drawing negative inferences from the mother's flat affect, and failing to consider the children's best interests regarding access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the children did not meet the statutory definition of Indian or native person under the Child and Family Services Act, and that an access order was statutorily precluded because it would impair adoption prospects.

The Court also strongly condemned the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings.

In a high-conflict family motion concerning a child's vaccination, the court held that a prior consent custody term prohibiting vaccination until age 12 did not bind the court where the child's best interests required a fresh assessment.

The court declined to involve the child directly, finding that parental conflict had already placed the child in the middle of the dispute and that her views could not be reasonably ascertained without harm.

Applying the law on expert admissibility, the court rejected the anti-vaccination opinion evidence tendered on behalf of the mother and accepted the infectious disease evidence filed through the amicus.

The court found that vaccination for measles, mumps, and rubella was in the child's best interests and gave the father authority to make that medical decision before the planned travel.

The appellants appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to properly consider the mother's Aboriginal heritage, misinterpreted her 'flat affect', ignored positive evidence, and failed to consider less intrusive alternatives.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors and properly prioritized the children's best interests, noting the parents' chronic inability to safely parent and the severe failure to thrive of one child.

The court also strongly criticized the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings, noting the children had been in foster care for over four years.