E.M. Morgan

Following a successful habeas corpus application resulting in his release from immigration detention, the applicant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent opposed the quantum, arguing the applicant should have pursued judicial review in Federal Court.

The court found that the respondent had treated the matter as a test case to defend the jurisdiction of the Immigration Division, despite agreeing the applicant should be released.

The court awarded the applicant his full requested costs of $61,760.50 on a partial indemnity scale pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter and Rule 57.01.

The applicant, awaiting sentencing for armed robbery and other offences, brought multiple applications challenging his incarceration conditions and seeking production from government entities.

The court ruled that the prosecuting Crown is the only proper and necessary party, with other government entities acting as interveners or third parties.

The court established a sequence for the upcoming applications, beginning with an O'Connor application for third-party production from the federal government, followed by habeas corpus and Charter applications, and concluding with the sentencing hearing.

The defendants were charged with importing cocaine after a controlled delivery of a package from Colombia.

The package contained cocaine hidden inside metal grinding wheels.

One defendant accepted the package at his residence, while the other was observed driving nearby in apparent counter-surveillance.

The court found that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant knew the package contained imported cocaine.

Both defendants were found not guilty.

The self-represented applicant, having been convicted of aggravated assault and breach of probation, applied prior to sentencing to vacate the finding of guilt and declare a mistrial.

He alleged breaches of his Charter rights due to the Crown's failure to disclose evidence and ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, particularly regarding an Agreed Statement of Facts admitting DNA evidence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no merit to the disclosure complaints and concluding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding a tactical decision was better suited for an appeal where a proper evidentiary record could be established.

The applicant, a refugee claimant, sought a writ of habeas corpus to be released from immigration detention after being held for 17 months.

The detention was based on a series of alleged breaches of release conditions that were either inadvertent or based on errors by police and immigration authorities.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the continued detention lacked a valid purpose, was arbitrary, and violated the principles of fundamental justice under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the Immigration Division's deference to the Canada Border Services Agency in determining breaches constituted procedural unfairness.

The plaintiff Bank brought an action against the corporate borrower and personal guarantors for defaulting on a loan.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred because the borrower had not made a payment in over two years, even though the guarantors had made recent payments under a forbearance arrangement.

The court rejected this argument, holding that payments by the guarantors were credited to the borrower's loan account and thus reset the limitation period.

The court granted judgment for the Bank and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The court also awarded full indemnity costs to the Bank as stipulated in the loan and guarantee agreements.

The plaintiffs brought an undefended trial for payment due under an employment contract.

The individual plaintiff, a licensed mortgage broker, was hired by the individual defendant to act as Vice President Operations and Compliance for several corporate entities controlled by the defendant.

The court found that the corporate defendants were alter egos of the individual defendant.

The defendants breached the contract by failing to pay the plaintiff's invoices and salary.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $80,412.50 in damages and $10,000 in substantial indemnity costs, holding all defendants jointly and severally liable.

Following a summary judgment finding the defendants liable for breaching a commercial lease, the court held a mini-trial to quantify damages.

The court accepted the plaintiff's expert evidence on the present value of unpaid rent, less mitigation from a new lease and the value of distrained chattels left by the tenant.

The court awarded the plaintiff $408,046 in damages, plus pre-judgment interest, and $49,046.05 in partial indemnity costs against the active defendants.

The applicant condominium corporation brought an application seeking an order to stop a unit owner from harassing its employees.

The respondent frequently sent abusive and insulting emails to the management office and verbally abused staff, calling them degrading names.

The court found that the respondent's conduct violated the Condominium Act's prohibition against activities likely to cause injury, including psychological harm, and constituted workplace harassment under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The court ordered the respondent to cease and desist from her uncivil, harassing, and abusive conduct.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of subsections 278.3(5) and 278.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued that requiring notice to a witness of an application for third party records (specifically, police occurrence reports regarding the complainant's boyfriend) would undermine cross-examination and violate sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada had already upheld the constitutionality of the Mills regime, which includes the impugned notice provisions, and that this regime applies to extrinsic police occurrence reports.

The accused was charged with armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a convenience store.

The Crown alleged the accused pistol-whipped the store clerk and struggled with him over a handgun, resulting in two shots being fired.

The accused testified that he was merely a bystander and that his young companion committed the robbery.

Applying the W(D) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory evidence as contrived and accepted the store clerk's testimony, which was corroborated by an independent witness and forensic evidence including gunshot residue.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The accused, a bar security guard, was convicted of aggravated assault after using excessive force to eject an intoxicated patron, causing severe facial injuries.

The court weighed the seriousness of the offence against the accused's lack of criminal record, strong community support, and low risk of re-offending.

Finding the incident to be an isolated overreaction, the court imposed a suspended sentence with three years of probation, community service, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The applicant sought a bail review after his mother withdrew as his surety due to personal tensions, resulting in his detention.

The Justice of the Peace had previously rejected a proposal for the applicant's step-father to act as surety while living in the same residence.

The Superior Court found that the applicant had never breached his release conditions and that the issues were interpersonal rather than related to bail compliance.

The court granted the bail review, allowing the applicant's step-father and cousin to act as sureties with a combined pledge of $2,000.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, sought a bail review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant proposed a house arrest plan with his aunt and father as sureties.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the proposed release plan unworkable due to the sureties' financial limitations, the applicant's lack of employment prospects, and the fact that one of the firearms was found on the proposed surety's property.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States for an $8.8 million fraud, applied for judicial interim release.

He was already on bail for domestic charges involving $200,000.

The court found that the proposed sureties and financial pledges were insufficient given the magnitude of the U.S. charges, the applicant's sale of his Canadian home, his ownership of property in Nigeria, and the nature of the charges which included identity theft and association with passport forgers.

The application was denied without prejudice to re-apply with stricter conditions and more substantial financial terms.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 523(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, proposing the use of an electronic monitoring device as a material change in circumstances.

The applicant had previously been detained on the secondary ground due to a history of re-offending while on bail under the supervision of his parents.

The court dismissed the application, finding that electronic monitoring only establishes location and does not displace the need for capable sureties, especially given the family's past failure to prevent breaches.

The Crown applied to adduce similar fact evidence of prior discreditable conduct by the accused, involving two other complainants in different cities.

The Crown argued the accused had a modus operandi of seeking out vulnerable women in homeless shelters or transit, engaging in short intense relationships, and committing sexual assaults accompanied by physical violence.

Applying the Handy framework, the court found the proposed evidence lacked sufficient similarity and strength, noting significant dissimilarities in the circumstances and weaknesses in the prior evidence.

The court concluded the evidence had little probative value and its admission would cause undue moral prejudice.

The application was denied.

Following a late-night bar ejection, two security workers were tried for aggravated assault arising from serious facial and eye injuries suffered by an intoxicated patron.

The court accepted the independent bystander evidence that one accused repeatedly smashed the patron's head into a glass door and punched him in the face, and rejected speculation that the injuries were caused by an accidental fall onto nearby objects.

Applying the W (D) framework and the criminal burden of proof, the court found the evidence against that accused proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the second accused, the evidence of participation in the beating was inconsistent and left the court with a reasonable doubt.

One accused was convicted and the other acquitted.

The applicant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was committed for trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession after police found 6.2 grams of crack cocaine on the vehicle's centre console.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the committal, arguing there was no evidence he had control over the drugs.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that mere proximity and opportunity to control the drugs did not amount to actual or constructive possession.

The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer control from the evidence, and quashed the committal for trial.

The applicant, a professional photographer charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving four aspiring models, applied to sever the counts so they could be tried separately.

The Crown intended to bring a similar fact application.

The court found that three of the complainants alleged severe conduct (intercourse and vaginal touching) and were allegedly connected through the applicant's former partner, making a joint trial appropriate.

However, the fourth complainant alleged less severe conduct (touching breasts), had no connection to the others, and the applicant did not intend to testify in her case.

The court severed the fourth complainant's case from the other three to prevent undue prejudice and protect the applicant's right to silence.