Douglas R. Lent

The defendant was convicted at trial of three counts of operating a conveyance while prohibited contrary to s. 320.18.

The Crown sought the maximum custodial sentence of 2 years less 1 day based on seven prior convictions for the same offence and eleven prior convictions for failing to comply with court orders.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence of 6-12 months, citing the jump principle and the defendant's indigenous background.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 15 months concurrent on all counts, finding that despite the serious criminal history and need for deterrence, the defendant had demonstrated positive change and rehabilitation potential, particularly following drug counselling in 2023 and the absence of further offences in the 20 months since the subject offences.

The offender was convicted of impaired operation of a conveyance and operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 45 to 60 days, an 18-month driving prohibition, and two years probation.

The defence sought an elevated fine, an 18-month driving prohibition, and probation if necessary.

The court imposed a two-month conditional sentence order with home confinement for the first month, an 18-month driving prohibition, and no probation order.

The court balanced the seriousness of the offence—involving extremely high blood alcohol levels (310 and 290 mg%), running a red light, and significant property damage—against the offender's first-time status, demonstrated rehabilitation through residential treatment and sustained sobriety, strong family support, and low risk of reoffending.

This decision addresses a Charter application challenging the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence and other related evidence in a case involving impaired driving, operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml, and dangerous driving.

The court carefully analyzed the issues of identity of the driver, the reliability of the alcohol screening device (ASD) fail result considering residual mouth alcohol, the lawfulness of detention in the police cruiser during the alcohol screening demand, and the timing of the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter but did find a minor breach of section 10(b) due to a brief delay in providing the right to counsel.

The breathalyzer evidence was admitted, and the accused was found guilty of the "80 plus" offence but not guilty of impaired driving or dangerous driving.

The defendant, Peter De Pinto, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in his trial for three driving-related offences.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the last scheduled trial date was 42 months.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating defence waivers and defence-caused delay, which amounted to 22.8 months.

This resulted in a net delay of 19.2 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court then considered whether the sudden death of the original trial judge constituted an exceptional circumstance.

It found that the judge's death was an unforeseen and unavoidable exceptional circumstance, and that the justice system had reasonably mitigated its impact.

A deduction of 6.65 months was made for this exceptional circumstance, bringing the remaining delay to 12.55 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving (excess blood alcohol).

On appeal, the sole issue was whether her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was violated.

The appellant had twice asked to call her husband after being advised of her rights, but the arresting officer denied the request, stating she could only speak to a lawyer.

The trial judge found that the appellant did not communicate that she wanted to call her husband to obtain a lawyer's name, and that it was not obvious to the police.

The Superior Court, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, upheld the trial judge's factual finding as reasonable and affirmed that a detainee has an obligation to explicitly state the reason for wanting to contact a third party to facilitate access to counsel.

The court found no Charter breach and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The court found the defendant was the driver and impaired based on pre-arrest observations.

However, significant breaches of the defendant's Charter right to counsel (s. 10(b)) occurred at the police detachment, including insufficient explanation of counsel options, failure to address dissatisfaction with duty counsel, lack of a Prosper warning, and delayed facilitation of counsel access during breath testing.

Applying the Grant criteria, the court excluded the breathalyzer readings for the 'over 80' charge, resulting in an acquittal on that count.

The evidence for impaired care and control, obtained prior to the Charter breaches, was not excluded, leading to a conviction on that charge.

Rajvinder Singh appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol.

At trial, he was acquitted of the over 80 mg charge due to a Charter violation (s. 10(b) right to counsel in Punjabi).

On appeal, Singh argued the trial judge erred in finding him impaired, primarily by challenging credibility assessments of witnesses and alleging misapprehension of evidence, including video recordings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were reasonable and well-supported by the evidence, and that no palpable or overriding errors in credibility findings or factual assessments were demonstrated.

The court reiterated the high standard for appellate intervention on factual findings and credibility.

Matthew Salciccia was found asleep at the wheel of his truck with the engine running.

He was arrested for impaired driving and having excess blood alcohol.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under s. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that there was no breach of his s. 10(b) rights, as he had waived his right to counsel at the roadside, and the police were not obligated to facilitate counsel of choice after he declined.

The court emphasized the need for specificity in Charter applications.

Salciccia was found guilty of both charges.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a suitable breath sample for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand after being found asleep in his vehicle.

The Crown and defence disputed the reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand and the mens rea standard for the offence.

The court found that the officer's ASD demand was within the 'forthwith window'.

However, the central issue was whether the Crown proved the failure to provide a suitable sample beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due to insufficient and inaccurate details provided by the administering officer regarding the multiple failed tests, the court found a reasonable doubt remained and dismissed the charge.

The defendant, Robert Cairney, was charged with "over 79" contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no section 8 violation regarding the immediacy of the ASD demand or residual mouth alcohol.

However, it found a minor section 10(b) breach due to a 3-5 minute delay in providing rights to counsel and a section 9 breach due to an approximate two-hour overholding caused by paperwork delays.

Despite these breaches, the court declined to stay the charges under section 24(1) or exclude the breath samples under section 24(2), finding the breaches to be of low seriousness and low impact, and that admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, John Zdichavsky, was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The trial proceeded alongside a Charter application to exclude breath sample results, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, with s. 10 allegations later abandoned.

The court found the initial traffic stop, the subsequent detention, and the arrest based on an Approved Screening Device (ASD) "fail" result to be lawful.

The judge rejected arguments that the officer lacked subjective belief or objective grounds, or that the ASD was unreliable due to lack of self-testing, waiting periods, or calibration records.

Finding no Charter violations, the court dismissed the Charter application and admitted the breath test results.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty as charged.

Her Majesty the Queen appealed the acquittal of Nicholas Bennett on a charge of driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol.

The trial judge had excluded breath test results, finding a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Prosper warning.

The respondent had initially invoked his right to counsel, but police conduct led him to believe further attempts to contact a lawyer would be futile.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding of a Charter breach and the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the seriousness of the police conduct, which effectively rendered the right to counsel meaningless, outweighed other factors, notwithstanding the minimally intrusive nature of breath samples.

The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was affirmed.

The defendant, Lenny Alexandre, was charged with operating a conveyance while prohibited.

The defence challenged the Crown's proof of identity, the connection of the license suspension to a criminal conviction, and argued that the Crown must prove the defendant was not registered in an ignition interlock program.

The court found that identity was proven by circumstantial evidence, the license suspension was sufficiently connected to a prior criminal conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, and that registration in an interlock program is a defence, not an element of the offence, placing an evidentiary burden on the defendant.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and "over 80", and the imposed sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand, alleged violations of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and the sufficiency of evidence for impairment.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the conviction and the 18-month driving prohibition, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal reasoning.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a traffic stop on September 20, 2018.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest for impaired driving, as the only observations were signs of alcohol consumption rather than impairment.

The court also found that the defendant's detention was unlawful as she was not brought before a justice within 24 hours as required by the Criminal Code.

The Intoxilyzer test results were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a traffic stop on October 21, 2017.

The defendant challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the defendant's section 9 rights were not breached, the police violated the defendant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) by failing to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and by not informing the defendant of the option to contact an alternative lawyer.

The evidence of refusal was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on the officer's observations and video evidence from the police division.

The accused was charged with robbery with a knife of an iPhone from the complainant on March 21, 2018.

The Crown's case relied primarily on eyewitness identification evidence, specifically the complainant's yearbook identification and claimed recognition of the accused from prior sightings at a plaza.

The accused denied involvement and testified he was in Toronto with his girlfriend at the time.

The court found multiple frailties in the identification evidence, including significant discrepancies in height estimation, inconsistencies regarding accents and facial coverings, and the unreliability of the recognition evidence based on brief, distant observations.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The appellant, Satgur Singh, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge's findings of guilt were unreasonable, specifically regarding the identification of the appellant as the driver.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's assessment of eight alleged inconsistencies in eyewitness identification evidence.

The court found that the trial judge was alive to the inconsistencies, addressed them fairly, and reasonably concluded that the appellant was the driver.

The cumulative evidence, beyond just eyewitness description, supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to allow the arresting officer in an 'over 80' trial to testify via video link from South Carolina, where he would be on a pre-planned vacation.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would diminish the right to make full answer and defence and that the technology would impede cross-examination on exhibits.

The court granted the application, finding that the defence failed to show that receiving the evidence by video link would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, and set out minimal technical requirements for the testimony.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the approved screening device demand and reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand.

The accused also challenged whether the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The court found the police had reasonable suspicion and reasonable and probable grounds, dismissed the Charter application, and found the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The accused was convicted.