Ontario Court of Justice

Date: August 27, 2025

Court File No.: Brampton 23-31100479

Between:

His Majesty the King

— AND —

Mason Heslip

Before: Justice P.T. O'Marra

Heard on: July 25, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: August 27, 2025

Counsel

N. Sohail — counsel for the Crown

D. Lent — for the defendant Mason Heslip

P.T. O'Marra, J.:

Introduction

[1] Mr. Mason Heslip has been found guilty of:

• Impaired Operation of a Conveyance (s. 320.14(1)(a)); and
• Operation with Blood Alcohol Concentration Over 80 mg% (s. 320.14(1)(b)).

[2] The Crown seeks a custodial sentence of 45 to 60 days, an 18-month driving prohibition, and two years probation, citing the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence and public denunciation. The Defence proposes an elevated fine, an 18-month driving prohibition, and, if necessary, a probation period. The focus is on Mr. Heslip's rehabilitation, his lack of prior record, the lack of personal injury, and the suitability of a non-custodial sentence.

[3] The Crown initially sought a free-standing restitution order; however, the City of Brampton has been sufficiently compensated by Intact Insurance for the damaged city property that was repaired and replaced.

[4] After reviewing the evidence, the pre-sentence report, submissions, and relevant jurisprudence, I conclude that a two-month conditional sentence order and an 18-month driving prohibition are appropriate and just in the circumstances.

Factual Context

[5] On December 8, 2022, Mr. Heslip was significantly impaired while driving. His blood alcohol levels were 310 mg% and 290 mg%, exceeding four times the legal limit. He ran a red light, became airborne, and crashed through two residential fences, coming to a stop in a backyard. The damage was substantial, but no injuries were reported.

[6] Mr. Heslip cooperated with the police and made several inculpatory statements, which were deemed admissible.

Mr. Heslip's Background and Circumstances

[7] Mr. Mason Heslip is a 35-year-old Canadian citizen with no prior criminal record. He was born in Orangeville, Ontario, and grew up in a stable, supportive family environment with his older sister and younger brother. His upbringing was described as positive, with no history of abuse, neglect, or child protection involvement. He maintains a close relationship with his mother, who, along with his siblings, continues to support him through his recovery from alcohol addiction and legal proceedings.

[8] Mr. Heslip has lived independently in Brampton since August 2022, following the sale of his parents' home. He is single, has no children, and maintains a small but supportive social circle, including two close friends from elementary school. His mother and friends describe him as kind, sensitive, and remorseful, noting that the offence was a wake-up call that prompted him to confront his addiction.

[9] Educationally, Mr. Heslip completed high school and later earned a two-year business diploma from a local community college. He has a consistent employment history, having worked in landscaping, court reporting, and most recently as a full-time labourer at a brick manufacturing plant. His employer and manager describe him as a valued employee whose performance has significantly improved since achieving sobriety. Prior to treatment, he struggled with attendance and focus, but since completing a residential program, he has demonstrated reliability and motivation.

[10] Mr. Heslip's struggles with alcohol began in his early 30s, escalating to daily consumption of vodka, often up to a full 26-ounce bottle. His addiction led to seizures, including one at work, and culminated in a serious alcohol-induced seizure in March 2023 that required hospitalization. This incident was pivotal. He entered a six-week residential treatment program in April 2023 and has remained sober since. He continues to participate in a two-year aftercare program, including regular urine and breath testing, all of which have returned negative results.

[11] He has expressed deep remorse for his actions, acknowledging the danger he posed to himself and others. He stated, "I'm mad at myself and I'm remorseful as I should have never done that," and has committed to lifelong sobriety. He no longer owns a vehicle and uses taxis to commute to work. He has indicated a willingness to comply with any court-imposed conditions, including restitution, counselling, and community supervision.

[12] The pre-sentence report states that Mr. Heslip has shown insight into his addiction, has taken meaningful steps toward rehabilitation, and is supported by a stable network of family, friends, and professionals. His risk of reoffending is low, and community supervision is recommended as an appropriate and effective sentencing option.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[13] There were several aggravating factors in this case, including:

(1) The extremely high blood alcohol concentration (BAC) readings.

(2) Mr. Heslip drove through a red light and was speeding.

(3) There was significant property damage.

(4) He posed a considerable risk to public safety.

[14] I find the following to be substantial mitigating factors:

(1) Mr. Heslip is a first-time offender with no criminal record.

(2) He completed a 30-day residential treatment program and has remained sober since March 2023.

(3) He achieved 24/24 negative urine tests and has been involved in a two-year aftercare program.

(4) He has strong support from family and employer.

(5) The pre-sentence report was highly positive, recommending community supervision.

(6) Mr. Heslip has shown insight, remorse, and a strong commitment to sobriety.

Sentencing Principles in Impaired Driving Cases Involving High BAC and Property Damage

[15] Sentencing in impaired driving cases is governed by the overarching principles set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. These include denunciation, deterrence (both general and specific), rehabilitation, proportionality, and restraint. When the offence involves a high BAC and significant property damage, courts have consistently emphasized the primacy of denunciation and deterrence, while still considering the offender's personal circumstances and prospects for rehabilitation.

Denunciation and General Deterrence

[16] The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently confirmed that denunciation and general deterrence are the primary sentencing goals in impaired driving cases. In R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, the Court stated at para. 1:

Impaired driving is a serious crime that continues to cause significant harm in Canadian society. Sentences must reflect society's condemnation of this conduct and deter others from engaging in it.

[17] This principle is particularly important when the offender's BAC is significantly elevated and the offence results in property damage or poses a risk to public safety. The courts have recognized that even in the absence of injury or death, the potential for catastrophic consequences justifies a firm sentencing response.

Proportionality and Moral Blameworthiness

[18] The principle of proportionality, codified in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, requires that the sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, the Court emphasized at para. 12:

The severity of a sentence depends not only on the seriousness of the crime's consequences, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

[19] A high BAC is a statutory aggravating factor under s. 320.22(f) of the Criminal Code, and courts have treated it as indicative of increased moral blameworthiness. The presence of significant property damage further aggravates the offence by demonstrating the real-world consequences of impaired driving.

Individualized Sentencing and Rehabilitation

[20] While denunciation and deterrence are paramount, sentencing must remain individualized and tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. In R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, the Court held at paras. 29-30 that:

29. The conditional sentence is defined in the Code as a sentence of imprisonment. The heading of s. 742 reads "Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment". Furthermore, s. 742.1(a) requires the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years before considering whether the sentence can be served in the community subject to the appropriate conditions. Parliament intended imprisonment, in the form of incarceration, to be more punitive than probation, as it is far more restrictive of the offender's liberty. Since a conditional sentence is, at least notionally, a sentence of imprisonment, it follows that it too should be interpreted as more punitive than probation.

30. On a related note, with the enactment of s. 742.1, Parliament has mandated that certain non-dangerous offenders who would otherwise have gone to jail for up to two years now serve their sentences in the community. If a conditional sentence is not distinguished from probation, then these offenders will receive what are effectively considerably less onerous probation orders instead of jail terms. Such lenient sentences would not provide sufficient denunciation and deterrence, nor would they be accepted by the public. Section 718 provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is "to contribute . . . to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society". Inadequate sanctions undermine respect for the law. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish a conditional sentence from probation by way of the use of punitive conditions.

[21] This principle is especially relevant for first-time offenders who have demonstrated insight, remorse, and a commitment to rehabilitation. Courts must balance the seriousness of the offence with the offender's personal circumstances and the likelihood of reoffending.

Restraint and the Use of Custodial Sentences

[22] The principle of restraint, codified in s. 718.2(e), requires that imprisonment be imposed only when necessary. In R. v. Sharma, 2022 SCC 39, the Court reaffirmed at para. 2 that:

Sentencing judges must consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances, with particular attention to the circumstances of Indigenous offenders and others facing systemic disadvantage.

[23] Although Sharma focused on systemic discrimination, its reaffirmation of restraint applies broadly. In impaired driving cases, restraint is particularly relevant where the offender has no prior record, has taken steps toward rehabilitation, and poses a low risk to public safety.

Crown's Position and Case Law

[24] The Crown relies on several cases to support its position that a custodial sentence is warranted in Mr. Heslip's case. These include R. v. Akilan, 2020 ONCJ (unreported, dated August 13, 2020); R. v. Wang, 2019 ONCJ (unreported, dated February 1, 2019); R. v. Sivanadi, 2017 ONSC 5740; and R. v. Patel, 2017 ONCJ 728. While these cases involve impaired driving with aggravating features such as high blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) and dangerous driving, they are materially distinguishable from this case in both factual and rehabilitative dimensions.

[25] In R. v. Akilan, the offender drove into a snowbank during a snowstorm, obstructing a live lane of traffic on Highway 401. His BAC was estimated to be between 160 and 235 mg, and he had his pregnant wife in the vehicle. Although he had no prior record and was considered to have strong rehabilitative prospects, the Court emphasized the danger posed to others and imposed a 30-day intermittent jail sentence with probation and a driving prohibition. Unlike Mr. Akilan, Mr. Heslip was alone in the vehicle. He has demonstrated a more extensive and sustained rehabilitative trajectory, including completion of a residential treatment program and ongoing aftercare with verified sobriety.

[26] In R. v. Wang, the offender drove over a curb and struck unoccupied road repair machinery, causing significant property damage. His BAC was between 175 and 220 mg, and he had a prior conditional discharge for dangerous driving involving alcohol. The Court found that despite Mr. Wang's post-offence counselling and remorse, a conditional sentence would not adequately serve the goals of deterrence and denunciation and imposed a 21-day intermittent jail sentence. Mr. Heslip, by contrast, has no prior criminal record, and his rehabilitative efforts—documented through a two-year aftercare program and consistent negative testing—are more robust and sustained than those in Wang.

[27] R. v. Sivanadi involved an offender who drove erratically with his wife and two young children in the vehicle, straddling lanes and running a red light. His BAC was 190 mg, and although there was no collision, the presence of vulnerable passengers and the risk posed to them were significant aggravating factors. The Court imposed a 30-day intermittent sentence. Mr. Heslip's case lacks such aggravating features: he was alone in the vehicle, and while his BAC was high, it was not accompanied by the same degree of erratic driving or endangerment to others.

[28] Finally, in R. v. Patel, the offender passed out at the wheel with his elderly parents in the car. His BAC was between 330 and 375 mg, placing him near the toxic range. He exhibited gross signs of impairment, including falling out of the police car and being unable to stand. The Court emphasized the extraordinary level of impairment and imposed a 45-day jail sentence. Mr. Heslip's BAC, while significantly elevated, was lower than Mr. Patel's, and he did not exhibit comparable physical symptoms of impairment. Moreover, Mr. Patel had not yet engaged in meaningful treatment, whereas Mr. Heslip has completed a residential program and maintained sobriety for over two years.

[29] These cases underscore that while impaired driving with a high BAC and property damage is serious, sentencing must remain individualized. As the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized in Lacasse, proportionality is the "cardinal principle" of sentencing, requiring that the sentence reflect both the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. Mr. Heslip's demonstrated rehabilitation, lack of prior record, and strong community support distinguish his case from the Crown's authorities and support the imposition of a non-custodial sentence.

Defence's Position and Case Law

[30] The Defence relied on several cases that involved an unsuccessful section 12 Charter challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Criminal Code in support of a non-custodial sentence, specifically an elevated fine and a driving prohibition.

[31] The decisions in R. v. Luke, 2021 O.J. No. 3068, R. v. Pashagumskum-Smoke, 2020 O.J. No. 5921 and R. v. Sabattis, 2020 O.J. No. 2081, collectively demonstrate a consistent judicial approach that disfavors custodial sentences for first-time impaired driving offenders, particularly where significant mitigating factors are present.

[32] In R. v. Luke, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court overturned a conditional discharge granted by the trial judge but did not impose a custodial sentence. Instead, the court substituted the mandatory minimum sentence of a $1,000 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition. The accused was a first-time offender with a high BAC and a single-vehicle crash. The appellate court emphasized that while the sentencing judge erred by underemphasizing deterrence and overemphasizing rehabilitation, the appropriate sentence remained non-custodial. The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the offence, including high blood alcohol readings and dangerous driving, but found that the minimum statutory sentence of a fine and driving prohibition was sufficient to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

[33] In R. v. Pashagumskum-Smoke, the Court similarly declined to impose custody despite the offender's extremely high BAC (280 mg%) and a single-vehicle collision with a retaining wall. The Court found that a conditional discharge would have been a just sentence but was precluded by the mandatory minimum sentence under section 255(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code. The judge concluded that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and, therefore, did not violate section 12 of the Charter. The sentence imposed was a $1,000 fine and a driving prohibition, reflecting the Court's view that rehabilitation and restorative justice principles—especially in light of the offender's Indigenous background and successful completion of treatment—were better served without incarceration.

[34] In R. v. Sabattis, the Court conducted an extensive analysis of both section 12 and section 15 Charter challenges to the mandatory minimum sentence. The offender, a young Indigenous woman with no prior record, was convicted of impaired driving and "over 80" with BAC readings of 210 and 230 mg. She drove into a ditch while significantly impaired and lost consciousness. The Court found that although a conditional discharge would have been a fit sentence, the mandatory minimum precluded it. Nonetheless, the judge imposed a non-custodial sentence: a $1,200 fine, a 15-month driving prohibition, and two years of probation with alcohol counselling. The Court emphasized that impaired driving is a serious offence, but also recognized the mitigating impact of Gladue factors, including intergenerational trauma and systemic disadvantage. The judge concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence was harsh but not grossly disproportionate, and that incarceration was not necessary to achieve sentencing objectives. The Court noted that the public interest is not served by incarceration where rehabilitation is demonstrably underway.

[35] Across all three cases, the courts consistently found that custodial sentences were not warranted for first-time offenders who demonstrated rehabilitative potential, had no prior criminal record, and whose offences, while serious, did not result in bodily harm. The decisions reflect a careful balancing of denunciation and deterrence with restorative justice and rehabilitation, particularly in the context of Indigenous offenders. These cases affirm that the mandatory minimum fine and driving prohibition are generally sufficient to address the gravity of impaired driving offences in such circumstances, and that custody should be reserved for more egregious or repeat offences.

[36] However, an elevated fine would not be appropriate in Mr. Heslip's case because it would fail to adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence and the principles of sentencing outlined in the Criminal Code. Mr. Heslip's conduct involved extremely high blood alcohol levels—over four times the legal limit—and dangerous driving that resulted in significant property damage. These aggravating factors demand a sentencing response that emphasizes denunciation and general deterrence, which a fine alone cannot achieve. Moreover, fines do not carry the same symbolic weight or rehabilitative structure as a conditional sentence, especially in cases involving public safety risks.

Conditional Sentence Framework

[37] Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code permits a conditional sentence where:

(1) The sentence is less than two years' imprisonment.

(2) The offender does not pose a danger to the community.

(3) The offence does not carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

(4) The offence is not excluded under s. 742.1(c) or (d) of the Criminal Code.

[38] These criteria are met. The Crown is not seeking a sentence of more than two years' imprisonment. Mr. Heslip's offence does not carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and he poses no ongoing risk. The pre-sentence report confirms his suitability for community supervision.

[39] In R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, the Supreme Court emphasized that conditional sentences are a form of imprisonment and can serve as a means of denunciation and deterrence when combined with appropriate conditions.

[40] The idea that a conditional sentence can still serve as a means of denunciation and deterrence was recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Habib, [2024] O.J. No. 5090, in footnote #3, as follows:

In contrast, courts are reluctant to sentence young adults who did not commit a serious crime involving significant personal violence to prison for their first criminal offence. Because these offences do not pose the same grave public safety threat as serious crimes involving significant personal violence, general deterrence "play[s] little, if any, role" (Thurairajah, at para. 41) and the role of denunciation is also limited. See R. v. Lawrence (2005), 197 O.A.C. 364 (C.A.), at para. 3. A suspended sentence and probation, a conditional sentence, or a very short prison term followed by probation best achieve rehabilitation and specific deterrence in these cases. See R. v. Priest (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 538 (C.A.), at pp. 543-544; R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, 87 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 55-60.

[41] In R. v. Sharma, the Supreme Court struck down legislative restrictions on conditional sentences, reaffirming the importance of individualized sentencing and the principle of restraint. The Court emphasized that conditional sentences remain a vital tool for achieving proportionality and rehabilitation.

Conclusion

[42] The Crown is correct that impaired driving is a serious offence that often warrants custodial sentences. However, sentencing must be individualized and proportionate to the offence.

[43] In my view, Mr. Heslip's case is not one where incarceration is necessary to achieve the sentencing objectives. He has already experienced significant consequences: loss of his vehicle, financial hardship, and the stigma of conviction. He has accepted full responsibility and made meaningful changes.

[44] However, imposing a high fine would not accurately reflect the seriousness of Mr. Heslip's driving behaviour and his exceptionally high readings. Relying solely on a fine in such circumstances would fail to adhere to the fundamental sentencing principles for impaired driving offences.

[45] A conditional sentence will allow Mr. Heslip to continue his rehabilitation while serving a sentence that reflects the seriousness of his offence. He has completed a residential treatment program, maintained sobriety for over two years, and continues to participate in a structured aftercare program. The pre-sentence report confirms his low risk of reoffending and recommends community supervision. It will also serve as a warning to others that impaired driving carries serious consequences, even when no one is injured. It also aligns with the principle of restraint, avoiding unnecessary incarceration for a first-time offender who has demonstrated genuine remorse and a genuine desire for change.

The Sentence Imposed

(A) Conditional Sentence Order

A Conditional Sentence Order will be for two months (60 days). There are the following five statutory conditions:

(1) Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

(2) Appear before the court when required to do so.

(3) Report as the Court directs (see Reporting in the Additional Conditions) in person to a supervisor and thereafter report when required by the supervisor and in a manner directed by the supervisor.

(4) Remain in Ontario unless you have prior written permission from the Court or the supervisor to leave the province.

(5) Notify the court or supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation.

(B) Reporting

Report to a supervisor immediately, and after that, at all times and places as directed by the supervisor or any person authorized by a supervisor to assist you in your supervision.

(C) Home Confinement

For the first month of the Order, you will be confined to your home except:

(1) Between noon and 3 pm on Saturdays to acquire the necessities of life.

(2) For any medical emergencies involving you or any member of your immediate family.

(3) For going directly to and from or being at employment, religious services and legal, medical or dental appointments.

(4) You will confirm your schedule in advance with the supervisor, setting out the times for these activities.

(5) With the prior written approval of the supervisor. The written approval is to be carried with you during these times.

(D) Verification of Compliance

You must present yourself at your doorway upon the request of your supervisor or a peace officer to verify your compliance with your home confinement condition.

[46] Pursuant to s. 320.24(2) of the Criminal Code, you will be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place anywhere in Canada for 18 months. This order is separate from any driver's licence suspension that will be imposed under the Highway Traffic Act.

[47] Given Mr. Heslip's sustained and well-documented rehabilitation, a probation order with a condition to attend alcohol counselling is unnecessary and would be redundant. The pre-sentence report confirms that Mr. Heslip has completed a 30-day residential treatment program, has remained sober for over two years, and continues to participate in a structured two-year aftercare program involving regular urine and breath testing—all of which have returned negative results. He has demonstrated insight into his addiction. Where an offender has already completed extensive treatment and demonstrated a low risk of reoffending, sentencing conditions should not be imposed for their own sake but must be necessary and proportionate. In Proulx, the Supreme Court cautioned against duplicative or unnecessary conditions that do not serve a rehabilitative or protective function. Considering Mr. Heslip's progress and ongoing accountability, further mandated counselling through probation would not enhance public safety or rehabilitation and would risk undermining the principle of restraint.

[48] Mr. Heslip, I will give you one year to pay the victim fine surcharge.

[49] This sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence while recognizing Mr. Heslip's significant rehabilitative progress. It balances the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and is consistent with the jurisprudence and the objectives of the Criminal Code.

Released: August 27, 2025

Signed: Justice P.T. O'Marra