David Cowling

The appellant appealed the property tax assessment of a 65-unit multi-residential property for the 2017 to 2022 taxation years.

The parties agreed to use the income approach but disputed the potential gross income and the capitalization rate.

The Assessment Review Board determined the potential gross income by substituting market rents for subsidized units and established a capitalization rate of 7.16% based on comparable properties.

The Board concluded the current value of the property was $10,409,916, which was reduced to $9,577,000 after applying an agreed 8% equitable adjustment, resulting in a reduction from the returned assessment of $9,970,000.

The appellant appealed the property tax assessment of a 113-unit multi-residential rental building in Kingston for the 2017 to 2021 taxation years.

The parties agreed that the income approach was the best method for determining the current value, but disagreed on the appropriate capitalization rate and whether the direct comparison approach should be used as a check.

The Assessment Review Board rejected the direct comparison approach due to a lack of similar comparable properties.

After analyzing the comparable sales provided by both experts, the Board determined a base capitalization rate of 5.89%, resulting in an overall capitalization rate of 7.16% and a current value of $20,103,701.

The Board further found that an equitable reduction was required based on the assessment to sales ratio of similar properties, reducing the final assessed value to $18,500,000.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought a motion for an order declaring that the appellant failed to comply with Rule 43 of the Assessment Review Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, and that equity of the assessments was not a live issue for the hearing.

The Board found that the appellant's Statement of Issues did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 43.

However, the Board declined to declare that equity was not a live issue, noting its statutory duty under section 44(3)(b) of the Assessment Act to consider equitable assessment.

The Board found that MPAC and the City had sufficient notice of the appellant's position through an expert report, mitigating any prejudice, and allowed equity to be raised at the hearing.

The respondents brought motions to strike the appellant's Amended Statement of Issues and Reply, arguing it was served past the deadline set out in the Schedule of Events.

The Assessment Review Board found that its rules do not provide for striking pleadings.

However, because the appellant failed to establish exceptional circumstances for missing the deadline to serve its Amended Statement of Issues, it cannot raise any new issues at the hearing that were not in its original Statement of Issues or its Amended Reply.

The Amended Reply was served on time and may be relied upon.

The respondents (MPAC and the City of Cambridge) brought a motion for disclosure of documents related to the appellant Toyota's excess capital and operating cost calculations for its Cambridge plant.

Toyota opposed the motion, arguing it was premature as the information would be in forthcoming expert reports, that the requests lacked specificity, and that it had already disclosed significant material.

The Assessment Review Board granted the motion, finding that relevance is the primary consideration and that Toyota has an ongoing obligation to disclose relevant documents in its possession.

The Board ordered production of the requested documents, except for a third-party expert report prepared for General Motors, which requires notice to GM.

The appellant appealed the property assessments for his property for the 2017, 2018, and 2019 taxation years.

He did not challenge the valuation but argued he was exempt from taxation based on constitutional and pseudolegal grounds, claiming he was not a 'person' under the Assessment Act.

The Assessment Review Board identified the appellant as an Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigant whose arguments were nonsensical and vexatious.

The Board dismissed the appeals as an abuse of process.

In a property assessment appeal, the municipal assessment corporation proposed that its representative, an unlicensed property assessor, also testify as a witness.

The appellants objected, arguing that only licensed paralegals could perform this dual role under the Board's Rules.

The Assessment Review Board held that its Rules do not prohibit an unlicensed representative from acting as both an advocate and a witness.

The Board found that the specific rule permitting paralegals to perform the dual role was enacted to satisfy the Law Society's Paralegal Rules of Conduct, not to restrict unlicensed representatives who are otherwise permitted to appear.

MPAC brought a motion to determine whether an unlicensed representative, specifically an MPAC property assessor, could act as both an advocate and a witness in a summary proceeding before the Assessment Review Board.

The respondents objected, arguing that only licensed paralegals were permitted to perform this dual role under the Board's Rules.

The Board found that its Rules, the Law Society Act, and By-Law 4 do not expressly prohibit an unlicensed representative from acting as both a representative and a witness.

The Board concluded that an unlicensed representative may perform the dual role, declining to follow a previous Board decision to the contrary.

The applicant filed two human rights applications against the respondents.

While the first application was under reserve following a hearing, the parties settled the second application and signed Minutes of Settlement containing a broad release.

The respondents argued the release settled both applications, while the applicant argued it only applied to the second.

The Tribunal found the release language was unambiguous and, applying principles of contract interpretation, concluded that the broad 'any and all applications' language covered the first application, which was outstanding at the time the settlement was signed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment.

Subsequently, the applicant was terminated and commenced a civil action seeking damages for wrongful dismissal, including general damages under the Human Rights Code.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal dismiss the application under section 34(11) of the Code.

The Tribunal found that the civil claim encompassed the same factual allegations of harassment and failure to accommodate as the application, and sought Code remedies.

As section 34(11) is mandatory, the Tribunal dismissed the application to prevent duplicative litigation.

The moving party brought a motion to strike portions of a Notice of Appeal and factums filed by a public complainant and the intervener.

The impugned portions alleged breaches of natural justice and prosecutorial incompetence during a police disciplinary hearing.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the motion, finding that it lacked the statutory authority under the Police Services Act or the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to strike pleadings that are clearly connected to the central issue of whether misconduct was proved on clear and convincing evidence.

The applicant alleged reprisal under the Human Rights Code, claiming he was assaulted by police officers.

The respondent sought to rely on a prior Police Services Act disciplinary judgment that cleared one of the officers of using excessive force, arguing issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The Tribunal held that while the judgment was admissible and not barred by s. 83(8) of the PSA, the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process did not apply to prevent the applicant from litigating the excessive force allegations, following the Supreme Court's decision in Penner.

In an ongoing human rights hearing, the Tribunal addressed several interim issues raised by the parties.

The Tribunal ruled that the applicant was not required to provide further particulars or link his evidence to specific Code breaches prior to final argument, as his direct evidence was already complete.

The Tribunal deferred ruling on the admissibility of the respondents' revised will says regarding a use of force training incident until after hearing from specific witnesses.

Finally, the Tribunal noted the respondents' position that they did not dispute the applicant's medical expert's qualifications or the correctness of his information, but maintained the information was insufficient to return the applicant's use of force.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of discreditable conduct and a penalty of demotion imposed by a Hearing Officer.

The appellant argued that the Hearing Officer was biased, the prosecutor was unfair, and that it was fundamentally unfair to proceed with the hearing in his absence while he was on long-term disability.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias or prosecutorial unfairness.

The Commission held that the Hearing Officer was legally correct to request medical information to substantiate the need for further adjournments and acted reasonably in proceeding in the appellant's absence after numerous delays and a persistent lack of cooperation.

The penalty of demotion was upheld as reasonable.

The appellant, a public complainant, appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding two respondent police officers not guilty of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority.

The appellant alleged prosecutorial misconduct, Hearing Officer bias, and errors in findings of fact and credibility.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, noting the appellant waived his right to allege bias by not raising it during the hearing, and concluding the Hearing Officer's factual findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant brought a motion to adduce new evidence on appeal, specifically transcripts from his criminal trial, and requested that the respondent police service acquire and provide them.

The appellant had previously declined to obtain or use the transcripts during the disciplinary hearing.

Applying the Palmer test, the Commission found that the evidence could have been adduced at the hearing with due diligence.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, a police sergeant, brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on his appeal of a discreditable conduct finding and demotion penalty.

The appellant argued the evidence, though chronologically available at the time of the hearing, was functionally unavailable because he was on long-term disability and did not participate.

The Commission applied the Palmer test and dismissed the motion, finding the first branch was not met because the evidence could have been adduced at the hearing.

The issue of whether the hearing officer erred in proceeding in the appellant's absence was deferred to the main appeal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging employment discrimination based on disability.

After retaining counsel, the applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings seeking leave to amend the Application to add further particulars.

The respondents did not respond to the request.

The Tribunal granted the request to amend, noting that the hearing date had not yet been set and the timing did not raise issues of unfairness to the respondents.

The applicant, a student who was suspended for fighting and bullying, brought an application alleging racial discrimination.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed several preliminary matters.

The Tribunal ordered the school board to produce redacted disciplinary records for students at the applicant's high school who were disciplined for fighting or bullying during the relevant school year.

The Tribunal also permitted the applicant's expert to testify regarding the disproportionate application of discipline to racialized students.

The Tribunal removed the individual school administrators as personal respondents, finding no compelling reason to continue against them since the school board accepted vicarious liability.

Finally, the Tribunal ruled that new allegations regarding the failure to provide homework were beyond the scope of the original complaint.

The applicant union breached a settlement agreement by paying a $1,000 photocopying fee late.

The responding employers sought to have the applications dismissed as a consequence of the breach, and requested that the Board consider representations made during the mediation process.

The Board panel, having mediated the settlement, decided to recuse itself from determining the consequences of the breach, as it would be inappropriate for the panel to hear evidence regarding confidential mediation communications.

The matter was referred to the Registrar to assign a different panel to hear the employers' request for dismissal.