Paul Kuleba v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2019 CanLII 47986

Assessment Review Board

Commission de révision de l’évaluation foncière

ISSUE DATE: May 22, 2019

FILE NO.: WR 160349

Assessed Person(s): Paul Michael Kuleba

Appellant(s): Paul Kuleba

Respondent(s): Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) Region 13

Respondent(s): Town of Ajax

Property Location(s): 836 Finley Avenue

Municipality(ies): Town of Ajax

Roll Number(s): 1805-040-007-11206-0000

Appeal Number(s): 3274167, 3300962 and 3355449

Taxation Year(s): 2017, 2018 and 2019

Hearing Event No.: 713275

Legislative Authority: Section 40 of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31, as amended

Heard: April 30, 2019 in Ajax, Ontario

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Counsel⁺/Representative

Paul Michael Kuleba

Self-represented

MPAC

David Cowling⁺ and Mattison Chinneck⁺

Town of Ajax

No one appeared

DECISION OF THE BOARD DELIVERED BY SCOTT McANSH

1Paul Michael Kuleba has appealed the assessments of the property he owns at 836 Finley Avenue in the Town of Ajax for the 2017, 2018, and 2019 taxation years to this Assessment Review Board (this “Board”). His sole ground of appeal is that he should not be placed on the assessment roll for a variety of nonsensical reasons. He has not challenged the value of MPAC’s returned assessments of $375,000 for those taxation years. MPAC filed valuation evidence for this hearing, recommending that the assessment be reduced to $295,000 for those taxation years, but MPAC is not seeking to have that lower value imposed. It is seeking to have the appeals dismissed due to the manner in which Mr. Kuleba has litigated the appeals.

2Mr. Kuleba’s arguments are stereotypical of a class of litigants known as Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Argument (“OPCA”) litigants. His materials relied on obscure and irrelevant legal instruments, he used motifs for naming that are common for OPCA litigants, he behaved oddly in the hearing room, and he did not provide any coherent argument for his position. The Ontario Courts have been clear that OPCA litigant arguments should not be seriously considered, because the entire purpose of the tactics is to abuse the judicial process.

3I find that when a party engages in OPCA conduct before this Board, as Mr. Kuleba has done here, the appropriate response is to dismiss the appeal as an abuse of process. Mr. Kuleba’s appeals are dismissed.

Background

4Mr. Kuleba appealed the 2017 assessment of the property on the basis that the assessment was too high. Sometime later he confirmed that the only issue in dispute was his alleged constitutional right to be free from taxation. He was advised of the requirement, set out in section 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, that notice “be served on the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario” if a constitutional argument is to be made at a hearing. Subsection 106(6) is clear that the requirement to serve notice applies to administrative tribunals, such as this Board. He did not serve the required notice.

5At the first hearing scheduled to hear these appeals, MPAC filed written material arguing that the Board did not have the jurisdiction to hear Mr. Kuleba’s constitutional arguments because he had not served the required notice. That hearing was adjourned and before the second hearing MPAC served both Attorney Generals with the required notice and both said they would not be appearing.

6Mr. Kuleba’s arguments are difficult to make sense of. He seems to argue that MPAC has no authority to assess his property because he has not agreed to have it assessed. However, the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31 (the “Act”), which he appealed under, sets out MPAC’s obligation to assess all property in Ontario. He also argues that he is not a person, but appeared at the hearing in corporeal form. That is, all of his arguments were legal nonsense. He also made those arguments in a ritualistic and forceful way.

Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Argument Litigants

7Mr. Kuleba is not the first person to argue that they should be exempt from taxation using ritualistic, and nonsensical, arguments. These arguments have been common in the courts for some time, and were summarized and described as OPCA tactics by Associate Chief Justice Rooke of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571. As Justice Rooke noted, at paragraph 4, “OPCA litigants do not express any stereotypic beliefs other than a general rejection of court and state authority… they will only honour state, regulatory, contract, family, fiduciary, equitable, and criminal obligations if they feel like it. And typically, they don’t.”

8People who engage in these tactics have generally learned them from others, usually for a fee. That is the sense in which these tactics are organized. There are people actively spreading these useless tactics to others for profit. Meads v Meads provides a useful description of some the more prominent Canadian gurus of OPCA tactics. It is not clear who Mr. Kuleba learned these tactics from. He was accompanied at the hearing by a man, who would only identify himself as “Chris”, who may have been his teacher. Mr. Kulbea referred to Chris as his “human rights advisor.” But their relationship was far from clear. What is clear is that Mr. Kuleba is engaged in OPCA litigation tactics.

9Meads v Meads sets out a number indicia of OPCA litigants, to help with their identification. Mr. Kuleba exhibits many of those traits, and generally presents as a classical OPCA litigant.

10The first indicia set out by Justice Rooke, starting at paragraph 206, is name motifs in written materials. OPCA litigants use odd formatting in their own name in material that they file. This includes the use of colons and dashes, as well as pharses like “of the family.” In this case, Mr. Kuleba put his name as “Paul-Michael (Family name: Kuleba),” a styling in line with OPCA techniques. Justice Rooke noted, at paragraph 206 that any “litigant who uses this ‘dash colon’ motif almost certainly has some kind of OPCA background or affiliation.”

11Another name motif is to split the person into two entities, one that is in all capital letters and another that is not. This split personhood was Mr. Kuleba’s main position in this hearing. He claimed to be the “the sole Administrator and sole Benefactor for the account name ‘PAUL MICHAEL KULEBA’” in emails and made statements to that effect at the hearing. Justice Rooke described the dual person tactic at paragraph 212 of Meads v Meads: “the capital letter version of the name is some kind of non-human thing, while the lower case name is the ‘flesh and blood’ aspect of the litigant.” That is how Mr. Kuleba framed his submissions. That is not a logical argument, but is a strong indication that he is an OPCA litigant.

12Justice Rooke states, at paragraph 222, that identification “that a municipality, province, or Canada is a corporation is a clear indication of OPCA affiliation.” Mr. Kuleba mentioned the corporate nature of municipalities in a letter sent to this Board.

13Another indication that Mr. Kuleba is an OPCA litigant is the terms he uses. Justice Rooke set out, at paragraph 221, a list of common terms used by these litigants. Mr. Kuleba has used variations of the terms “flesh and blood man”, “natural born person”, and “subject only to common law.” Meads v Meads is clear that “most of these items are strong indicia.”

14Another indication that a party is an OPCA litigant is a reference to “certain obsolete, foreign, or typically otherwise irrelevant legislation,” paragraph 228. Meads v Meads sets out a list of common legislation and Mr. Kuleba relied on the Canadian Bill of Rights from that list. He also relied on the Interpretations Act of Canada, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 16, both of which have no application here. He also pled the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which could have application. He did not, however, frame a coherent constitutional argument.

15Mr. Kuleba handed up one document at the hearing: his birth certificate. Meads v Meads notes, at paragraph 220, that a “person’s birth certificate is a focus of certain OPCA schemes.” Mr. Kuleba’s birth certificate was a central part of his litigation strategy before me. That is a strong indication that he is an OPCA litigant.

16Meads v Meads sets out hearing room conduct that also indicates someone may be an OPCA litigant. First, they make demands, such as seeing the decision maker’s oath of office, see paragraph 243. Mr. Kuleba demanded my oath and proof of my status as a Member of this Board at the hearing. He also demanded proof that MPAC had authority to assess land. His most persistent demand at the hearing was that I confirm that this Board has “inherent jurisdiction.” I could not do so, given the statutory nature of this Board, but he persisted in his demand for that confirmation. In fact, he would not approach the counsel table until I stated that the Board had inherent jurisdiction. Given that only the superior courts have inherent jurisdiction, I could not say this Board had that power. Mr. Kuleba therefore remained at the back of the room throughout the hearing.

17“Another common motif is that an OPCA litigant will engage in various peculiar comments that relate to names and identification,” paragraph 245. Mr. Kuleba would not respond to “Mr. Kuleba” at the hearing, insisting that he was “Paul” and that Mr. Kuleba was a corporate entity that he managed and not his name. This dual aspect argument is a common OPCA tactic and has no effect in Canadian law. Paul Kuleba is a unified legal entity.

18A denial of tribunal authority is also common, see paragraph 248. Mr. Kuleba questioned my standing as a Member, and confused the Board’s role in the common law framework of Ontario, but did not directly deny that the Board had authority. He did insist that the common law was some kind of special status, which is an indication of OPCA litigation.

19A strong sign of Mr. Kuleba’s OPCA strategy was his refusal to approach the counsel table. In Meads v Meads this was framed, at paragraph 249, as “a refusal to pass the bar:” The council chamber in which this hearing was held did not have a bar per se, but there was a point in the room which Mr. Kuleba stated he would only pass if I confirmed the Board’s inherent jurisdiction. He never did approach the counsel table and made his limited submissions from the back of the room.

20There are some Meads v Meads indicia that are not present here, including strange formatting of documents, set out starting at paragraph 214, and atypical mailing addresses, set out starting at paragraph 231. But Mr. Kuleba shows so many traits of OPCA litigation that I can only conclude that he is engaged in those tactics. Those tactics are designed to complicate and “break” judicial and quasi-judicial processes. They are therefore vexatious strategies, brought in bad faith. They are not meaningful arguments about the issues under appeal.

21I believe it is important to note that “an OPCA litigant in court is likely operating under instructions obtained from a commercial source, and has been told to conduct and frame his or her court activities in an unnatural, incorrect, and distorted context,” Meads v Meads, at paragraph 167. That is, Mr. Kuleba may believe that his conduct will lead to tax relief and that if he follows a scripted routine he will get his desired outcome. His conduct is not a clear indication that his thinking is fundamentally disordered. I can only say that his legal submissions are nonsensical. Justice Rooke aptly described Mr. Kuleba’s conduct when he said, at paragraph 80, that: “OPCA litigants appear, engage in a court drama that is more akin to a magic spell ritual than an actual legal proceeding, and wait to see if the court is entranced and compliant.” I am not entranced by Mr. Kuleba’s nonsensical arguments.

22I will briefly address those arguments. He made essentially two arguments. First, that he was exempt from taxation on a constitutional basis, and secondly that he was exempt from taxation because he is not a person, as defined in the Act.

23His constitutional argument turned, as best as I can tell, on both a split person tactic and a contract theory of government action, both of which are common OPCA arguments. He says that he is not the person on the assessment roll, but the administrator of that account. I do not fully understand what is meant by that. He also says that MPAC does not have the authority to assess his property, effectively because he didn’t agree to being assessed. MPAC has the clear authority to assess all land in Ontario, set out in the Act. So that argument also has no merit.

24His person argument was based on the definition of person in section 1 of the Act: “’person’ includes a corporation, partnership, bridge authority, agent or trustee, and the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of a person to whom the context can apply according to law.” He says that he is a natural person, which is not listed in the definition and that only persons are liable to assessment. This is a common “detaxer” argument and was thoroughly reviewed in Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123, in the context of the Income Tax Act. Master Schulz held, at paragraph 61, that “the idea that a ‘person’ is only a corporation and not a human being is one of the oldest Detaxer OPCA motifs. In every case, Canadian courts have said the same thing. Human beings are persons…” That is also true here.

25The word “includes” expands the definition beyond its common meaning. The common meaning of “person” is a human being, which could also be called a natural person. It is defined to include other things, but certainly includes Mr. Kuleba, who appeared at the hearing in person.

Response to OPCA Litigants

26The courts have been clear that the arguments put forward by OPCA litigants should not be considered on their merits. They are plainly wrong, and largely nonsense, so any time spent on those arguments is wasted adjudicator time. Time spent on OPCA arguments is time that is taken away from more serious claims. As noted by Justice Myers in Jarvis v Morlog, 2016 ONSC 4476, at paragraph 3, “not another moment of judicial resources or party expense should be invested on OPCA claims. They should be summarily nipped in the bud with reference to Meads v. Meads and no more.” That is the appropriate remedy, once an OPCA litigant has been identified. OPCA claims should be dismissed as an abuse of process.

27This Board has the power to dismiss claims as an abuse of process, both in subsection 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, and Rule 24(b) of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, which permits dismissal of an appeal if “the Board is of the opinion that the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious, is commenced in bad faith or only for the purpose of delay.” Mr. Kuleba’s OPCA action, like all OPCA actions, is vexatious and was brought in bad faith. I therefore dismiss the appeals.

28I would add that Rule 24(b) permits dismissal without a hearing. It would be entirely appropriate to dismiss an appeal if the filed material shows that the appellant is an OPCA litigant. The Board held a hearing here, but there is no requirement to do so with OPCA litigants.

CONCLUSION

29Mr. Kuleba is an OPCA litigant engaged in vexatious conduct made in bad faith. This Board should not tolerate that type of litigation. His appeals are dismissed.