David L. Corbett

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim arising from an alleged oral land development partnership.

The plaintiff alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and sought rescission and return of capital contributions after withdrawing from the partnership before completion of the project.

The court held that the motion could not be determined on summary judgment because the key issues—including alleged misrepresentations, disclosure obligations between partners, the terms of the plaintiff’s withdrawal, and limitation issues—turned largely on credibility and disputed factual narratives.

Applying the “full appreciation” test for summary judgment, the court concluded that the evidence required the trial process.

The motion was dismissed and the matter directed to trial.

The plaintiff sought damages arising from a motor vehicle collision in which liability was admitted.

A jury assessed general damages at $35,000 but awarded nothing for competitive disadvantage or handyman services.

The trial judge was required to determine whether the claim met the statutory threshold under s.267.5 of the Insurance Act for recovery of non‑pecuniary damages.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that his ongoing symptoms were caused by the collision, given significant prior back injuries and more persuasive defence expert evidence.

In any event, the alleged impairments did not amount to a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The action was dismissed for failure to meet the statutory threshold.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking remedies under a mortgage relating to a motel business, alleging the mortgagor breached a restriction on transferring interests by entering into a trust agreement transferring shares to a new spouse.

The defendants argued the trust agreement did not constitute a default, that it was signed under duress, and that the plaintiff knew of and consented to it.

Additional issues arose concerning whether the mortgage provision restricting transfers to a new spouse was contrary to public policy and whether the interest waiver clause constituted an unenforceable penalty.

The court held that the dispute involved significant factual and credibility issues, including duress, consent, and the surrounding context of the agreements.

As these issues required assessment of witness credibility and the broader factual matrix, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss an application challenging the constitutionality of public funding for Ontario Catholic separate schools.

The applicant argued that such funding violated Charter freedoms and equality rights and sought declarations eliminating or reducing funding for Catholic schools.

The court held that the applicant lacked private interest standing as a taxpayer and declined to grant public interest standing.

Binding Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal jurisprudence confirmed that funding for Catholic separate schools is constitutionally protected under the Constitution Act, 1867 and immune from Charter scrutiny.

The application was dismissed for lack of standing and lack of any reasonable prospect of success.

Unit owners sought an order compelling mediation and arbitration under s.132 of the Condominium Act, 1998 regarding directions issued by the condominium corporation concerning interactions with neighbours, security staff, and board members, and use of common facilities.

The corporation argued the dispute should proceed in court rather than through the Act’s mandatory mediation/arbitration process.

The court held that the impugned directions were minor administrative measures relating to day‑to‑day condominium management and did not give rise to a genuine dispute requiring mediation, arbitration, or litigation.

Applying the de minimis principle, the court concluded the issues were too insignificant to justify legal proceedings.

The application was dismissed with reduced costs payable to the condominium corporation.

A condominium corporation sought a declaration that a developer agreement and related by-law limiting the developer’s liability for construction deficiencies were void and ultra vires under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The impugned agreement limited claims against the developer to those available under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act and had been disclosed to purchasers and registered on title.

The court held that the pre-turnover board had authority to enter into such an agreement and that limiting developer liability in this manner was not inconsistent with the Condominium Act.

The arrangement was part of the commercial framework under which the condominium project was developed and sold, and purchasers had notice of the limitation.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.

The plaintiffs sought an extension of time to serve a statement of claim on a contractor nearly nine years after the action was commenced, and the defendants moved to dismiss the entire action for delay.

The court found the plaintiffs’ efforts to locate and serve the contractor were lackadaisical and that significant prejudice resulted from the lengthy delay, including loss of records, faded memory, and the death of a witness.

Accordingly, the court refused to extend time for service on that defendant.

However, although the court found a period of “inexcusable delay” in prosecuting the action, it held that the remaining defendants had not demonstrated prejudice sufficient to create a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The motion to dismiss the entire action for delay was therefore refused.