Daniel Gregg Hamson

The plaintiff was wholly successful on an interim injunction motion and sought partial indemnity costs of $79,836.56.

The plaintiff argued costs should be awarded immediately as there might not be a trial, while the defendants argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court exercised its discretion to order costs in the cause, noting it is the preferable course for interlocutory injunctions, but allowed the parties to return for a costs determination if no trial is held within 18 months.

The appellant franchisors appealed a decision allowing the respondent franchisees to rescind their franchise agreement due to a materially deficient franchise disclosure document (FDD).

The appellants argued the application judge erred by applying an objective test rather than requiring subjective evidence that the deficiencies impaired the franchisees' ability to make an informed decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the test for rescission under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act is objective.

The court upheld the findings that the failure to include financial statement notes, head lease details, and the fact that this was the first non-mall location constituted material non-disclosure.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and fixed the costs of the motion at $5,000, with the determination of entitlement reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicants sought the appointment of a new arbitrator for a second arbitration concerning franchise agreements, while the respondents sought to re-appoint the arbitrator from the first arbitration.

The applicants objected on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the arbitrator had made adverse credibility findings against them in the first proceeding.

The respondents argued the original arbitrator was best positioned to determine if the new claims were res judicata.

The court declined to appoint the original arbitrator, finding that relying on his private notes from the first arbitration would violate deliberative secrecy and that the interpretation of his prior award must be done objectively by a new decision-maker.

The court appointed a retired judge as the new arbitrator.

A law firm, Teplitsky Colson, and its lawyer, Stephen Brunswick, brought a motion to be removed as lawyers of record for the plaintiff, Corey Libfeld, citing an irreparable breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The firm argued that the plaintiff failed to provide instructions, made accusations of scheming and fiduciary duty violations, and threatened legal action.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting no irreparable breakdown existed and that the firm continued to act on other matters.

The court found that the firm had demonstrated good and justifiable cause for removal, noting the severe deterioration of trust and communication, and granted the motion, dismissing the plaintiff's opposition.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $4,500 to the responding party.

Following their successful motion for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant from terminating their franchise business, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $115,500.

The defendant argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge or reduced by half.

The court rejected reserving costs, noting the action was at an early stage.

Noting the importance of the issues and the defendant's failure to provide its own costs outline for comparison, the court fixed costs payable to the plaintiffs at $95,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiffs, a franchisee and its principal, moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant franchisor from terminating their franchise agreement pending trial.

The franchisor had issued a notice of termination alleging numerous breaches of health and safety standards following intensive inspections.

The plaintiffs argued the franchisor breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing under the Arthur Wishart Act and common law by enforcing standards with unreasonable severity to appropriate the profitable business.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm in the potential destruction of the business, and the balance of convenience favouring the plaintiffs.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiff franchisor sought an interlocutory injunction to enforce restrictive covenants against the defendant franchisee, who had purported to terminate the franchise agreement and opened a competing fitness studio.

The dispute arose after the franchisor implemented a direct-to-consumer online fitness program during the COVID-19 pandemic, which the franchisee alleged constituted a fundamental breach.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding fundamental breach, the franchisor failed to establish a strong prima facie case, and the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction given the imminent expiration of the agreement and the potential loss of livelihood for the franchisee's employees.

The franchisee applied to rescind a franchise agreement under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging material deficiencies in the franchisor's disclosure document.

The court found that the franchisor failed to disclose complete financial statements, the absence of a head lease, a negotiated agreement to lease, and the fact that the location was the franchise's first non-mall setting.

These omissions effectively deprived the franchisee of the opportunity to make an informed investment decision, amounting to a failure to provide a disclosure document.

The application was allowed, the rescission was declared valid, and the franchisor and its associate were ordered to pay $306,581 in statutory compensation, with the franchisee's loss of income claim referred to a master.

The plaintiff franchisor requested the immediate scheduling of a motion for injunctive relief on the basis of urgency during the COVID-19 pandemic, which the defendant franchisees opposed.

The court found that the dispute, which centered on unpaid royalty fees and had been ongoing since September 2019, did not meet the criteria for urgent scheduling under the court's COVID-19 notices.

The request for immediate scheduling was denied, and a timetable was set for the motions to be heard at a later date.

The plaintiff franchisee and its officers sought statutory compensation and damages under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, alleging a fatally flawed disclosure certificate.

The defendant franchisor and its principal counterclaimed for wrongful rescission and damages.

The court found the franchisor's disclosure certificate was fatally flawed, entitling the franchisee to rescind the agreement.

The principal was found to be a franchisor's associate, personally liable for statutory compensation.

The counterclaim was dismissed.

The appellants, corporate entities and individual guarantors, appealed summary judgments granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent bank.

The corporate appellants had entered into franchise agreements to operate restaurants with financing provided by the respondent.

After difficulties arose and the franchisees sought to rescind the franchise agreements, they returned the restaurant operations to the franchisor.

The respondent bank demanded repayment of the outstanding financing, alleging events of default including cessation of business.

The motion judge granted summary judgment finding events of default had occurred.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in concluding they had ceased to carry on business, contending their business had merely changed to recovering their franchise investments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the appellants' position lacked business reality and common sense.

The Martin Defendants sought a stay of action against them in favour of arbitration, relying on s.7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that granting a partial stay would unreasonably bifurcate the proceedings because the fourth defendant, TDL Group Corp., was not a party to the arbitration agreements, and all claims arose from closely related facts.

The court dismissed the motion for a partial stay, finding it unreasonable to bifurcate the action and that doing so would lead to a multiplicity of legal proceedings, contrary to the policy reflected in s. 138 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant franchisor appealed a Master's order staying its application for declarations regarding the termination of a franchise agreement.

The Master had concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Saskatchewan was the clearly more appropriate forum.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings regarding the franchisor's regional office in Saskatchewan.

The court also affirmed that the territorial connection to Ontario was weak, as the conduct underlying the dispute occurred in Saskatchewan, where the respondents operated the franchise.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside two partial default judgments obtained by the plaintiff, NRG Lites Inc., arguing the Registrar lacked jurisdiction.

The Master agreed, finding the claim was not for a liquidated demand as it required a legal determination of individual liability for a contract with an alleged non-existent corporation and lacked sufficient particulars.

The Master also criticized the plaintiff's counsel for sharp practice in obtaining default judgments without notice to opposing counsel.

The motion was granted, setting aside the judgments, notings in default, and writs of seizure and sale.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against a corporate franchisee and its personal guarantors for defaulting on a business loan.

The franchisee had surrendered its restaurant to the franchisor and sought to rescind the franchise agreement.

Relying on the reasons in a companion case involving the same franchisor and one of the same guarantors, the court granted summary judgment for the outstanding loan amounts and awarded full indemnity costs.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) moved for summary judgment against Everest Group Inc. and its guarantors (Yousaf Kahn, Zarmina S. Khan, and Shadid Saleem Khawaja) for outstanding business loans.

Everest Group, a franchisee, ceased operations after attempting to rescind its franchise agreement, which RBC deemed an event of default under the loan and security agreements.

The defendants argued that the cessation was due to exercising statutory rescission rights under the Arthur Wishart (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 Act, and should not constitute a default, and sought adjournment pending a third-party claim against the franchisor.

The court granted summary judgment, finding clear events of default based on the loan agreements' terms, including cessation of business and failure to make payments.

The court rejected the defendants' interpretation of the contracts and their argument for forbearance, stating that RBC was objectively reasonable in enforcing its rights.