Danalyn J. MacKinnon

The applicant, Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, sought a protection order for a child, P.W., based on allegations of sexual abuse by the father, L.W., against his older daughter, M.W. The father and Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss Dilico's application, arguing no genuine issue for trial and agency failures in disclosure and consultation.

Dilico also moved to strike portions of an affidavit.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions, finding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding the sexual abuse allegations.

The court also dismissed the First Nation's motion to strike, noting their default in filing an answer.

The matter was directed to proceed to a focused hearing to determine protection findings.

This motion concerned an application by D.A. for custody of or access to a child, A.H., under the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA).

Dilico Anishinabek Family Care, a respondent, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss or strike D.A.'s application.

Dilico argued that D.A. was a foster parent prohibited from bringing such an application under Family Law Rule 7(4), and that there was no genuine issue for trial under Rule 16 because a valid customary care agreement (CCA) was in place, to which the court should defer.

The court dismissed Dilico's motion, finding that D.A. was not a "foster parent" as defined by the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and that Rule 7(4) does not prohibit a foster parent from commencing an application.

Furthermore, the court found the customary care agreements invalid due to lack of proper signatures and First Nation involvement, and that Dilico had acted outside its mandate.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the child's best interests and ordered the CLRA proceeding to continue, staying the customary care agreement.

The applicant father sought to increase his parenting time, which had been temporarily limited.

The respondent mother opposed this, citing allegations of sexual impropriety and procedural issues, and sought to maintain the status quo until trial.

A section 30 assessment by Dr. Horvath did not substantiate the sexual abuse allegations and recommended a gradual increase in the father's parenting time.

The court found that the allegations of sexual abuse were not proven and that delaying parenting changes in high-conflict cases is not always appropriate.

The court ordered a temporary, gradual increase in the father's parenting time, incorporating most of the assessor's recommendations, and set a timetable for trial and costs submissions.

The respondent sought a stay of the applicant's court proceeding, arguing that an Interim Parenting Agreement constituted a binding arbitration agreement requiring disputes to be resolved through mediation/arbitration.

The applicant contended the agreement did not bar her from court.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for a stay, holding that the Interim Parenting Agreement did not comply with the mandatory formal requirements for family arbitration agreements under the Arbitration Act and its Regulation, and that such terms could not be implied.

The applicant father sought a temporary order for primary residential care or an equally shared residential schedule for his nine-year-old son, alleging parental alienation by the respondent mother.

The mother opposed, asserting the child should continue to reside with her due to the child's wishes and fear of the father.

The court found the mother exerted significant influence over the child, supported his negative attitude towards the father, and minimized her own mental health issues.

The court dismissed the mother's allegations of abuse against the father and concluded that it was in the child's best interests to reside with the father temporarily, subject to specific terms for transition, counselling, and limited initial contact with the mother.

The applicant sought leave to bring an urgent ex parte motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on the former matrimonial home, which was solely owned by the respondent and listed for sale.

The applicant, now a former spouse, argued the home could not be listed or sold without his consent and sought a CPL to protect his interest in an equalization of net family property.

The court dismissed the request, finding that spousal rights under sections 18(1) and 21 of the Family Law Act do not extend to former spouses, and a claim for equalization does not establish an interest in land entitling a claimant to a CPL.

The defendant pleaded guilty to stunt driving contrary to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after being detected driving 212 kph in a posted 90 kph zone on Highway 17.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $3,000 fine and 30-day licence suspension.

The court rejected the joint submission as markedly out of line with public expectations and contrary to the public interest, finding the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court imposed a $7,000 fine and a maximum two-year driving suspension, emphasizing the egregious nature of the speeding (122 kph over the limit) on a dangerous two-lane highway and the need for general and specific deterrence.

The defendant was charged with trespassing contrary to section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Trespass to Property Act after being served with a notice of trespass and subsequently travelling on a road that crossed the Bergen property to access his landlocked parcel.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that the defendant had a limited statutory right to use the road as an access road under the Road Access Act, which confers on users of access roads a temporary right to travel to and from their properties without being considered trespassers until a court order closing the road is obtained.

The defendant was acquitted.

This family law trial addressed custody, access, child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property following a contentious separation.

The court found significant credibility issues with both parents, particularly regarding their financial disclosures and conduct impacting the children's relationship with the father.

The court granted sole custody and primary residence to the mother, established a detailed access schedule, imputed income to both parents for support calculations, and ordered an equalization payment and post-separation credits in favour of the mother.

Mortgages unilaterally registered by the father against the matrimonial home were set aside, and both properties were ordered sold.

Lump sum spousal support was declined, but future spousal support was reserved.

Security for child support was ordered from the father's share of property sale proceeds.

This endorsement addresses the costs of two motions concerning section 7 expenses, where the respondent father was the moving party.

The respondent's claim and offer to settle significantly exceeded the ordered outcome.

While the applicant mother's offer was more reasonable, it was made late, and she had initially resisted contribution and failed to file a financial statement.

Considering these offsetting factors, the court awarded the applicant mother $900 in costs for the final preparation and argument of the second motion.

This motion addressed the reasonableness of the Applicant mother's refusals to contribute to specific s. 7 expenses for the parties' two children.

The Respondent father sought payment for past post-secondary and competitive hockey expenses, and a prospective order for s. 7 contributions.

The court strictly adhered to the scope of a prior order, limiting the review to expenses incurred up to March 10, 2016, and rejecting the father's attempt to expand the motion into a de facto motion to change.

The court ordered the mother to pay 40% of Ashley's post-secondary income shortfall ($760) and a reduced amount for Michael's hockey expenses ($2,022), after disallowing mileage and certain other items.

The mother's refusal to contribute to these allowed amounts was deemed unreasonable.

The father's request for a go-forward order was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship for two children, I.G. (13) and Z.C. (20 months), who had been in care beyond statutory timelines.

The respondent mother opposed, arguing for genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court, utilizing enhanced fact-finding powers under Family Law Rule 16(6.1), determined that both children were in need of protection due to the mother's untreated mental health, lack of cooperation with the Society, and inability to prioritize the children's needs.

Crown wardship was granted for both children.

Access for the mother to Z.C. was denied, while supervised access for I.G. was ordered, contingent on his welfare and desire.

The defendant, a helper trapper, was charged with using a non-certified trap (Woodstream Oneida Victor Conibear 120) for trapping pine marten, contrary to section 18(1)(a) of Regulation 667/98 under the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

The defendant argued that responsibility for compliance with the regulation rested solely with the head trapper under section 10(2) of the regulation.

The court rejected this argument, finding that helper trappers are independently required to comply with all trapping regulations, including trap certification requirements.

The court convicted the defendant of the offence as a strict liability matter in a public welfare statute, noting the defendant presented no evidence of due diligence.

The Crown charged the defendant with knowingly giving a false statement to a conservation officer contrary to section 96(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

The defendant was alleged to have falsely stated that no second bull moose was shot by members of the hunting party during opening weekend, when in fact Kevin Cain had shot a second bull moose unlawfully.

The trial turned on the credibility of the officer's account of the interview conducted at the defendant's home versus the defendant's account.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was asked about Kevin Cain or Rick Cain, and whether the defendant's responses were as alleged by the Crown.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his driver's licence was suspended, contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant had 21 prior convictions for the same offence and had accumulated $27,000 in unpaid fines.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission for 12 months probation with no fine or incarceration.

The court rejected the joint submission, finding it contrary to the public interest and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court imposed 60 days custody, a $2,000 fine (the statutory minimum for a subsequent offence), plus costs and surcharge, and 12 months probation with specific conditions including a prohibition on being in the driver's seat of any vehicle.

The Crown prosecuted an individual officer and a corporation for violations of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act arising from fire code violations discovered at a resort property.

The corporation was charged with failing to comply with inspection orders, and the officer was charged with knowingly permitting the corporation to violate the fire code.

The court found that the inspection orders were defectively issued and served—directed to the individual rather than the corporation, and not properly served on the corporate entity.

Consequently, the corporation's charges were dismissed.

The officer's charges were also dismissed because the Crown failed to prove the requisite knowledge element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the officer had demonstrated a cooperative approach to remedying the violations and had not acted with culpable knowledge or willful blindness.

The defendant, an Aboriginal member of the Lac Des Milles Lac First Nation, was found guilty of driving while suspended contrary to s. 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

With 20 prior convictions for the same offence, the Crown sought 30 to 60 days in custody.

The defence argued that Gladue principles should apply to preclude incarceration.

The court found the pre-sentence report with Gladue considerations to be insufficient and deficient in addressing the unique systemic and background factors affecting the Aboriginal offender and the impact of those factors on the defendant.

The court ordered that a stand-alone Gladue report or supplementary report be provided before sentencing could proceed.