Colin McKinnon

The appellant appealed convictions for breaching a recognizance contrary to s. 145 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the identification evidence was unreliable and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The convictions arose after police officers arrested an individual outside an apartment and later discovered he had provided a false identity.

The trial judge relied primarily on the arresting officer’s observations and subsequent recognition of the accused from a photograph, with limited confirmatory evidence from another officer.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge properly applied the governing principles regarding eyewitness identification and the standard for unreasonable verdicts.

The appellate court concluded that the evidence was reasonably capable of supporting the convictions and that no reversible error occurred.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failing to stop for police.

At trial, the defence argued non-insane automatism and challenged the admissibility of roadside utterances on the basis that the accused lacked an operating mind due to a severe panic attack.

The trial judge admitted the utterances after a voir dire, noting the absence of medical or psychiatric evidence, and later relied on those statements in rejecting the automatism defence and convicting the accused.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge should have granted an adjournment to permit a forensic psychiatrist to testify on the voir dire regarding the accused’s mental state.

The appellate court found that such evidence might have raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and potentially affected the outcome of the trial.

The court determined whether agreed costs arising from a successful Rule 21 determination of a question of law should be payable immediately or in the cause pending appeal.

The underlying motion, brought by the tax authority under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, sought determination of a legal issue prior to trial.

The court held that the Rule 21 proceeding constituted a discrete proceeding capable of disposing of the action and therefore warranted immediate costs consequences.

The successful parties were awarded agreed partial indemnity costs payable forthwith rather than in the cause.

The existence of a pending appeal did not justify delaying payment of the costs.