Clayton Ruby

The appellants sought to set aside a sentence order directing forfeiture of cash bail toward restitution arising from a break and enter and theft involving the release of mink from a fur farm.

The Crown conceded that the Criminal Code did not authorize forfeiture of bail money to satisfy a restitution order, and the court quashed that portion of the sentence.

The majority held, however, that it should not direct payment of the bail funds to third-party family members and a friend who had supplied the money, particularly given possible competing creditor claims and the unsuitability of criminal proceedings to adjudicate such disputes.

Requests for costs and interest against the Crown were also denied.

A dissent would have ordered the bail money returned directly to the third-party funders ex debito justitiae.

The appellant and a companion forcibly confined and sexually assaulted a young woman.

While the companion strangled the victim, the appellant held her legs to prevent her from struggling.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase 'caused the death' in s. 214(5) requires the accused's actions to be a substantial and integral cause of the death.

The Court found that the appellant's act of holding the victim's legs was a substantial cause of her death, as she likely would have resisted the strangulation otherwise.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent attacked his parents-in-law while sleepwalking, killing his mother-in-law and seriously injuring his father-in-law.

At trial, he presented a defence of non-insane automatism, supported by uncontradicted expert medical evidence that sleepwalking is a sleep disorder, not a neurological or psychiatric illness.

The trial judge left only the defence of non-insane automatism with the jury, which acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that on the evidence and policy considerations, sleepwalking in this case did not stem from a 'disease of the mind' and was properly classified as non-insane automatism, entitling the accused to an absolute acquittal.

The appellant challenged both the common law rule allowing the Crown to raise insanity over an accused’s objection and the Criminal Code provision requiring automatic detention of an insanity acquittee pending the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor.

The Court held that the common law rule violated s. 7 because it impermissibly deprived an accused of control over the conduct of the defence, and it reformulated the rule so that the Crown may generally raise insanity only after the trier of fact has otherwise concluded the accused is guilty, or where the accused has put mental capacity in issue.

The Court further held that s. 542(2) was intra vires Parliament’s criminal law power, but violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter because it mandated automatic, arbitrary, and indeterminate detention without a hearing and without standards.

The appeal was allowed, a judicial stay of proceedings was entered, and the declaration of invalidity was suspended for six months with interim detention limits.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

At trial, evidence was led of three separate conspiracies, but the appellants were only involved in one (Phase II).

The appellants argued that the indictment charged a broader conspiracy encompassing all phases, and since they were not involved in Phase I, they should be acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the indictment adequately specified the time and locations relevant to the Phase II conspiracy, giving the appellants reasonable notice of the charge.

The Crown proved the conspiracy charged, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and related offences.

Following their committal, their trial was delayed for almost two years, primarily due to institutional problems and a lack of resources in the judicial district.

The appellants moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the delay was clearly excessive and unreasonable, establishing a framework for assessing s. 11(b) claims that considers the length of delay, explanation for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was directed.

The appellants, Ministers of the Crown, were found guilty of contempt of court by the Federal Court of Appeal for failing to comply with an order to produce a file.

The order was served on their solicitor, but there was no evidence the Ministers had actual personal knowledge of it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that contempt of court requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the order.

The Court found that service on a solicitor under the Federal Court Rules does not create a presumption of actual knowledge for the purposes of a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding, nor does vicarious liability apply to hold the Ministers responsible for the actions of their officials.

The appellant, who was wrongfully convicted of murder and served eleven years in prison, sought judicial review of a ruling by a Royal Commission established to inquire into his prosecution.

The Commission ruled that while it would hear evidence on the general nature of cabinet discussions regarding the case, it would not permit questions about the views of individual cabinet members, deeming them irrelevant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Order in Council establishing the Commission gave it the exclusive discretion to determine what 'other related matters' were relevant to its inquiry.

The Court found that the Commission reasonably exercised its jurisdiction in balancing cabinet secrecy with the administration of justice.

A provincial Royal Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr. The Commission sought to compel the attendance of the justices of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal who had heard the Reference that quashed the conviction, in order to question them about the composition of the panel and the record relied upon.

The justices successfully applied for a declaration of judicial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Commission's appeal, holding that the fundamental principle of judicial independence provides judges with absolute immunity from being compelled to testify about their adjudicative decisions and qualified immunity regarding administrative decisions such as panel composition.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He admitted to forcing the complainant to have sexual intercourse but claimed his drunkenness caused the attack.

The trial judge instructed the jury that drunkenness is no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sexual assault causing bodily harm is an offence of general intent.

The Court affirmed the rule in Leary, holding that evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered by the trier of fact to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, and that this rule does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.

The accused appealed from a Court of Appeal order setting aside his jury acquittal for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge seriously misdirected the jury by inviting application of the reasonable doubt standard to individual pieces of evidence rather than to the ultimate issues on the whole of the evidence, while recognizing a limited exception in credibility instructions.

The Court further held that psychiatric evidence elicited from a defence expert, tending only to place the accused within an abnormal group capable of the offence, was not admissible on identity because it lacked sufficiently distinctive traits and its prejudicial propensity effect predominated.

Although the Court found the Court of Appeal erred on the psychiatric evidence issue, it concluded the Crown met the stringent burden applicable on an appeal from acquittal by showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same absent the misdirection.

The appeal was therefore dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

The appellants were charged with second-degree murder.

After the jury was empanelled but before the appellants were put in the jury's charge and before any evidence was called, a juror was discharged pursuant to s. 573 of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded with eleven jurors, and the appellants were convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, holding that for the purposes of s. 573, a jury trial does not commence until the accused has been placed in charge of the jury.