Chiappetta

The parties separated and engaged in a high-conflict dispute over the parenting of their young daughter.

The mother sought sole custody and permission to relocate with the child to San Francisco, where her extended family lived.

The father opposed the move, sought equal parenting time, and requested that no custody order be made.

The court declined to make a formal custody order, finding it would only fuel the conflict.

The court denied the mother's request to relocate, finding that the move was primarily for her preference and would disrupt the child's consistent and beneficial relationship with her father.

The court ordered a shared parenting schedule based on the assessor's recommendations, granted the mother final decision-making on medical and religious issues, and granted the father final decision-making on educational issues.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order making her child a Crown Ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in assessing her mental health, housing efforts, and the quality of access visits.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the mother's ongoing mental health challenges, including auditory hallucinations, and instability posed an overwhelming risk.

Fresh evidence regarding the mother's new housing and medication was admitted but found insufficient to alter the trial judge's findings.

Following a 20-year traditional marriage, the parties disputed the respondent's income for support purposes, as he operated a sole proprietorship and deducted personal expenses to lower his taxable income.

The court imputed income to the respondent, including an income tax gross-up on unreported income, fixing his income at $215,000.

The court ordered retroactive child and spousal support back to September 1, 2012, finding the respondent's failure to proactively determine his true income blameworthy.

Ongoing spousal support was ordered at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and secured by a life insurance policy.

The respondent wife in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking an order that service of her Answer and Amended Answer on the applicant husband be deemed service on 36 added corporate and trust respondents, arguing the husband was their alter ego.

The court found insufficient evidence on the motion to make an alter ego finding.

The court validated service on one Ontario corporation and two entities in non-contracting states under the Rules of Civil Procedure as they had actual notice.

However, the court held it had no discretion to validate service on the remaining entities located in Hague Convention contracting states, as Rule 17.05(3) is mandatory and a complete code for service abroad.

The respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant's pleadings and a separate motion for contempt, both based on substantially similar allegations of breaching court orders.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the motion to strike pending the disposition of the contempt motion, arguing that responding to the motion to strike would effectively compel him to testify and violate his right against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The court agreed, finding that the applicant's right to a fair trial on the contempt motion would be prejudiced if he were forced to respond to the civil motion to strike first.

The court ordered the motion to strike stayed pending the resolution of the contempt motion.

The applicant husband sought a divorce, and the respondent wife sought to set aside their 1996 marriage contract.

The contract waived spousal support and equalization.

The wife argued she did not understand the contract, signed under duress, and that the husband failed to disclose assets.

The court found the contract valid under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, noting the wife received independent legal advice and signed voluntarily despite being advised not to.

However, the court set aside the spousal support waiver under s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act, finding that enforcing it after a 16-year traditional marriage where the wife was financially dependent would result in unconscionable circumstances.

The applicant husband sought a divorce, and the respondent wife sought to set aside their 1996 marriage contract, which waived spousal support and property equalization.

The court found the contract valid under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, noting the wife received independent legal advice and signed voluntarily despite the husband's failure to provide full financial disclosure.

However, the court set aside the spousal support waiver under section 33(4) of the Family Law Act, finding that enforcing it would result in unconscionable circumstances given the wife's 16-year financial dependence in a traditional marriage.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment ordering that his child be made a Crown ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The father raised numerous grounds of appeal, primarily challenging the trial judge's findings of fact regarding his parenting capacity, criminal history, and mental health, as well as the refusal to extend Society wardship or grant access.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings or application of the law, and ordered the child to be placed in an adoptive home without further delay.

The applicant and respondent lived in a common law relationship for 24 years.

The respondent was the sole legal owner of the family residence.

Upon separation, the applicant sought a 50% beneficial interest in the home and occupation rent.

The court found a joint family venture existed, entitling the applicant to a 50% constructive trust interest based on the current value of the home.

The claim for occupation rent was dismissed as the applicant left voluntarily and had access to the home post-separation.

The plaintiffs, comprising 118 limited partnerships, brought an action against the Ontario Power Authority and Ontario for misfeasance in public office and unjust enrichment, seeking $450 million in damages related to changes in the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) program.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process because it attempted to relitigate the lawfulness of the FIT program changes, which had already been upheld by the Divisional Court in a prior judicial review application.

The court also held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for either misfeasance in public office or unjust enrichment.

The defendants, a law firm and one of its lawyers, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for intentional infliction of mental suffering, negligence, and breach of contract.

The action arose from the defendants' prior representation of the plaintiffs in two litigation matters.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that although there were genuine issues of material fact regarding negligence and breach of contract, the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of damages.

Without evidence of damages, the claim had no chance of success, making a trial unnecessary.

The applicant sought costs on a complete indemnity basis for steps taken to compel the respondents' compliance with a consent order.

The respondents had paid the outstanding amounts prior to the final motion hearing, which was subsequently dismissed.

The court found the applicant was entitled to costs for steps taken prior to the respondents' compliance, but not for the unnecessary second appearance.

The court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs, set-off against the respondents' costs for the second appearance, resulting in a net award of $14,500 to the applicant.

The plaintiff, an artist, brought an action for copyright infringement against the defendant, another artist, alleging that the defendant's paintings of crumpled paper infringed the copyright in the plaintiff's 'Classical Series' of paintings.

The court found that while copyright subsisted in the plaintiff's individual paintings, it did not subsist in the series as a whole.

The court dismissed the action, concluding that the defendant's works were not substantial copies or colourable imitations of the plaintiff's works, as the similarities were based on commonplace artistic techniques.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendant had independently created his works using his own photographic models.