Brenda Culbert

The respondent requested an adjournment of a scheduled hearing because a key witness was unavailable to attend the first day due to a graduate program orientation.

The applicant opposed the request.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario denied the adjournment, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify it, noting that the applicant's evidence would likely consume the first day and the corporate respondent could select another employee to instruct counsel.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation due to internet censorship at a public library.

He initially named only a librarian as the respondent.

The applicant brought a Request for Order During Proceedings (RFOP) to add the library as a respondent and to amend his requested remedies to include $2,500 in monetary compensation and withdraw his request for the librarian's dismissal.

The respondents consented to adding the library and withdrawing the dismissal request but opposed the monetary claim.

The respondents also brought an RFOP to remove the librarian as a personal respondent.

The Tribunal granted both requests, allowing the amendments due to a lack of prejudice and removing the librarian because she was acting within the scope of her employment.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that awarded her $5,000 for discrimination.

The applicant argued the award was unreasonable because it did not compensate her for lost wages akin to a wrongful dismissal claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the HRTO's award was based on a procedural failing in the duty to accommodate and was distinct from common law wrongful dismissal damages.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the court found the HRTO's decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable, and defensible outcomes.

The applicant sought to amend his human rights application to add the President of the corporate respondent as a personal respondent and to change the monetary remedy sought.

The Tribunal applied the Smyth and Persaud factors, finding that the proposed personal respondent's conduct was central to the allegations of age discrimination and that the corporate respondent's insolvency raised concerns about its ability to remedy any Code infringement.

The Tribunal granted both requests to amend the application.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking leave to amend her human rights application to add specific claims for monetary compensation and a public interest remedy.

The respondents objected, arguing lack of supporting documentation.

The Tribunal applied the Aubin factors and granted the amendment, finding no prejudice to the respondents as the hearing was months away and they had notice that compensation was being sought.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceeding to amend the remedies sought in their human rights application.

The respondents subsequently filed a Request to amend their response to address the altered remedies, to which the applicant consented.

The Tribunal granted both requests.

The applicant sought to amend his human rights application to include specific remedies, namely monetary compensation for injury to dignity and an order for the respondent to install a ramp to his unit.

The respondent neither consented nor objected.

The Tribunal applied the Wozenilek test and allowed the amendments, finding no apparent prejudice to the respondent as the amendments simply clarified the remedies sought.

The applicant filed a human rights application 24 days after the expiry of the one-year limitation period under s. 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed for delay.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's delay was incurred in good faith under s. 34(2) because he had sought timely advice from the Human Rights Legal Support Centre, which incorrectly advised him of the limitation deadline based on his retirement date rather than the date of the last discriminatory incident.

Finding no substantial prejudice to the respondents, the Tribunal allowed the application to proceed.

The applicant, a former police officer, sought to re-activate his human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment following his acquittal on disciplinary charges under the Police Services Act.

The respondents opposed re-activation due to the applicant's delay and moved to dismiss the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code and as an abuse of process.

The Tribunal dismissed the respondents' motion, finding that the human rights issues were not determined in the disciplinary hearing and that proceeding with the application would not constitute an abuse of process.

However, the Tribunal required the applicant to file an affidavit explaining his delay in requesting re-activation before deciding whether to allow the application to proceed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of sex by the respondent casino, 15 months after the incident.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed for being filed outside the one-year statutory time limit.

The applicant argued the delay was incurred in good faith due to her mental health issues, learning disability, and personal circumstances.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's level of activity in pursuing her rights shortly after the incident, along with the medical evidence, did not support her claim that her disabilities prevented her from filing on time.

The application was dismissed as the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings to amend his human rights application to seek damages for wage loss in the amount of $27,300 and general damages of $15,000.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that the amendment was reasonable and would not prejudice the respondents given the hearing was five weeks away and the increase in damages was relatively small.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondents sought early dismissal of part of the application and deferral of the remainder, arguing that the allegations were the subject of union grievances.

At a teleconference hearing, the applicant conceded that a concluded grievance had appropriately dealt with the substance of the first part of the application, and that deferral was appropriate for the remaining allegations pending an ongoing second grievance.

The Tribunal dismissed the first part of the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code and deferred the remainder.