Family and Matrimonial Law

An uncontested trial in a family law matter involving a divorce application and ancillary relief.

The respondent mother sought sole decision-making responsibility for seven children, child support of $1,740 per month based on an imputed income of $60,000 for the applicant father, and orders dispensing with the applicant's consent for government documents, international travel, and removal from the Greater Toronto Area.

The applicant was noted in default and did not appear.

The court granted all relief sought, finding that sole decision-making was in the best interests of the children given the respondent's role as primary caregiver and the applicant's minimal involvement.

Child support was ordered with credit for $12,000 already paid.

Costs of $7,571 were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking various relief concerning the estate of the late Dean Joseph Costanza, including a suspensory order under the Succession Law Reform Act, a Mareva injunction, and an order to deposit life insurance proceeds into trust.

They argued that the $500,000 life insurance payout, designated to the minor defendant, should be deemed part of the deceased's net estate for dependant support purposes under s. 72(1)(f) of the Act.

The court dismissed these requests, finding that the life insurance proceeds, already paid out pursuant to a prior unappealed court order, were not subject to clawback under s. 72(1)(f) due to the application of s. 72(7) and because they were no longer "payable." The court further held that the plaintiffs' requests constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the prior order and an abuse of process.

The Mareva injunction was also denied as the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a genuine risk of asset dissipation.

This decision arises from a Binding Judicial Dispute Resolution (BJDR) hearing in a family law matter, resolving outstanding issues between separated spouses.

The court adjudicated disputes concerning the treatment of cell phone payments as Section 7 expenses, the inclusion of a personal debt (Fairstone) in the applicant's net family property, the allocation of post-secondary education expenses for the eldest child, the payment schedule for retroactive child support, and claims for occupation rent and contributions to the matrimonial home.

The court found cell phones to be Section 7 expenses, disallowed the Fairstone debt due to insufficient evidence, ordered retroactive child support as a lump sum from trust funds, and awarded occupation rent to the respondent while crediting the applicant for her contributions to the matrimonial home.

Final orders were made regarding child support, spousal support, equalization, and parenting arrangements.

The applicant moved to set aside an order abandoning her spousal support claim, which was made during a settlement conference.

She alleged that her former counsel pressured her due to his unpreparedness and that her anxiety disorder impacted her decision.

The respondent opposed, arguing the applicant failed to establish grounds to set aside the order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of fraud by counsel and that the applicant did not meet the preconditions under Family Law Rules 25(19) or the residual power test from Mountain View Farms.

The court emphasized the importance of finality in consent orders and the integrity of the administration of justice.

This endorsement addresses multiple procedural issues in a family law case, including outstanding disclosure, scheduling of a long motion for spousal support, severing the divorce from corollary issues, and costs for settlement conferences.

The court found the respondent in breach of a disclosure order and ordered costs against him.

The court also granted the respondent's motion to sever the divorce, finding no evidence of prejudice to the applicant.

Significant costs were awarded against the applicant for wasting court time and the respondent's time during settlement conferences by not being prepared to sign an agreement she had negotiated.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of an interlocutory motion brought by the respondent (Greg) seeking to transfer the applicant's (Suzanne's) shares in the family farm corporation.

The court found the respondent's conduct, including non-compliance with court orders, financial disclosure failures, and litigation tactics, amounted to bad faith and litigation bullying.

Consequently, the court awarded full indemnity costs of $24,113.64 to the applicant, emphasizing that such egregious conduct warranted sanction.

This endorsement addresses costs following motions for parenting orders, including decision-making responsibility for a child's Covid-19 vaccination and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The applicant mother was largely successful on the underlying motions, having been granted primary care, decision-making responsibility for the Covid-19 vaccination, and permission to move from the matrimonial home with the children.

The mother sought $5,000 in costs, while the father requested each party bear their own costs.

The court found the mother was more successful and acted reasonably, and awarded her $3,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, to be paid by the father.

The court also confirmed that a costs order can be made even if the underlying judgment is subject to appeal.

The applicant child protection agency apprehended two young children.

The maternal grandmother, K.D.-M., sought to be added as a respondent and for the children to be placed in her care.

The agency and the children's mother opposed this, advocating for agency care with a plan to return the children to the mother, or placement with the father.

The court found that the agency improperly failed to name the maternal grandmother as a party, as she qualified as a "parent" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act due to a Voluntary Service Agreement.

The court also determined that placing the children with the maternal grandmother, subject to supervision terms, was appropriate, as the risk of harm could be mitigated.

The maternal grandmother's motion was granted, and the children were ordered to be returned to her care.

The appellant, Julie Lawrence, appealed the order of the motion judge regarding the disposition of her late father's estate.

The central issue was whether a $50,000 TD line of credit taken out prior to the deceased's marriage to the respondent (the estate trustee and second wife) was a debt of the estate or secured against the matrimonial home.

The motion judge found the estate liable for the debt.

The appellant also alleged the motion judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and improperly refused an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual findings, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no improper exercise of discretion regarding the adjournment or costs award.

The respondent father sought costs following a motion for increased interim access and the appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court had granted increased access on modified terms and declined the OCL request.

The father claimed success and sought $3000 in costs, relying on an offer to settle.

The applicant mother argued that success was divided and no costs should be awarded.

The court found that success was indeed divided and declined to make any order as to costs.

This decision addresses multiple motions in a family law dispute concerning child support, post-secondary education expenses, and contempt.

The court dismissed the applicant's contempt motion regarding costs due to lack of jurisdiction and reserved the contempt motion for non-compliance with a temporary order for trial.

The applicant's motion to dismiss the respondent's motion was denied as it would prejudice the children's rights to support.

The respondent's motion to set aside a prior order terminating child support for the adult daughter was granted, but the court provisionally ordered that the applicant is not obligated to pay support for the daughter beyond her 18th birthday, subject to re-determination at trial.

Interim retroactive child support for both children and ongoing child support for the son were ordered, but the retroactive amount was equitably set off against substantial costs owed by the respondent to the applicant.

The respondent's request for an increased contribution to university expenses was denied due to lack of material change and incomplete disclosure, with this issue also reserved for trial.

Both parties were ordered to provide comprehensive financial disclosure.

The applicant brought a motion to change child support retroactively, alleging the respondent misrepresented his income and falsified financial documents.

The court found the respondent lacked credibility due to a pattern of concealing income and falsifying records.

While most of the respondent's claimed business expenses (mileage allowances, car payments, insurance, cell, internet, gas heating, bookkeeping) were rejected, the court allowed a deduction of one-third of claimed gas and repair expenses.

The respondent's 2014 gross income was also adjusted upwards based on new evidence.

The applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, alleging material misrepresentation and non-disclosure by the respondent regarding the valuation of a company.

The respondent had received letters of intent to purchase the company and was negotiating a buyout of his partner's interest while simultaneously negotiating the separation agreement with the applicant, without disclosing this information.

The court found that the respondent's failure to disclose this information constituted a material misrepresentation, both subjectively and objectively, and breached the duty of utmost good faith in family law negotiations.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the entire separation agreement, declining to re-write it or address the oppression remedy under the Business Corporations Act at this stage.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel brought a motion for an order placing a newborn child in extended society care pending determination of a protection application seeking Crown wardship.

The child had been apprehended two days after birth due to concerns regarding the mother's mental health issues, transiency, parenting ability, and prior child protection involvement, as well as concerns regarding the father's substance use and inability to present a care plan.

The mother sought return of the child to her care, asserting she had addressed her mental health issues and secured appropriate accommodations.

The court found that the Society had met its burden under section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, establishing reasonable grounds to believe the child would suffer harm if returned to the mother's care, even with conditions.

The motion was granted, placing the child in the interim care of the Society with access at the Society's discretion.

Appeal from a family law trial decision concerning equalization of net family property, child support, spousal support, and costs.

The trial judge found the appellant had concealed substantial income through an improper insurance scheme and made extensive findings against his credibility.

The appellant, self-represented on appeal, challenged multiple aspects of the trial decision including the trial judge's treatment of his medical conditions, the respondent's asset disclosure, the award of child support, denial of occupation rent, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or exercise of discretion.

A status review hearing concerning a child in the protection system where the applicant society sought to place the child with paternal grandparents, while the foster parent sought custody.

The court found that the child had formed a secure and selective attachment to the foster parent and that severing this attachment would cause significant trauma.

The court rejected the society's plan and granted custody to the foster parent under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, finding that the child's best interests required maintaining the established attachment relationship.

The decision addresses the tension between family reunification principles and the child's psychological well-being, and clarifies the scope of foster parent rights at the status review stage.

This is a dispositional phase decision in a child protection matter involving two children, J.C. (age 6½) and N.Y. (age 11), who were apprehended from their grandmother's care.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for J.C., arguing he was adoptable.

The grandmother sought return of J.C. to her care or, alternatively, access if Crown wardship was ordered.

The court found that J.C. had serious behavioral and mental health issues requiring long-term residential treatment and was not adoptable in the foreseeable future.

The court made J.C. a Crown ward but granted access to his grandmother and sister, finding that such access would not impair future adoption opportunities and that the familial relationships were meaningful and beneficial to the child.

A child protection agency sought to reopen a trial after evidence had concluded and submissions had been made, but before judgment was rendered.

The agency wished to introduce a psychological assessment of the child conducted by an expert who had not testified during the trial.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence could have been adduced during the agency's case-in-chief, that reopening would cause significant delay in a matter where timely permanency planning was critical, and that the timing of the motion suggested the agency only sought to introduce the evidence after confirming it would support their case.

The court found that allowing the motion would be unfair to the respondent and contrary to the child's best interests.

A motion to transfer child protection proceedings from the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto to the York Region Children's Aid Society.

The children had been in the father's care for nearly four years in York Region following a 2008 trial finding that the mother had engaged in extreme parental alienation.

The court granted the motion to transfer, finding that the preponderance of convenience favoured transfer to York Region where the children resided, attended school, and where the Unified Family Court could coordinate both child protection and Divorce Act custody proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking statutory findings that four children were in need of protection and dispositional orders placing two children with their maternal grandparents and two children with their paternal grandmother, subject to Society supervision and specified access conditions.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to have all children returned to her care.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the mother had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.

The court found that the mother had not successfully addressed her lifestyle and parenting challenges, remained incapable of forming therapeutic relationships with professionals, and was unable to prioritize the children's needs over her own.

The court made custody orders under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act placing the children with their grandparents, with access to the parents as agreed by the custodians or as specified by the court.