Family and Matrimonial Law

This decision resolves a high-conflict divorce proceeding between Rona Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Ryan Scott, addressing issues of parenting time, child and spousal support (both retroactive and ongoing), equalization of net family property, and related matters.

The court grants sole decision-making authority and primary residence to the applicant, orders child support based on imputed income due to the respondent's intentional unemployment, and calculates retroactive and ongoing support.

The court also addresses a complex promissory note and inheritance issue, and rejects the respondent's claims regarding alleged proceeds from a "pornographic lifestyle" as entirely lacking in merit.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office sought to enforce significant child support arrears against the payor.

The payor claimed inability to pay a lump sum and proposed a reduced payment plan.

The court found the payor lacked credibility regarding his income and financial disclosure, and had deliberately delayed proceedings and prioritized his own interests.

The court ordered immediate and annual lump sum payments towards arrears, ongoing child support, and imposed committal terms for non-compliance, holding an immediate warrant in abeyance to allow for payment.

The Highland Shores Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order for the child L.K.D. to be placed in the custody of his father, L.D., with discretionary access for the mother, A.N. The child had previously been found in need of protection.

The mother opposed, seeking the child's return to her care and attempting to overturn the prior protection finding.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on disposition or access, concluding that placing the child in the father's custody with discretionary access for the mother was in the child's best interests, given the child's consistent wishes and the mother's lack of insight into protection concerns.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order finding the respondent in contempt of a previous final order that required her to provide vacant possession of a property.

The court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the respondent was in contempt, having satisfied the three elements for contempt: a clear order, the respondent's knowledge of it, and her intentional failure to comply without a legitimate excuse.

The court noted the respondent's history of non-compliance and attempts to relitigate past issues.

Sentencing for the contempt was adjourned to allow the respondent a final opportunity to rectify her non-compliance.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel appealed a lower court order that required it to hire a third-party professional supervision service for supervised home visits.

The Society argued that this requirement contravened s. 94(6)(c) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), which prohibits compelling the Society to provide financial assistance or purchase goods/services for supervision orders.

Applying a correctness standard of review, the court found that the lower court's order did indeed contravene s. 94(6)(c) by obligating the Society to purchase services.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned provision of the order was set aside.

The applicant father sought a contact order for his two children, aged 12 and 6, after a period of limited contact since separation.

The respondent mother raised concerns about family violence and COVID-19 risks, proposing supervised outdoor visits.

The court, considering the children's best interests and verified domestic violence risks, granted the father supervised indoor contact three out of four weekends, with supervision by the father's mother or sister, not the respondent.

The court also required the father to adhere to strict COVID-19 protocols, including weekly testing and maintaining a limited social bubble, and rejected the respondent's arguments for outdoor-only visits or her own supervision, citing the need for a more natural environment for the children and the inadequacy of the medical report regarding COVID vulnerability.

The applicant father brought a motion for an uncontested trial and divorce after the respondent mother abducted their child to South Korea without notice or consent.

The court granted the applicant sole custody of the child, ordered the respondent to pay child support based on imputed income, issued restraining orders preventing the respondent from communicating directly with the child or approaching the applicant's residence or the child's school, and granted the divorce.

Due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct and bad faith, the court awarded the applicant full recovery costs.

The Respondent Father brought a motion to enforce existing access orders for the child of the marriage and for a defined holiday access schedule, including police enforcement for access and an order for costs.

The Applicant Mother brought a cross-motion to vary the Father's access to remove overnight visits and to vary child support based on updated income.

The court found the Mother had a pattern of unlawfully withholding the child and had not properly brought her motion to change access.

The Father's motion for enforcement and a defined holiday schedule was granted, including police enforcement.

Child support was varied by consent.

The Father was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant, Mary Fatima DeMelo, brought a motion seeking disbursement of $488,348.75 from the proceeds of her former matrimonial home's sale and a seven-day suspension of a writ of possession held by CIBC Mortgages Inc. She argued that CIBC acted in bad faith by holding proceeds from one property (Binns) while also having security on another (Greenvalley), and by not paying funds into court as per a freezing order.

CIBC contended it was entitled to execute its writ against any of the defendant's assets and was not obligated to withdraw its writ or take a chance on future repayment from the Greenvalley property sale, which had deficiencies.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that CIBC was entitled to file and execute its writ and that holding the sale proceeds did not constitute bad faith, as CIBC was a secured creditor not required to take a chance on future repayment.

The husband sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a final family law order, a stay of that order pending appeal, and relief regarding the matrimonial home.

The trial judge had struck the husband's pleadings for failure to comply with undertakings and court orders, resulting in an uncontested trial where the wife was awarded lump-sum spousal support of $248,734, an equalization payment, costs, and a restraining order.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold.

The husband delayed five months before seeking the extension of time, during which he attempted to frustrate the sale and develop a litigation strategy rather than prepare his appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time but dismissed the stay request and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the wife.

Paternal grandparents sought to be added as parties to child protection proceedings under Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules and section 39(3) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The children were apprehended due to unexplained injuries sustained by the younger child while in parental care.

The court applied the five-factor test from Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. H(S) and denied the motion.

While the grandparents had a legal interest in the matter, the court found that adding them as parties was not required in the children's best interests, would not unduly delay proceedings, was not necessary to determine the issues, and critically, the grandparents could not present a viable plan as they remained part of the criminal investigation into the child's injuries.

The grandparents also failed to meet the threshold requirement of section 39(3) as they had not continuously cared for the children in the six months preceding the hearing.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the scope of a judge's jurisdiction under section 36(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act to direct a police force to enforce a child custody and access order.

The motion judge ordered the Ontario Provincial Police to enforce a custody and access order in place of the Waterloo Regional Police Service due to an inherent conflict of interest arising from the father's membership in the WRPS and allegations that the WRPS had inappropriately intervened to further the father's interests.

The appellants argued the motion judge lacked authority to impose such an obligation and that only the Ontario Civilian Police Commission could determine whether a municipal police force had failed to provide adequate policing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that section 36(2) permits a judge to specify any police force having jurisdiction in the area where the child may be found, and that in exceptional circumstances such as this, a judge may order the OPP to assist where the municipal police force cannot act due to a conflict of interest.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his civil action seeking damages against his former spouse and her parents for alleged fraudulent concealment of assets.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that the appellant's claim for damages was premised on an alleged entitlement to an equalization payment governed by the Family Law Act, which can only be pursued in family law proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting that while the appellant's equalization claim was time-barred under the Family Law Act, he was not necessarily without recourse if he could satisfy the criteria for an extension of time and pursue the matter through family law proceedings.

This is a costs decision arising from motions in a family law matter.

The court granted the mother temporary custody of two children, permitted travel without the father's consent, and ordered the father to pay temporary child support retroactive to July 1, 2015, including arrears of $11,577.

The father's motion for joint custody, shared parenting time, and child and spousal support was dismissed.

The mother sought costs of $9,094.74 while the father sought approximately $1,800.

The court awarded costs to the mother as the successful party, considering the factors under the Family Law Rules and the reasonableness of the amounts claimed.

The Applicant sought an order for $500,000 in interim disbursements for legal and valuation costs in a family law proceeding where she was attempting to set aside a separation agreement.

The Respondent opposed the motion.

The court found that the Applicant's claims had merit but criticized her for "splitting her case" in her reply affidavit regarding cost calculations and efforts to secure financing.

The court also noted the Applicant's failure to adequately explain past costs despite favourable awards and her insufficient efforts to self-finance.

Considering the complexity of the Respondent's financial affairs requiring expert review, the court ordered the Respondent to pay $140,000 in interim disbursements, allocated equally between expert and legal fees, payable in two installments.

The respondent mother brought a motion to set aside an order made on February 3, 2014, which declared her daughter a ward of the Crown with no access.

The mother sought to rely on facts arising or discovered after the order was made, arguing that fresh evidence would undermine important findings of fact and put the best interests of the child back in issue.

The court considered whether Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to child protection proceedings and, assuming it did, examined whether the mother met the conjunctive criteria for setting aside an order based on newly discovered evidence.

The court found that the evidence presented—affidavits from the child's father, a neighbour, and the mother's boyfriend—did not constitute new evidence, would not have changed the outcome, and raised credibility concerns.

The motion was dismissed.

Both parents brought motions to change child support provisions in a consent order from April 8, 2013.

The child, Shannon, had suspended her full-time education in June 2012 but returned to college full-time on January 6, 2014, to complete an Advanced Therapist Course ending October 3, 2014.

The father sought termination of support effective January 1, 2014, while the mother sought revival of support including a contribution to post-secondary expenses.

The court found a sufficient change in circumstances to assess the order and determined that child support should be revived for the nine-month period Shannon was in school.

The court applied the Child Support Guidelines table amount and required the child to contribute additional funds to post-secondary expenses.

The father received credits for direct payments made to the child and a previously ordered overpayment credit, resulting in a net payment of $7,030 due within 45 days.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office brought a motion seeking a warrant of committal to incarcerate the respondent for 180 days for failure to pay court-ordered child and spousal support.

The respondent opposed the motion and sought to set aside the default order and the dismissal of his prior change motion.

The court found that the respondent had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the default order was made and that his credibility was severely undermined by numerous inconsistencies in his evidence.

The court granted the warrant of committal for 180 days or until the outstanding default of $26,130.21 was paid.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under clause 37(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act based on the mother's mental health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence.

The father supported the motion while the mother opposed it.

The court granted the motion and found the child in need of protection, determining that the mother's combination of untreated mental health conditions, ongoing drug use during pregnancy and post-birth, and inability to protect herself from domestic violence created a real and likely risk of physical harm to the child.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support in a family law application.

The respondent brought a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that property issues required adjudication.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted the applicant temporary spousal support of $559 per month and transferred the matter to Superior Court.

The applicant sought costs of the motion.

The court awarded nominal costs of $2,500 to the applicant, payable by the respondent forthwith and enforceable as support, considering the significant income disparity between the parties and the applicant's success on the motion.