Administrative Law

The moving party sought to set aside on consent a trial judgment declaring that it was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of a residential property.

The trial judge had made significant negative credibility findings against witnesses called on behalf of the moving party and its predecessor in title.

The Court of Appeal refused to allow the appeal on consent, holding that courts cannot set aside judgments based solely on party agreement without considering whether doing so would be appropriate in light of the law and facts, and whether it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found that setting aside the judgment, which incorporated findings of misconduct, would undermine the administration of justice.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The court dismissed James Brajak’s application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The application sought declarations regarding beneficial ownership of a purported estate/trust and recognition as a “free private ecclesiastical person.” The court found the application lacked legal basis or merit, was not justiciable, and relied on nonsensical and religious arguments.

The court emphasized the importance of robustly applying Rule 2.1 to prevent waste of judicial resources.

The applicant, William Malamas, sought leave to commence an application for judicial review of decisions by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Malamas had not satisfied the requirements under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act for leave to proceed as a vexatious litigant.

The court held that the proposed proceeding was an abuse of process and lacked reasonable grounds, as it was intrinsically linked to prior litigation that led to the vexatious litigant order.

This decision certifies a class action against the Province of Ontario regarding the issuance of "Birth Alerts" by Ontario children's aid societies (CASs), but declines to certify the action against the CASs themselves.

The court finds that the claims against the CASs suffer from the "Ragoonanan problem"—the lack of a representative plaintiff with a claim against each defendant—and that the CASs acted independently, not collectively.

The action against Ontario, however, is certified on the basis of negligence and breaches of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, as the Province had oversight authority and failed to act to stop the practice despite being able to do so.

The court sets out the certified class, common issues, and clarifies the preferable procedure for such claims.

The applicant, West Whitby Landowners Group Inc., sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their judicial review application against the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) and Elexicon Energy Inc. The Divisional Court had found it lacked jurisdiction over the OEB's opinion on cost allocation, deeming it not a statutory power of decision affecting legal rights, and that certiorari was unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, clarifying the test for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The court emphasized that the key consideration for granting leave is the impact the decision will have on the development of Ontario's jurisprudence, particularly in administrative and public law, moving away from a rigid checklist approach.

The appellant challenged the appeal judge’s dismissal of her appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, which had confirmed her involuntary admission to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been discharged from CAMH.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no live controversy and no special circumstances to warrant exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court rejected arguments that the appeal right would become illusory or that appellate guidance was needed on the interpretation of Box B criteria under the Mental Health Act.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent, a municipal councillor, contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) by participating in a council vote to indemnify himself and other councillors for legal expenses incurred in responding to a Human Rights Tribunal application.

The applicant argued the respondent had a pecuniary interest and sought to have his seat declared vacant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent's actions did not contravene the MCIA, particularly under the s. 4(i) exception for benefits related to a member's duties, and that the indemnification by-law was mandatory.

The court also noted that even if there was a contravention, the severity claimed was not warranted, and the respondent acted in good faith.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought a writ of habeas corpus challenging her security reclassification from medium to maximum and her involuntary transfer from Grand Valley Institution for Women (GVI) in Ontario to Nova Institution for Women (Nova) in Nova Scotia.

While the security reclassification issue became moot as she was reclassified to medium, the core of the application concerned whether the inter-provincial transfer constituted a deprivation of residual liberty and if the transfer decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The court found that a lateral transfer between maximum security institutions, even inter-provincial, does not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty, as it does not impose a more restrictive physical constraint or loss of more than mere privileges.

The court also found the transfer decision to be reasonable, based on evidence of the applicant's continued attempts to introduce contraband, and procedurally fair, as the "gist" of confidential information was provided as permitted by the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Dr. Thirlwell, a psychiatrist, sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that upheld an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The ICRC's interim order imposed terms on Thirlwell's registration, including a prohibition on issuing vaccine exemptions and a requirement to consent to OHIP inquiries, due to concerns about her providing improper medical exemption letters for cash.

The Divisional Court dismissed Thirlwell's judicial review application, finding the OHIP term reasonable for patient protection.

Thirlwell moved for a stay of the Divisional Court order pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied the stay, finding no serious question to be tried and that the public interest in patient safety and confidence in the College's disciplinary system outweighed Thirlwell's personal interests.

The Appellants, a banquet hall corporation and its director, appealed convictions for numerous tax-related offences under the Employer Health Tax Act and Retail Sales Tax Act, and the imposed sentence.

The appeal grounds included the Kienapple principle, mens rea categorization, due diligence, arraignment defects, expert witness weight, unreasonable delay, witness credibility, and judicial recusal.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no legal or factual errors in the trial judge's findings regarding distinct offence elements, mens rea application, rejection of due diligence, and procedural regularity.

However, the court allowed the appeal against sentence in part, affirming the custodial term but significantly reducing the total fines, applying the principles of proportionality and totality, and capping daily fines to the date the Information was laid rather than the date of arraignment.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash an appeal judge's order disqualifying his unlicensed agent and refusing an adjournment in a provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appeal judge correctly applied the principles for disqualifying agents, particularly where the agent engaged in misconduct by intentionally concealing their involvement.

The court affirmed its inherent authority to control its processes and ensure the integrity of proceedings.

The adjournment issue was deemed moot as the appellant was permitted to restart his appeal.

Cricket Canada brought an application under section 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Sports Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC) and its appointed arbitrator.

The underlying dispute involved the Alberta Cricket Council (ACC) seeking membership in Cricket Canada, which Cricket Canada argued was outside the SDRCC's jurisdiction.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the SDRCC had jurisdiction over the dispute, interpreting "Sports-Related Dispute" broadly to include disputes among sport organizations concerning participation and membership entitlements.

The applicant, Clara Eva Boros, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender her to Romania for extradition.

The Minister's decision regarding the significant delay in the extradition process, spanning over 18 years, was found to be unreasonable due to a lack of transparent investigation into when Romanian authorities became aware of the applicant's presence in Canada and an insufficient explanation for the delay on the Canadian side.

The Court of Appeal allowed the application, remitting the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration with specific directions for further inquiry and explanation regarding the delays.

The applicant appealed the revocation of his firearms license following his guilty plea to possession of child pornography.

The Area Firearms Officer revoked the license based on the applicant's conviction, his admission of a long-standing sexual interest in children that he could not control, and public safety concerns reflected in the sentencing court's imposition of custody, probation, and a section 161 order with extensive restrictions.

The applicant argued that the revocation was based on an automatic policy rather than individualized assessment and that he had been a responsible firearms owner in full compliance with all regulations.

The court upheld the revocation, finding that the AFO conducted an individualized assessment applying the proper criteria under the Firearms Act and that the decision was objectively reasonable.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's December 27, 2018 disposition ordering his detention on a forensic unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with specified privileges.

The appellant contended that the Board departed from a joint submission of the parties by rejecting his request for community privileges accompanied by an approved person, and that he was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no joint submission was made and that the Board's decision requiring staff accompaniment was amply supported by evidence of the appellant's history of violence, hallucinations, and medication non-compliance, as well as the opinion of his treating psychiatrist.

The applicant, an inmate, sought a writ of habeas corpus to be transferred from Warkworth Institution to Bath Institution, both medium security facilities.

He argued that his involuntary transfer from Bath to Warkworth constituted an unlawful restriction of his liberty due to differences in the living environments and supervision levels between the two institutions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the transfer between two medium-security institutions, despite differences in privileges and layout, did not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty sufficient to invoke habeas corpus jurisdiction.

The court emphasized that a loss of privileges is not equivalent to a deprivation of liberty.

The appellant's property was damaged by flooding following significant rainfalls in May 2013.

The floodwaters originated from adjacent land expropriated by the respondent municipality in 2009 for a construction project.

The appellant had commenced an injurious affection claim before the Ontario Municipal Board in 2011.

Following the flooding, the appellant commenced an action in Superior Court in June 2015.

The respondent moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the claim was discoverable when the flooding occurred in May 2013.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether an action in Superior Court would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy, and by misapprehending the evidence regarding the appellant's belief that the OMB had exclusive jurisdiction over injurious affection claims.

The applicant, 2494044 Ontario Inc., sought an order directing Norfolk County to register a tax deed for a commercial property after being the highest tenderer in a tax sale.

The County cancelled the tax sale after the previous mortgagee paid the outstanding taxes.

The court found that the County Treasurer acted reasonably in exercising discretion under section 382(6)(a) of the Municipal Act to cancel the tax sale, as it was not in the municipality's financial interest to continue.

The application was dismissed, affirming the Treasurer's decision.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering continued detention of an NCR accused at a maximum security forensic psychiatric facility.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for attempted murder of his former psychiatrist and had been detained since 2006.

The appellant refused to engage in treatment and maintained a negative view of mental health workers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the board's finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety but found that the board erred in failing to recognize a treatment impasse after a decade of no progress.

The court ordered a new hearing to consider an independent assessment and alternative treatment approaches.