Anna Husa

An aerodrome operator appealed an order requiring it to file a permit application under a new municipal by-law for fill and site alteration work performed before the by-law was enacted.

The court considered whether the by-law could be applied retroactively to work completed under a prior regulatory regime.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the by-law had no retroactive effect and could not be applied to work performed before its enactment.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution, defamation, negligence, and misrepresentation.

The claims arose from the defendant reporting the plaintiffs to the police for alleged corporate fraud, which led to criminal charges that were later withdrawn.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the misrepresentation claim, finding no reliance by the plaintiffs.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding the remaining claims, concluding that a fair and just determination could not be made at this stage due to outstanding factual issues and incomplete discovery.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment setting aside a transfer agreement on grounds of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The appellants argued the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction under a bifurcation order and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's order was within the scope of the bifurcation order and his factual findings were well-supported by the evidence.

Two competing applications concerned whether a municipal site alteration by-law regulating the dumping of fill applied to an aerodrome.

The municipality sought declarations that its by-law requiring a permit and environmental safeguards for fill operations applied to the airport’s grading activities, while the airport operator argued that such regulation intruded on exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

Applying the constitutional doctrines governing division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity, the court held that the by-law’s pith and substance concerned environmental protection and land use regulation, matters within provincial jurisdiction.

The by-law did not impair the protected core of federal aeronautics power because it regulated only the quality and management of fill, not the design or operation of runways or airport facilities.

The municipal application was granted and the airport operator’s application was dismissed.

A lawyer sought declarations that his professional liability insurer had a duty to defend him in underlying mortgage fraud litigation and that the insurer breached confidentiality by reporting allegations to the Law Society.

The underlying pleadings alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the lawyer signing a certificate of independent legal advice without meeting one of the mortgagors.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exclusion for dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious acts.

The court held that the pleadings sounded in professional negligence rather than fraud and that the exclusion did not apply, triggering the insurer’s duty to defend.

The court also held the insurer did not act improperly in reporting the allegations to the Law Society and that PIPEDA did not apply because the insurer’s mandatory professional liability program was not a commercial activity.

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly exercised a shotgun buy/sell provision in a shareholders agreement, requiring the respondents to transfer their shares in the corporation.

The respondents argued the shotgun notice was invalid because it was issued jointly by two shareholders, and alternatively, that the applicants repudiated the agreement by demanding a release not required by the contract.

The court held that the shotgun provision, interpreted in its factual matrix, allowed for joint exercise by the applicants as a single shareholder group.

The court further found that the applicants did not repudiate the agreement, as they were ready and willing to close without the disputed release, whereas the respondents refused to close.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to transfer their shares.

The appellant appealed from orders granting summary judgment and dismissing her claims against the Crown and Seneca College.

She alleged wrongful denial of student aid funding and an improperly assigned failing grade in a nursing course.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that student aid was discretionary and restricted due to an unrefunded overpayment, and that the appellant failed the course despite numerous opportunities to rewrite the exam.

The appeal was dismissed, and fresh evidence was not admitted.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a claim alleging negligence in the conduct of a federal tender process relating to hydroelectric facilities.

The plaintiff sought damages, declarations, and injunctive relief, alleging that a profit‑sharing requirement in the Request for Proposals was ultra vires the governing federal legislation.

The court held that Parks Canada was acting as a federal board, commission, or tribunal within the meaning of the Federal Courts Act and that the relief sought fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s. 18.

The court distinguished Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., finding that the action effectively challenged administrative decisions and sought traditional judicial review remedies.

The statement of claim was struck for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant, a law clerk, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his fourth party claim against a former articling student/associate for contribution and indemnity in a solicitor negligence action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing the claim was misconceived as the principal solicitor was responsible for the associate's actions.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the substantial indemnity costs award from $25,000 to $17,000, finding the appellant's counsel did not mislead the court and the allegations in the pleadings were not entirely irrelevant.

The appellants, a travel agent and agency, appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them liable for failing to inform the respondent clients about passport validity requirements for travel to Panama.

The respondents were denied boarding because their passports expired within six months of travel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellants breached their statutory duties under the Travel Industry Act to advise the clients of the passport restrictions both before entering the contract and in writing afterward.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the respondent breached fiduciary duties through non-disclosure of financial dealings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew of the non-disclosure and the additional mortgages, yet chose to compromise his claim and sign a release with the benefit of legal advice.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for an unpaid account of $4,886 for services rendered to a former client.

The appellant sued the respondent, a lawyer who took over the client's file, alleging breach of contract for failing to protect the account.

The trial judge found no cause of action against the respondent personally and that the account was not reasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding Rule 20 and Rule 21.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the arguments and noting that the proposed fresh evidence conflicted with the appellant's own evidence.

The scope of the surviving unjust enrichment and constructive trust claim remains to be determined in ongoing litigation.

Costs were awarded to the respondent and the appellants' former counsel.

The appellants brought a motion to restore their appeal to the hearing list after failing to strictly comply with a consent order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the failure was minimal, explained, and caused no real prejudice to the respondent.

No costs were ordered.