Andrew Duncan Gray

The applicant, a professional horse trainer, sought judicial review of a penalty imposed by the Ontario Racing Commission after one of his horses tested positive for a Class III drug.

The applicant argued that the Commission denied him procedural fairness by refusing to disclose past penalty rulings, that the panel's rejection of a joint settlement proposal created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the imposed penalty of a 10-month suspension and $50,000 fine was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias as the panel maintained an open mind, and that the penalty was reasonable given the applicant's prior disciplinary record.

The appellant, a former director and executive, appealed a trial judgment that set aside his employment contract using the oppression remedy under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the oppression remedy should only be available to minority shareholders unable to use normal corporate machinery, and that the trial judge improperly substituted her view for the Board's business judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the oppression remedy addresses abuse of power and is not limited to minority shareholders.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the Board's process in approving the contract was seriously flawed and fell outside the range of reasonableness.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also refused despite the respondents failing to prove fraud, given the appellant's egregious conduct.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that he exercised undue influence over his mother in the procurement of instruments transferring property to his son.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of physical and moral control amounting to undue influence was supported by the evidence and not undermined by the opinion of a solicitor who was not privy to all family interactions.

Abella J.A. dissented, finding that any presumption of undue influence was rebutted by the mother's evidence and the cogent evidence of her solicitor.