Amy Robin Barkin

The accused pleaded guilty to human trafficking under section 279.01 of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved the confinement and sexual exploitation of a 15-year-old girl in foster care, whom the accused compelled to work as a prostitute for financial gain.

The accused, aged 23 with a prior criminal record including robbery convictions, had been in custody since November 21, 2012.

Both Crown and defence counsel jointly submitted that a 5-year sentence was appropriate.

The court imposed a 5-year sentence with credit for time served at a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in approximately 33.9 months remaining to be served.

Additional orders included a 20-year SOIRA order, a lifetime section 109 prohibition order, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to Criminal Code s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown called evidence of an anonymous report of impaired driving, police observation and pursuit of the vehicle, an approved screening device test showing an "F" reading, and two breath samples taken at the police station registering 120 and 110 milligrams respectively.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing there were unexplained delays between the time of the alleged offence and the taking of the first breath sample, which would undermine the presumption of identity under Criminal Code s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found the accused guilty, holding that the delays were explained and the police acted reasonably in the circumstances, particularly in ensuring the accused received access to counsel in his language of choice.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code following a trial.

The offence involved the accused entering the complainant's bedroom without consent and touching her vaginal area while she was sleeping.

The complainant awoke and told the accused to leave, which he did immediately.

The accused was a first-time offender with strong community support, stable employment, and a supportive family.

He had commenced substance abuse counselling following his conviction.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12-14 months, while defence counsel sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a 60-day intermittent sentence with 18 months probation, finding that incarceration was necessary for denunciation and deterrence despite the accused's positive background and the relatively less serious nature of the sexual assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and three counts of assault relating to his wife.

A replacement information was later filed with four counts of assault.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The total delay from charge to estimated end of trial was approximately 19.5 months.

The court found that while the total delay exceeded the Morin guideline of 8-10 months for institutional delay, the unacceptable delay attributable to Crown actions and institutional resources was 10.5 months.

The court found actual prejudice to the accused, including loss of employment income, jeopardized employment opportunities, and stress affecting work performance.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271(1) of the Criminal Code.

The alleged incident occurred on October 14, 2010, in Newmarket, Ontario.

The complainant and accused had been consuming alcohol and cocaine together the previous evening.

The complainant alleged that the accused entered her bedroom while she was sleeping, got into her bed naked, and placed his hands in her private areas.

The accused claimed he merely wanted a hug and rubbed her back after she complained of a kink.

The court found the accused guilty based on the complainant's credible testimony corroborated by email exchanges in which the accused apologized for his conduct, which the court interpreted as an admission of guilt.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for the offence of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg.

The sentencing judge had imposed a suspended sentence and probation despite the offender having a prior related conviction and a very high blood alcohol reading.

The Crown argued the sentence was illegal or demonstrably unfit because it failed to recognize the applicable minimum punishment and inadequately considered deterrence.

The appeal court held the sentence was demonstrably unfit and failed to properly account for prior convictions and the aggravating blood alcohol level, though incarceration was inappropriate because the offender had completed the sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and substituted a $2,000 fine.

The applicant brought a motion alleging a violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

He was charged with five counts of assault with weapon, eight counts of assault, and one count of uttering a death threat, arising from his operation of a martial arts instructional facility.

The Crown scheduled the trial for March 2013, approximately 21 months after arrest.

The applicant's counsel sought earlier dates but none were available.

The court found that the delay from when the parties were ready to proceed (January 2012) to the scheduled trial completion (March 2013) was approximately 14 months, well above Morin guidelines.

Considering the applicant's significant prejudice to both liberty and security of the person interests, the court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, evading police, and failing to stop after an accident.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper burden of proof to circumstantial identification evidence.

The court held that the trial judge properly approached the frailties of eyewitness identification, rejected unreliable identification procedures, and carefully assessed the circumstantial evidence.

The trial judge reasonably concluded that the only rational inference from the evidence was that the appellant was the driver, and the convictions were upheld.