Amandeep Sidhu

A minority shareholder application was brought under the Business Corporations Act seeking an order for the majority to purchase the minority interest.

The court found that the applicant was a legitimate shareholder and that a breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence among the small shareholder group, coupled with some oppression, warranted a remedy.

The court ordered a process for the termination of the business relationship, giving the respondents the option to either pursue a sale of the company's assets or a court-ordered share valuation process to purchase the applicant's shares.

The valuation date was set, and the issue of a holdback for a separate lawsuit was deferred.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment against him.

The underlying action related to funds advanced by the respondent to the appellant and her daughter to purchase a home, which the appellant claimed were a gift rather than a loan.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the defence, given the appellant's own written communications admitting to the indebtedness and corroborating evidence from a mortgage broker.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A proposed purchaser under an agreement of purchase and sale sought leave to intervene in a mortgage enforcement proceeding where the defendants had brought a motion to stay a power of sale and sought relief from forfeiture.

The court considered Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing intervention by added parties.

The proposed intervenor demonstrated a real interest in the litigation because the outcome could affect his contractual right to complete the purchase of the property and his submissions would assist the court in assessing issues including fair market value.

The court found that at least one of the disjunctive criteria under Rule 13.01(1) was met and that intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings.

Leave to intervene as an added party on the defendants’ motion was granted.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment.

The motion judge found that while the appellant had a triable defence, he failed to move expeditiously, waiting 28 months after the noting in default to proceed with the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding ample evidence to support the conclusion on delay and confirming that the motion judge properly considered the prejudice to the parties and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a default judgment obtained against them in a civil action alleging fraud, conspiracy, oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation.

Applying the principles governing motions to set aside default judgments, the court considered whether the motion was brought promptly, whether there was a plausible explanation for the default, and whether the defendants had an arguable defence on the merits, along with prejudice and the interests of justice.

The court found the defendants failed to provide a credible explanation for their failure to defend after service and had not demonstrated a substantive defence to the pleaded allegations.

The draft statement of defence contained only general denials and no evidentiary response to the serious allegations underlying the judgment.

In the absence of an arguable defence and adequate explanation for the default, the interests of justice did not favour setting aside the judgment.

The moving defendant sought to set aside a default judgment and writ of seizure and sale arising from a claim for repayment of funds advanced toward the purchase of a residential property.

The motion alleged inadequate notice, collusion between the plaintiff and a co‑defendant, and that the funds were a gift rather than a loan.

Applying the three‑part test for setting aside default judgments, the court considered promptness, explanation for the default, and whether there was an arguable defence on the merits.

The evidence, including communications acknowledging the debt and circumstances surrounding the financing, demonstrated that the funds were a loan rather than a gift.

The court found no meritorious defence and dismissed the motion.

The applicants sought a final injunction enforcing a non-competition covenant in a shareholders agreement after a former business participant returned to a competing enterprise and contacted prospective clients previously approached through the joint venture.

The court held the agreement unambiguously provided that the restrictive covenant survived the cessation of share ownership for five years, and rejected the argument that the termination clause nullified the restraint.

Applying the more generous approach to restrictive covenants in commercial agreements, the court found the five-year term and GTA geographic scope reasonable and enforceable.

The court further held that damages would rarely be an adequate remedy for breach of an enforceable negative covenant and granted injunctive relief against the respondents.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion to set aside a default judgment, the plaintiff sought costs of $9,975.65 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants argued the legal fees claimed were excessive and unreasonable, noting the plaintiff's lawyer spent twice as much time on the matter.

The court disagreed, finding the costs claimed to be fair, reasonable, and within the defendants' reasonable expectations.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the requested amount.

The moving defendants sought to set aside an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim, and a subsequent default judgment arising from repeated non-compliance with documentary disclosure obligations and other procedural defaults in a commercial lease action.

The court held that relief was unavailable under rr. 37.14 and 59.06 because the evidence did not establish insufficient notice, accident, mistake, fraud, or newly discovered facts.

Applying the default judgment framework, the court accepted promptness and assumed an arguable defence and counterclaim, but found no plausible excuse for the defaults, found prejudice roughly balanced, and held that setting aside the judgment would adversely affect the integrity of the administration of justice.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving defendant sought to set aside a default judgment arising from a restaurant renovation dispute involving alleged breach of contract.

The court accepted that the moving party had explained the original default and had advanced a triable defence, but found that he did not bring the motion promptly and failed to satisfactorily explain extensive delay and repeated non-compliance with court orders.

Applying the established three-part framework for setting aside default judgment, the court held that granting relief would not be in the interests of the administration of justice.

The motion was dismissed with partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.

Following a successful motion setting aside an ex parte custody order, the applicant sought costs totalling $46,772.33.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including success, complexity, reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, proportionality, and expectations of the parties.

The court found the respondent had acted in bad faith by misleading the court in obtaining the earlier ex parte order, including failing to disclose prior custody proceedings and a pending criminal assault charge, and by mischaracterizing the applicant’s mental health and circumstances.

The court also held that costs associated with a mandatory case conference preceding the motion could properly be included in the motion’s costs.

Given the respondent’s bad faith and the applicant’s complete success, the court ordered full indemnity costs.