Amandeep Sidhu

The defendant 2075750 Ontario Inc. brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for specific performance or damages arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The motion was based on the plaintiffs' repeated and intentional breaches of production obligations, delay tactics, and the resulting demonstrable prejudice to the defendant, including lost documents and faded memories.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing that the delay was not inordinate, that 2075750 Ontario Inc. also caused delay, and that no actual prejudice was shown.

The court found that the plaintiffs deliberately and wholly ignored the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding document production, intentionally withheld critical evidence, and engaged in a pattern of delay, causing actual prejudice to the defendant's ability to have a fair trial.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action in its entirety with costs and ordered the deletion of instruments from the property title.

The applicant, Brenda King, brought a motion for relief from forfeiture concerning a property from which she had been evicted.

She sought the opportunity to purchase the property pursuant to an earlier agreement.

The court reviewed the history, including an initial option to purchase, an amending agreement, and a subsequent court order that set a new purchase date.

The applicant failed to provide funds or secure a real estate lawyer by the closing date stipulated in the court order, thereby breaching her obligations.

Applying the three-factor test for relief from forfeiture, the court found that the applicant's conduct constituted a significant breach and, crucially, that she lacked the current financial ability to complete the purchase even if relief were granted.

Consequently, the motion for relief from forfeiture was denied.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment for possession of a property and monetary judgment against the mortgagor and guarantors, claiming interest at 21% and relying on a mortgage renewal agreement.

The defendants disputed the interest rate, asserting 12%, and challenged the enforceability of the renewal agreement.

The court found the 21% interest clause violated section 8 of the Interest Act, ruling the interest rate to be 12%.

The court also found the renewal agreement unenforceable due to the plaintiff's knowledge that a co-owner's signature was required, thus the indoor management rule did not apply.

Additionally, a construction lien registered by one defendant was declared expired and vacated.

The defendant Sandhu brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against her, arguing that a settlement agreement had resolved the dispute.

The plaintiff Zaib opposed, alleging her signature on the agreement was forged.

The court ruled the defendant's expert handwriting report inadmissible because it was presented as an exhibit to a legal assistant's affidavit, preventing cross-examination of the expert.

Given the conflicting evidence regarding the agreement's authenticity and numerous inconsistencies in the defendant's discovery testimony, the court found that credibility was a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The Plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to file additional evidence, including an expert handwriting report, in the context of a summary judgment motion brought by the Defendant Sandhu.

The court reviewed the procedural history, noting previous orders setting strict timelines for filing expert reports and additional materials.

Applying the factors for granting leave under Rule 39.02(2), the court found the evidence relevant and responsive to cross-examination, but determined that granting leave would result in non-compensable prejudice to the Defendant and would conflict with earlier court orders.

The Plaintiff's explanation for the delay in retaining the expert and bringing the motion for leave was deemed unsatisfactory, as the need for such evidence was known much earlier.

Consequently, the Plaintiff's motion for leave was dismissed.

The defendants, Sharon Gooden-Allen and Desmond Allen, defaulted on a second charge on their property, which was subsequently transferred from Surrinder Jass to Sean Wilson.

Wilson then entered an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) with Sean Brown.

The Allens challenged the validity of the assignment and the propriety of the sale, bringing a motion to stay the APS.

Wilson brought a cross-motion to have an order to continue the action made *nunc pro tunc*.

The court found the assignment of the charge to Wilson to be valid and the APS bona fide, dismissing the Allens' motion to stay the sale.

Wilson's motion for a *nunc pro tunc* order to continue was granted, allowing him to enforce the judgment and exercise his rights as chargee in possession.

The applicants entered into agreements to purchase pre-construction condominiums from the respondent developer.

The agreements required the purchasers to provide financial disclosure and mortgage approvals within a specified time.

The applicants failed to provide the required documentation on time, and the respondent terminated the agreements.

The applicants sought relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants had not exercised reasonable diligence to comply with the agreements, their breach was substantial, and there was no reliable evidence of the disparity between the value of the properties and the damage caused by the breach.

The plaintiff purchased 50% of the shares in the corporate defendant for $400,000.

Following the purchase, the individual defendant denied the plaintiff access to banking records, paid illegal kickbacks to suppliers, and misappropriated corporate funds and assets.

The plaintiff brought an action for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The court found that the defendant's conduct was oppressive and unfairly disregarded the plaintiff's reasonable expectations from the outset.

The court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $400,000, representing the original purchase price of the shares.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.

The plaintiff requested a telephone conference to settle the form of an order made at a previous motion.

The defendants' counsel of record had declined to approve the draft order because his retainer was terminated and the corporate defendant intended to act in person.

The court held that because the corporate defendant had not obtained leave to act in person and the lawyer had not been removed from the record, the lawyer had a professional obligation to approve the draft order as to form and content.

The court signed the draft order.

A minority shareholder application was brought under the Business Corporations Act seeking an order for the majority to purchase the minority interest.

The court found that the applicant was a legitimate shareholder and that a breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence among the small shareholder group, coupled with some oppression, warranted a remedy.

The court ordered a process for the termination of the business relationship, giving the respondents the option to either pursue a sale of the company's assets or a court-ordered share valuation process to purchase the applicant's shares.

The valuation date was set, and the issue of a holdback for a separate lawsuit was deferred.

A proposed purchaser under an agreement of purchase and sale sought leave to intervene in a mortgage enforcement proceeding where the defendants had brought a motion to stay a power of sale and sought relief from forfeiture.

The court considered Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing intervention by added parties.

The proposed intervenor demonstrated a real interest in the litigation because the outcome could affect his contractual right to complete the purchase of the property and his submissions would assist the court in assessing issues including fair market value.

The court found that at least one of the disjunctive criteria under Rule 13.01(1) was met and that intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings.

Leave to intervene as an added party on the defendants’ motion was granted.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a default judgment obtained against them in a civil action alleging fraud, conspiracy, oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation.

Applying the principles governing motions to set aside default judgments, the court considered whether the motion was brought promptly, whether there was a plausible explanation for the default, and whether the defendants had an arguable defence on the merits, along with prejudice and the interests of justice.

The court found the defendants failed to provide a credible explanation for their failure to defend after service and had not demonstrated a substantive defence to the pleaded allegations.

The draft statement of defence contained only general denials and no evidentiary response to the serious allegations underlying the judgment.

In the absence of an arguable defence and adequate explanation for the default, the interests of justice did not favour setting aside the judgment.

The moving defendant sought to set aside a default judgment and writ of seizure and sale arising from a claim for repayment of funds advanced toward the purchase of a residential property.

The motion alleged inadequate notice, collusion between the plaintiff and a co‑defendant, and that the funds were a gift rather than a loan.

Applying the three‑part test for setting aside default judgments, the court considered promptness, explanation for the default, and whether there was an arguable defence on the merits.

The evidence, including communications acknowledging the debt and circumstances surrounding the financing, demonstrated that the funds were a loan rather than a gift.

The court found no meritorious defence and dismissed the motion.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion to set aside a default judgment, the plaintiff sought costs of $9,975.65 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants argued the legal fees claimed were excessive and unreasonable, noting the plaintiff's lawyer spent twice as much time on the matter.

The court disagreed, finding the costs claimed to be fair, reasonable, and within the defendants' reasonable expectations.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the requested amount.

Following a successful motion setting aside an ex parte custody order, the applicant sought costs totalling $46,772.33.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including success, complexity, reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, proportionality, and expectations of the parties.

The court found the respondent had acted in bad faith by misleading the court in obtaining the earlier ex parte order, including failing to disclose prior custody proceedings and a pending criminal assault charge, and by mischaracterizing the applicant’s mental health and circumstances.

The court also held that costs associated with a mandatory case conference preceding the motion could properly be included in the motion’s costs.

Given the respondent’s bad faith and the applicant’s complete success, the court ordered full indemnity costs.