Sheri D. Price

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging disability discrimination in employment for failure to accommodate.

The union, AMAPCEO, requested intervenor status, arguing the application could affect the collective agreement and a workplace accommodation pilot process.

The Tribunal granted the union's request to intervene as unopposed.

The respondents also requested to dismiss the application, arguing the issues were resolved in a prior policy grievance settlement.

The Tribunal deferred the request to dismiss to the adjudicator assigned to hear the merits of the application.

The respondents requested an order requiring the applicants to amend and re-file their human rights applications separately, and sought a 60-day extension to file their responses.

The applicants consented to amending their applications but opposed the 60-day extension.

One applicant also sought to amend her application to add allegations of reprisal.

The Tribunal ordered the applicants to amend and re-file their applications separately within 10 days, permitted the addition of the reprisal allegations, and granted the respondents 21 days from receipt of the amended applications to file their responses.

The respondent requested that the human rights application alleging failure to accommodate pregnancy-related needs be dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent argued that the substance of the application was appropriately dealt with by an Employment Standards Officer.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the Employment Standards Officer only addressed unpaid wages and explicitly noted that the failure to modify work was not an employment standard and was the subject of a separate tribunal proceeding.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights application as abandoned after he failed to respond to a status inquiry letter.

The applicant submitted that he never received the letter and had no intention of abandoning his application, which had been deferred pending grievance arbitration.

The Tribunal granted the reconsideration request, finding that the applicant successfully rebutted the presumption of delivery and that the failure to respond was through no fault of his own.

The applicant filed a Request for Reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision that dismissed the human rights application on the basis of delay.

The applicant argued that new facts regarding the claimant's travel dates and language barriers justified the delay, and that the hearing process was unfair.

The Tribunal found that the travel dates were known at the time of the original hearing and would not have been determinative.

The Tribunal also rejected the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness, concluding that the applicant had a full and fair opportunity to present submissions.

The Request for Reconsideration was dismissed.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision dismissing her reprisal claim.

The claim was based on a letter from the respondents' counsel threatening civil litigation for defamation if she did not withdraw her human rights application.

The Tribunal originally found the letter was absolutely privileged as a pre-litigation communication.

On reconsideration, the Tribunal found its original analysis of pre-litigation privilege conflicted with established jurisprudence.

However, the Tribunal upheld the dismissal of the reprisal claim on two alternative grounds: first, the letter was absolutely privileged because it was written in the course of the ongoing Tribunal proceedings; second, even if not privileged, the applicant failed to prove the threat was intended to retaliate against her for claiming Code rights, rather than to stop her from making defamatory comments in the community.

The respondent employer requested an order to strike out allegations in the human rights application that occurred prior to and on December 23, 2009, citing delay, abuse of process, and estoppel.

The applicant clarified that pre-December 2009 events were included only for context, so the adjudicator left their evidentiary use to the hearing adjudicator.

The adjudicator dismissed the estoppel argument regarding the December 2009 allegations, noting that a person cannot contractually agree to waive future human rights protections.

The Tribunal convened a summary hearing by teleconference to determine whether the application should be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing despite receiving proper notice.

In the absence of the applicant or any explanation for his failure to attend, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The respondents requested an order dismissing the applicant's human rights application on the basis that it was duplicative of another application alleging contravention of a settlement agreement, or alternatively, that the applications be consolidated.

The Tribunal found the legal issues in the two applications were distinct, as one alleged breach of contract under s. 45.9 of the Code and the other alleged discrimination and reprisal under ss. 1 and 8.

The request to dismiss was denied, but given the factual overlap, the Tribunal ordered the applications to be processed together and heard by the same adjudicator.

The applicant, a resident of a co-operative apartment, filed a human rights application alleging harassment on the basis of being a 'single Caucasian woman' and reprisal.

She claimed that the respondents failed to address her complaints about a neighbour's loud music and colluded to have her charged with criminal harassment.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to allege facts linking the respondents' conduct to a prohibited ground, and her noise complaints did not constitute claiming or enforcing rights under the Code.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability after being placed on a medical leave of absence and denied accommodation.

The respondent employer requested that the Tribunal defer the application pending the conclusion of an ongoing grievance arbitration dealing with the same facts and issues.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that deferral was appropriate to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions.

The Tribunal considered two requests for reconsideration of a previous decision finding that the respondent discriminated against the complainant.

The complainant sought to correct a typographical error in the respondent's name, which the Tribunal granted.

The respondent, through his daughter acting as power of attorney, sought reconsideration on the basis that his severe mental disability (paranoid schizophrenia) rendered him incapable of participating in the original hearing.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's fundamental right to be heard outweighed the public interest in finality, extended the time limit for the request, and ordered the complaint to be heard de novo.

The respondent employer sought to dismiss the applicant's human rights application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that an internal insurance appeal process conducted by its disability management service provider had appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the internal insurance appeal process was not a 'proceeding' within the meaning of s. 45.1, as it lacked the guarantees of procedural fairness and adjudicative independence.

Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that even if it were a proceeding, it did not deal with the substance of the human rights application regarding the failure to accommodate the applicant's disability-related needs.

The personal respondent brought a request to dismiss the human rights application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant alleged sexual harassment and sexual solicitation by the personal respondent, her supervisor.

The personal respondent argued that the substance of the application was appropriately dealt with in criminal proceedings, where he pleaded guilty to simple assault and received an absolute discharge.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the criminal proceedings did not address the human rights issues of sexual harassment and solicitation, and therefore the substance of the application was not appropriately dealt with.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and family status.

One of the named personal respondents, the former Director of Human Resources, filed a request to be removed as a party.

Applying the Persaud factors, the Tribunal found no compelling reason to continue the proceeding against the personal respondent, as her interactions with the applicant arose out of her corporate duties and there was no issue regarding the corporate respondent's deemed liability.

The request was granted and the personal respondent was removed as a party.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

A summary hearing was scheduled to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant received proper notice but failed to attend the teleconference hearing.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed her application.

She argued that she made a mistake by not accepting a settlement offer from the respondent during the hearing and requested that the Tribunal grant her the settlement due to financial hardship.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that regretting the rejection of a settlement offer is not a valid ground for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

Furthermore, the Tribunal noted it lacks jurisdiction to order a remedy without a finding of a Code infringement.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of age, sex, and race regarding the claimant's employment and termination.

The respondents argued the application was filed outside the one-year time limit under s. 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the last incident of alleged discrimination occurred on June 4, 2008, when the employer made a settlement offer, and that subsequent steps in the grievance procedure did not constitute new incidents.

As the application was filed on June 30, 2009, it was out of time.

The Tribunal also found the delay was not incurred in good faith, as waiting for the conclusion of a grievance process or being out of the country were not reasonable explanations.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a practicing Christian who observes weekly and High Sabbaths, alleged that his employer and union discriminated against him on the basis of creed.

He claimed the employer was required to provide paid leave for his High Sabbaths and that the union failed to negotiate such leave or pursue his grievance.

The Tribunal dismissed these claims, finding that the duty to accommodate does not require employers to pay wages for time not worked.

However, the Tribunal found that the employer's Attendance Recognition Program, which disqualified the applicant from perfect attendance bonuses due to his unpaid religious absences, constituted adverse effect discrimination.

The employer was ordered to pay $2,000 for injury to dignity and to revise the program.

The applicant in a human rights proceeding requested an order requiring the respondent municipality to produce documents regarding building code capacity and age verification procedures at a community centre, as well as particulars of the respondent's witnesses' responses to his intended evidence.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the requested documents were not arguably relevant to the core issue of whether the applicant's race or colour factored into his exclusion from the gymnasium.

The Tribunal also found that the respondent's will-say statements complied with the Rules of Procedure and provided sufficient detail for the applicant to know the case he had to meet.