Barbara Miller

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for oppressive conduct under the Business Corporations Act, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following their offers to settle, but the court found the offers did not comply with Rule 49 due to uncertain release terms.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the defendants' argument for elevated costs despite allegations of fraud made by the plaintiff.

The court considered the complexity of the proceeding, the amounts claimed, the rates and hours spent by counsel, and the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The appellant architect appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to notify a prior architect on three projects and for providing architectural services through an unlicensed entity.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings regarding the failure to notify, concluding the Committee reasonably interpreted the regulation.

However, the Court set aside the finding regarding unlicensed practice, holding the Committee failed to determine whether the drawings at issue constituted a 'design' under the Architects Act.

The matter was remitted to the Committee on that issue.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device was made "forthwith" in accordance with section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that the officer failed to make the demand promptly upon acquiring sufficient information to give rise to reasonable suspicion, thereby breaching the accused's Charter rights.

The court found that the officer reasonably did not form the requisite reasonable suspicion until after the accused was placed in the police cruiser, at which point the demand was made promptly.

The Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting for its arrival when discovered.

The Crown conceded that the accused was impaired and over the legal limit but argued she was in care or control of the vehicle.

The trial judge found that the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized in a snowbank and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting inside the vehicle with the engine running for warmth.

The trial judge found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The complainant requested that the name of the corporate respondent in a previous Tribunal decision be corrected to reflect a legal name change that occurred before the decision was issued.

The respondents opposed the request, arguing it was out of time and the Tribunal lacked authority.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding it had the power under section 21.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to correct errors similar to typographical errors at any time, and alternatively, the power to correct an error made in expressing its manifest intention.