Lorne Slotnick

The applicant, a seasonal camper of Polish origin, alleged that his family was evicted from a campground because of their ethnic origin.

The respondents maintained that the eviction was due to a long history of rule-breaking, culminating in an aggressive confrontation between the applicant and a security guard.

The Tribunal found no evidence that Polish campers were treated differently or that the rules were applied more strictly to them.

The application was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish that his ethnic origin was a factor in his treatment or eviction.

The respondents moved to dismiss the human rights application after the applicant's litigation guardians failed for more than six months to comply with a Tribunal order to produce an unredacted document.

Following an interim decision that gave the applicant one final week to produce the document or face dismissal, the applicant failed to communicate with the Tribunal or produce the document.

The application was consequently dismissed.

The respondents requested the dismissal of a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, arguing that the applicant failed to comply with a Tribunal order to produce an unredacted psychological assessment.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's deliberate refusal to produce the document prejudiced the respondents and impaired the Tribunal's ability to assess the facts.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant to produce the complete report within seven days, failing which the application would be dismissed.

The applicant requested permission to audiotape the upcoming Case Resolution Conference hearing as an aide-memoire.

The respondents opposed the request, arguing it would cause delay, formality, and potential discomfort for witnesses.

The Tribunal found that audiotaping is akin to taking notes and that concerns about misuse could be addressed through conditions.

The Tribunal granted the request, allowing either party to audiotape the hearing subject to strict conditions regarding the use and dissemination of the recordings.

The applicant, a seven-year-old child with a disability, brought a human rights complaint against the respondent school board.

Prior to the hearing, the applicant's parents requested orders to close the hearing to the public, seal medical and school records, and keep the identities of the applicant and his parents confidential.

The Tribunal denied the requests, emphasizing the fundamental principle of open and transparent proceedings under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Tribunal's Rules.

The Tribunal found that the sensitive nature of the medical evidence and the applicant's age were not exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the open court principle.

The respondents brought preliminary requests to remove three individual respondents from the human rights application and to bar a report made to the Children's Aid Society from being considered.

The Tribunal dismissed both requests, finding it premature to remove the individual respondents whose conduct was central to the allegations, and holding that it could not assume the report to the Children's Aid Society was made with reasonable grounds or without malice before hearing evidence.

The applicant, a part-time retail employee at a winery, alleged sexual harassment by a director and reprisal by the corporate employer.

The applicant claimed the director made inappropriate comments, including calling her 'boobie girl'.

The Tribunal found the comments were offensive but did not constitute sexual harassment under the Code.

However, the Tribunal found that the corporate respondent stopped scheduling the applicant shortly after another employee raised concerns about the director's conduct on the applicant's behalf.

The Tribunal concluded the termination of employment was at least partially a reprisal for raising human rights concerns, violating section 8 of the Code.

The applicant was awarded $2,000 in general damages and $2,340 for lost wages.

The applicant filed an application under section 53(3) of the Human Rights Code.

At a Case Resolution Conference, the parties agreed to defer the hearing of the matter until after the applicant's appeals to the Ontario Labour Relations Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board are resolved.

The parties also agreed to remove two personal respondents from the proceeding.

The Tribunal issued an interim decision reflecting these agreements.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of disability following his termination.

He subsequently commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal, which included a claim for damages under the Human Rights Code.

The respondents requested that the Tribunal application be dismissed pursuant to section 34(11) of the Code.

The Tribunal found that the application was barred because the applicant had commenced a civil proceeding seeking compensation for the alleged human rights infringement, and that proceeding had not been withdrawn prior to making the application to the Tribunal.

The applicant, injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought an order requiring the insurer to produce any surveillance evidence it had obtained, regardless of whether the insurer intended to rely on it at the hearing.

The arbitrator dismissed the request, holding that under Rule 40 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code, an insurer's obligation to produce surveillance evidence only arises if it intends to rely on it at the hearing.

The arbitrator followed the appellate decision in Puljic, finding that the specific rule regarding surveillance takes precedence over the general rule allowing an arbitrator to order production of relevant documents.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

After failing to resolve disputes through mediation, he applied for arbitration.

The applicant failed to comply with a prior order to produce documents and sign authorizations.

The arbitrator removed the applicant's former representative from the record at his request and ordered the arbitration stayed until the applicant complied with the production order.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant failed to appear at the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator stayed the proceeding to allow the applicant time to provide an explanation, but no correspondence was received and mail sent to the applicant's last known address was returned.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant's application for statutory accident benefits was previously dismissed after the applicant and his counsel failed to attend the hearing.

The insurer sought expenses of $6,723.58.

The arbitrator reduced the counsel hours claimed from 55 to 40 and adjusted the hourly rate to comply with the Legal Aid Services Act.

The arbitrator ordered the applicant to pay $3,588.72 in expenses to the insurer.

The arbitrator declined to order the applicant's counsel to pay any portion of the expenses personally under s. 282 of the Insurance Act, finding that the counsel did not cause unnecessary expenses or delays, and the fault lay with the client.

The applicant failed to attend a peremptory preliminary issues hearing regarding his claim for statutory accident benefits.

His counsel requested an adjournment, stating the applicant was in the Philippines, but provided no evidence or instructions.

The arbitrator dismissed the application due to the applicant's failure to meet his onus of establishing a basis for his claim.

The arbitrator also ordered expenses payable to the insurer and allowed submissions on whether the applicant's counsel should be personally liable for a portion of the costs.

The applicant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, applied for statutory accident benefits and subsequently for arbitration.

He failed to appear at the hearing, having sent a letter requesting an adjournment due to alleged family emergencies, but subsequently lost contact with his counsel and the Commission.

The arbitrator refused to grant the adjournment immediately but declined the insurer's request to dismiss the application outright.

Instead, the arbitrator stayed the proceeding and ordered the applicant to provide justification for his absence and pay $750 in expenses to the insurer by a specified date, failing which the application would be dismissed.

The insurer brought a motion to stay the arbitration proceeding until the applicant attended three insurer examinations under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant had refused to attend the examinations, arguing they were solely to determine if his impairment was catastrophic, which was not an issue in the arbitration.

The arbitrator found that two of the examinations were primarily for determining catastrophic impairment and were not proper under section 42.

However, the arbitrator ordered the applicant to attend the third examination with a neurologist, as it was reasonably necessary to assess the ongoing claim for income replacement benefits.

The motion was allowed in part, but the request to stay the arbitration was denied.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until they were terminated by the insurer following an insurer examination.

More than three years later, after the applicant underwent knee and hip replacement surgeries and applied for arbitration, the insurer requested a further examination by the same doctor.

The applicant refused to attend.

The arbitrator held that the applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration, finding that the requested examination did not meet the requirements of section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator concluded that the primary purpose of the examination was to prepare for the upcoming arbitration hearing rather than to determine entitlement to a benefit.

The applicant was struck by an uninsured vehicle while walking across a street.

She applied for statutory accident benefits from Wawanesa, which insured the driver of the vehicle on another policy.

Wawanesa returned the application, claiming it was not an insurer because the driver had cancelled her liability coverage days before the accident.

The arbitrator held that Wawanesa, having initially advised the applicant's counsel that the driver was insured, created a sufficient nexus to be considered an insurer.

As the first insurer to receive the application, Wawanesa was required under O. Reg. 283/95 to respond to the application and pay benefits pending any priority dispute.

The insurer brought a motion to compel the insured to attend an in-person vocational assessment examination and to stay the arbitration hearing until she complied.

The insurer had previously obtained a paper review report from its vocational expert, who stated his conclusions were reliable and comprehensive.

The arbitrator found that the insurer's request, made more than four years after benefits were terminated and shortly before the hearing, was for hearing preparation rather than ongoing claims assessment.

The arbitrator concluded the examination was not reasonably necessary under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and allowed the arbitration to proceed.

The adjudicator determined the quantum of costs payable by the Ontario Human Rights Commission to the City of Thunder Bay following a previous order for costs on a party and party basis for 20 hearing days, reduced by 30%.

The City claimed approximately $73,000, while the Commission argued for $18,350.50.

The adjudicator allowed preparation time but excluded the cost of a legal assistant and time spent arguing about costs.

After applying the necessary reductions and pro-rating, the costs were fixed at $47,907.91.