Tobin

The parties separated after a 24-year marriage.

The court resolved several contested issues regarding property division, child support, and spousal support.

The court found the husband had a 50% beneficial interest in a corporation held solely in the wife's name based on a resulting trust.

The court also determined the husband's income for child support purposes by attributing a portion of the pre-tax corporate income to him, rejecting his argument that all retained earnings were necessary for capital expenditures.

Finally, the court found the wife entitled to indefinite spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.

The mother, a Jordanian citizen, brought the parties' three children from Kuwait to Ontario and sought a parenting order.

The father, residing in Kuwait, challenged Ontario's jurisdiction and sought the return of the children pursuant to Kuwaiti custody orders.

The court found that while the children were not habitually resident in Ontario at the time the application commenced, Ontario had jurisdiction under s. 22(1)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act due to the children's physical presence, substantial connection, and the balance of convenience.

Alternatively, the court found jurisdiction under s. 23, as the children would suffer serious harm if returned to Kuwait due to the risk of psychological harm, family violence, and the children's strong views against returning.

The father's request to recognize the Kuwaiti orders was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to split the divorce claim from the other issues in the case pursuant to Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent opposed, arguing that a divorce would prejudice her pending claims in India, and relied on an affidavit from an Indian lawyer as expert evidence of foreign law.

The court found the expert evidence inadmissible because the lawyer was not sufficiently qualified and the opinion lacked reliability.

Finding no disadvantage to either spouse, the court granted the motion to split the divorce and awarded costs to the applicant.

The applicant moved under Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules to split his request for a divorce from the other issues in the case.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing that a Canadian divorce would prejudice her ability to pursue property claims against the applicant in India.

The respondent relied on an unsworn letter from an Indian lawyer as expert evidence of foreign law.

The court found the letter inadmissible as expert evidence due to a lack of qualifications and explanation.

However, to deal with the case justly, the court adjourned the motion to allow both parties to obtain and present admissible expert evidence regarding Indian law.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change seeking a temporary order to relocate the parties' child from London to Calgary.

The respondent father opposed the move and sought a 2-2-3 parenting schedule.

The court applied the relocation provisions of the Children's Law Reform Act and found that the mother, as the primary caregiver, had a reasonable plan for relocation that would provide her with family support and career advancement.

The court determined that the relocation was in the child's best interests and granted the temporary order, while establishing a schedule for the father's contact with the child.

The parties separated after a brief marriage and sought orders regarding parenting, child support, and spousal support for their six-year-old child.

The mother withdrew her initial request to relocate to Germany.

The court ordered joint decision-making responsibility, with the mother having final decision-making authority subject to certain limitations, and granted the mother primary residence with the father having parenting time on alternate weekends and one overnight per week.

The father was ordered to pay $605 per month in child support and $150 per month in indefinite spousal support, subject to review.

The father's claim for retroactive reimbursement of spousal support was dismissed, though a minor credit for child support overpayment was granted.

The applicant moved for a post-judgment Mareva injunction in aid of execution, alleging the respondent intended to sell his home and move to Mexico to avoid paying child support and costs.

The court found the applicant established a strong prima facie case that there was a risk the respondent intended to remove assets from the jurisdiction.

The balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction, which was ordered to remain in effect for 120 days.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application seeking an extended society care order for a three-year-old child who had been in foster care since birth.

The mother sought the child's return.

The court found the child remained in need of protection due to the mother's unresolved anger management issues, housing instability, and association with individuals involved in criminal activity.

Concluding that a supervision order would not adequately protect the child, the court ordered extended society care.

The court also granted limited supervised access to the mother and siblings, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

The applicant sought costs of $7,500 following three motions concerning parenting time, school registration, and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent requested no order for costs.

The court found divided success but determined the applicant was the more successful party on the core issues.

Considering the parties' behaviour, the importance of the issues, and the time spent, the court ordered the respondent to pay $6,000 in costs to the applicant, payable from his share of the net proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home.

The applicant maternal grandmother moved to amend a previous costs order of $85,000 against the respondent father, seeking to apportion 50 percent of the costs to child support.

The father had declared bankruptcy, and costs attributed to child support survive bankruptcy.

The court found it had jurisdiction to apportion costs retroactively.

However, because child support was resolved by consent before trial and was not a contested issue, the court declined to apportion 50 percent as requested.

Instead, considering the time spent and complexity, the court apportioned 10 percent of the costs to child support.

The mother withheld the child from the father after the father was charged with distributing intimate images of the mother online.

The father brought a motion for the return of the child, and the mother brought a cross-motion for a temporary variation of the final parenting order to grant her primary care.

The court found the matter urgent but dismissed the mother's motion for a temporary variation, holding that the untested affidavit evidence regarding the father's involvement in the distribution of the images was not sufficiently compelling to establish an immediate risk of harm to the child.

The mother was ordered to return the child to the father's care.

The parties, who share parenting time on a rotating weekly basis, disagreed on which school their four-year-old child should attend for junior kindergarten.

The applicant father proposed a public school near his home, while the respondent mother proposed a French first language Catholic school.

The court applied the best interests of the child test, considering logistics, the parents' ability to assist with homework, and the promotion of the child's religious and linguistic heritage.

The court ordered that the child attend the French Catholic school proposed by the mother, finding it more consonant with the child's best interests.

The Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a four-month-old Indigenous child.

The parents opposed, seeking the child's return under supervision.

The court analyzed whether the provincial child protection legislation conflicted with the federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, concluding there was no conflict and the augmented provincial best interests test applied.

Finding that the child could be adequately protected by strict terms of supervision while residing with the maternal great-aunt, the court dismissed the Society's motion and placed the child in the joint care of the parents.

The applicant mother and respondent father both brought motions for interim primary care of their three children and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The parties had been living separate and apart under the same roof for over a year, with significant domestic conflict adversely affecting the children.

The father sought to introduce surreptitious video recordings of the mother; the court admitted three where the mother was aware of the recording but gave them little weight, and excluded a fourth taken without her knowledge.

The court granted the mother interim primary care, finding she had been the primary caregiver and it was in the children's best interests to maintain the status quo.

The court also granted the mother exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to protect the children from further exposure to conflict, with the implementation date adjourned to allow the father to find alternate accommodations.

The applicant sought a divorce under Part 2 of the Civil Marriage Act, which allows Canadian courts to grant divorces to non-resident spouses whose marriage is not recognized in their state of residence.

The parties, who reside in Hong Kong, separated four months before the application was issued.

The court found the application deficient because the Act requires parties to be separated for at least one year before making the application.

Additionally, the court held that expert evidence is required to prove the foreign law that Hong Kong does not recognize the marriage.

The applicant was granted time to file further evidence before the application would be dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for a temporary order granting her exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and custody of the children.

The parties had been living separate and apart under the same roof for over a year.

The moving party alleged that the living arrangement had become unbearable due to tension and verbal abuse.

The court found that while there was tension and stress in the home, it did not rise to the level of warranting the dramatic and highly prejudicial effect of excluding the responding party from the home at this time.

The motion was dismissed.