CITATION: Kirwin v. Kirwin, 2024 ONSC 3269

COURT FILE NO.: FC390/20

DATE: July 17, 2024

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN:

Wendy Marilyn Kirwin

Monique Rae Bennett, for the Applicant

Applicant

- and -

Christopher Leo Kirwin

Zachary Wilson, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: May 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 31, 2024

TOBIN J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: PART 1

Introduction

1The parties were able to resolve some issues arising from their marriage and separation. They appear before the court seeking orders on contested matters related to property, child support and spousal support.

2In these Reasons, I will refer to the Applicant as the “wife”, and the Respondent as the “husband.” I do so for the sake of clarity.

3These Reasons address the issues identified by the parties as being in dispute. Based on the findings set out in these Reasons, the parties ought to be able to calculate their respective net family properties, determine the equalization payment due, and calculate post-equalization adjustments. As well, they ought to be able to calculate retrospective and ongoing child support and spousal support. Once calculated, a final order will be granted. If the parties are not able to resolve these issues, they are to appear before me for further submissions.

Facts

4The wife is now 54 years of age. She is employed as a high school teacher and has been teaching since 1994.

5The husband is now 56 years of age. He is a commercial real estate broker and invests in real estate.

6After dating for a number of years, the parties married on July 21, 1995. He was then 27 and she was 25.

7Once married, they lived in Stratford. This was midway between London, where the husband was a real estate appraiser, and Waterloo, where the wife was employed by the local school board.

8The parties subsequently moved to Kitchener. The husband had opened an appraisal office in London and Kitchener.

9By the fall of 1998, the wife was able to obtain employment with the board of education in London. The parties then moved to London and purchased a home.

10The husband began building his own appraisal and real estate business in London.

11Their lives were then centered in London.

12They are the parents of four children: [P.], born [MM DD], 1999, [M.], born [MM DD], 2001, [K.], born [MM DD], 2004, and [J.], born [MM DD], 2006.

13When [P.] was born, the wife took a six-month parenting leave. At the end of the leave, she returned to work on a part-time basis.

14When [M.] was born, the wife took a one-year parenting leave. At the end of that year, she returned to work, again on a part-time basis. The parties hired a nanny to help them in their home.

15Beginning in February 2004, when pregnant with [K.], the mother took a one-year parenting leave.

16In February 2005, she returned to work, again on a part-time basis. The parties hired a nanny to help in the home. The nanny would stay until 3:30 p.m. when the wife returned home.

17In September 2006, the wife took a two-year parenting leave; the first year with pay and the second without.

18The wife returned to her employment on a part-time basis in September 2008.

19It was not until 2017 that the wife returned to teach on a full-time basis.

20It was the wife’s evidence, which I accept, that the first ten years of their marriage, the husband worked full days and was usually home for dinner. He was active in the lives of the children.

21After those ten years, the husband was less present. He networked. He was often not home for dinners. The husband acknowledged coming home often to “a cold dinner for him on the plate.” It was left to the wife primarily to attend to the children’s needs.

22The husband, because of his flexible schedule, was able to take the children to appointments during the school day. He was involved in the children’s extracurricular activities. He earned a scuba license with [P.]. With [M.], he took his snowboard instructor course, and with [K.], his ski instructor course. He taught skiing and snowboarding at a private ski club with the children.

23During the marriage, the parties enjoyed some economic success. They acquired a home in London and a cottage on a lake. They were able to join a private ski club. Also, they were able to contribute to the wife’s pension for the periods she was on parental leaves. The husband was able to expand his business and acquire properties as a method of wealth accumulation.

24The following corporations were used to accumulate that wealth: J.A.C.K. Realty Inc. (“JACK”), 1865566 Ontario Inc. (“186”), Kirwin Realty Services Inc. (“KRS”), 2660625 Ontario Inc. (“266” which eventually was named “SWOT”), and 1390715 Ontario Inc. (“139”).

25Unfortunately, there were problems in the marriage that resulted in the parties separating. The date of separation agreed to by the parties was March 3, 2019.

26The wife remained in the home in London and eventually the husband resided at their cottage.

[P.]

27The wife continued working on a part-time basis so that she could meet the needs of the children, especially [P.]’s.

28When [P.] was 15, he exhibited symptoms that eventually were diagnosed as chronic fatigue syndrome. The wife made sure that [P.] attended the alternative school at which he was enrolled. She made sure he got there.

29[P.] did graduate from high school and enrolled at […] College for the fall of 2019. He did not return to […] College for his second term in January 2020.

30After sharing his time between the home of the parties in January and February 2020, [P.] has since lived with the husband.

31In September 2020, [P.] enrolled, and continues to attend, university on a part-time basis.

[M.]

32[M.] lived with the wife until September 2021. She completed high school and was accepted to attend a university in British Columbia to study art. However, the pandemic required her to stay at home and attend classes online. This was not to her liking. Instead, she began learning to be a tattoo artist. By the fall of 2021, she was earning enough money to reside on her own.

[K.]

33[K.], a good student, graduated from high school and chose to attend university to study molecular biology and genetics. She intends to earn her Master’s degree. She remained in the wife’s home until the fall of 2022, when she went to university. She now returns to the wife’s home during the summer months (May to August). For the summer of 2024, she is involved in a co-op education program, as a researcher.

[J.]

34[J.] will graduate high school in June 2024. She is enrolled in a one-year college hairstyling program. It is expected that she will continue to live with the wife and commute to school.

Property

35The parties were able to agree on many issues related to the calculation of their respective net family property and post-equalization adjustment claims. However, the following issues were not agreed upon by them.

Issue #1—What interest, if any, does the husband have in 139?

Facts

36In the early years of the parties’ marriage, the husband was a real estate appraiser. He was not a member of a pension plan where savings could be accumulated. His plan to accumulate wealth for the family slowly over time was to invest in real estate. He described real estate investment as a “slow burn,” where it takes approximately 20 years to realize value.

37139 was incorporated on March 29, 2000 for the purpose of acquiring property.

38The husband was an officer and director of 139.

39The wife was also an officer and the sole shareholder of 139.

40The corporation was organized this way to protect family wealth from potential creditors.

41As an appraiser, the husband was of the view that he would be more exposed to lawsuits arising from his professional work than would the wife as a teacher.

42The husband provided the funds that allowed the corporation to start acquiring real estate. He invested approximately $200,000 he received from the sale of his interest in an internet company.

43The husband had signing authority for 139. He managed the company and made all the significant business decisions. The wife had little to do with 139.

44Over time, 139 acquired and sold a number of properties. It also received interest-free loans from related corporations controlled by the husband.

45At the date of separation, 139 owned two properties, 392–396 Clarence Street and 140 Dundas Street. It also owed money to a related corporation.

46The husband continued to manage 139 after the parties separated, until October 2023.

47Following the separation, the husband took management fees for the work he did on account of 139. He received a total of $82,341 in management fees from 2020 until 2022. He did not receive any management fees from 139 prior to separation.

48He stopped managing the affairs of the company in large part because of his disagreement with the wife about how to pay for needed improvements to the properties.

49Since October 2023, the wife, with the help of her brother, has managed the properties owned by 139.

50The wife does not want to manage or hold these properties for the long term. Her intention is to sell the properties and wind up the company. Her intentions were known by the husband when he stopped managing 139. He understood that his resignation as an officer and director would result in the liquidation of the company.

51At the time of trial, the wife had been able to sell 140 Dundas Street for $1.85 million, with a closing date in June 2024.

52At the date of separation, the appraised value of 140 Dundas Street was $950,000 based on an appraisal commissioned by her.

53The appraised value of this property on the date of separation, based on an appraisal commissioned by the husband, was $647,000.

54At the time the appraisals were commissioned, the parties expected that the husband would be able to own 139. The issue was, at what price. They were not able to agree.

55The husband now advances a trust claim for a proprietary interest in 139 so that he can share in the post-separation increase in value of the company.

56Subsequent to the separation, the husband, through KRS, began a lawsuit against 139 for $746,591.50 as of February 1, 2024, on account of an intercompany loan as well as for possession of the two properties. According to the statement of claim issued by KRS, 139 requested that KRS loan it $622,002.76, with interest at 10% per annum, by letter of agreement dated April 1, 2022. 139 gave a mortgage to KRS to secure the loan in the amount of $1.5 million. The loan documents were not put in evidence in this trial.

57This transaction occurred after the date of separation and at a time when the parties were unable to resolve issues arising from their separation, including what was to happen with 139.

58The statement of claim issued by KRS was served very shortly after the parties concluded an agreement to sell their cottage to the husband. This had been a protracted and contentious negotiation. The wife’s evidence, which I accept, is that the husband did not say anything about claiming interest on the intercompany loan until after the cottage sale.

59When 139 was valued at the date of separation by Mr. Hoare on behalf of the wife, he did so on the basis that intercompany loans were non-interest bearing. He did so on the basis that the financial statements did not say they were interest bearing and that there was no indication in the corporate documents that they were.

Position of the parties

60The husband claims that he is entitled to a beneficial interest in 139 on the basis of a resulting trust or by way of a remedy for unjust enrichment. The remedy he seeks is a 50% proprietary interest in 139.

61The wife’s position is that there is no unjust enrichment. She argues that while she has ownership of 139 and will benefit from it, at the same time, the husband has other corporations that he owns outright or as a majority shareholder with a third party. He will benefit from post-separation increases in the value of these investments. 139, according to the wife, was part of the joint family venture. The husband and she will share in the value of the other’s property as of the date of separation through the equalization provisions of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”).

62The wife submits that regarding post-separation increase in value of the corporations, it is the totality of the investments held by both that must be considered. The husband will benefit from the increase in value of those corporations owned by him, and the wife will not. She will have the benefit of the increase in value of 139, and he will not. According to the wife, these circumstances do not amount to either party being unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.

63The wife also argues that, if post-separation increases are to be taken into account, it should be through a s. 5(6) claim, which allows for an unequal division of net family property.

Legal considerations

64Before property can be equalized under the FLA, it is necessary to determine the net family property (“NFP”) of each spouse: Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, at para. 47.

65Section 10(1) of the FLA provides the Court with the jurisdiction to determine questions of ownership or possession of particular property as between spouses.

66In Rawluk v. Rawluk, 1990 CanLII 152 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R 70, the majority of the Supreme Court held that claims of beneficial ownership are available to determine ownership in equalization proceedings under the FLA s. 10(1): see Martin, at para. 47.

67The beneficial interest claimed by the husband in this case is ownership by resulting trust and as the remedy for unjust enrichment.

Resulting trust

68In Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, the Supreme Court of Canada stated at para. 20 that a “… resulting trust arises when title to property is in one party’s name, but that party, because he or she is a fiduciary or gave no value for the property, is under an obligation to give it back to the original owner.”

69Section 14 of the FLA provides that the rule of law “applying a presumption of resulting trust” applies in questions of ownership of property between spouses as if they were not married.¹ In Pecore, at paras. 24 and 25, the Supreme Court explained the presumption of resulting trust as follows:

24 The presumption of resulting trust is a rebuttable presumption of law and general rule that applies to gratuitous transfers. When a transfer is challenged, the presumption allocates the legal burden of proof. Thus, where a transfer is made for no consideration, the onus is placed on the transferee to demonstrate that a gift was intended [...]. This is so because equity presumes bargains, not gifts.

25 The presumption of resulting trust therefore alters the general practice that a plaintiff (who would be the party challenging the transfer in these cases) bears the legal burden in a civil case. Rather, the onus is on the transferee to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust.

[Citations omitted.]

70Where a party transferred property to their spouse with the intention of defeating potential creditors, that party may be precluded from claiming a resulting trust because they have not come to court with “clean hands.”

71In this case, the reason the corporation was put in the wife’s name alone was to protect it from possible creditors of the husband.

72The reason for putting the corporation in the wife’s name is a relevant factor to the determination of the resulting trust claim, but it is not determinative of the husband’s intent at the time of transfer: see Nassbaum v. Nassbaum, (2004), 2004 CanLII 23086 (ON SC), 10 C.B.R. (5th) 54 (Ont. S.C.), para. 32.

73In this case, the husband provided all the funds to establish 139.

74The wife provided no consideration for the registration of the shares in her name.

75The wife accepted the shares as part of the husband’s plan to acquire wealth for them and to protect it from his potential creditors.

76This plan continued until October 2023, when the husband gave over control of the corporation to the wife.

77I find that in all of these circumstances, the husband has established the presumption of resulting trust regarding the shares in 139. This was not rebutted by the wife. However, I find that the parties understood at the time of the transfer, and it was the husband’s intention at that time, that the shares were to benefit both of them. Investing in property was the way wealth would be acquired equally for the parties.

78I find that one half of the shareholdings was a gift to the wife. She accepted that gift by having the shares held in her name.

79The other half of the shareholding was intended to be held for the benefit of the husband. I find that it was not his intention to gift 100% of the shares to the wife. The other half of the shareholding was intended to be held by the wife for the benefit of the husband.

80Subsequent to the transfer, the husband acted in accordance with the plan to accumulate wealth for them by investing in real property. At trial, the husband did not claim to have an entitlement to all of the shares in 139 but only to half of them.

81Despite evidence that shares were put in the wife’s name to protect the corporation from potential creditors, I find on all the evidence that the husband intended to gift half of the shares to the wife. There were no specific creditors at the time the shares were registered in the wife’s name.

82The wife argues that the husband’s claim through KRS against 139 is inconsistent with this trust claim because he is “suing himself”. With respect, I do not agree that is the case. The lawsuit of KRS against 139 does not call into question or contradict the husband’s intentions at the time the shares in 139 were put into the wife’s name nor their plan to acquire wealth through real estate investments. It is not for the Court, in this case, to determine whether the KRS claim for interest on the intercompany loan and having it and the principal amount owing secured by way of a mortgage, is proper, valid, or enforceable. That may be for another Court to decide.

83I do not agree with the wife that the husband’s claim to post-separation increases should be limited to a s. 5(6) claim: see Rawluk, supra.

Unjust enrichment claim

84As I have found that the husband has a proprietary interest in the shares, it is unnecessary to make a finding with respect to the husband’s unjust enrichment claim.

85Nonetheless, I would find that the wife would be enriched in the circumstances of this case, as I have described, should she retain the post-separation increase in value of 139 on her own. The husband would be correspondingly deprived. There is an absence of a juristic reason that would support a finding that the wife should be entitled to more than one half of the increase in the post-separation value of 139.

86The enrichment is the increase in the value of 139 post separation. 139 was able to increase in value, in part because of the husband’s initial investment and his ongoing management even after the separation. The husband’s investment and efforts contributed to the opportunity for the value of 139 to grow post separation.

87The husband would be correspondingly deprived if he were not able to share in this increase in value. I accept the husband's argument that a further deprivation is that he would not fully realize the return of his initial investment.

88As I have found that the husband intended to gift one half of 139 to the wife, that is a sufficient juristic reason why the wife should be able to retain one half of the post-separation increase in value of 139. However, I am not persuaded by the wife in all the circumstances of this case, that there is a juristic reason why one half of the post-separation increase in 139 should not accrue to the husband.

89I find that monetary damages would not be appropriate in this case. It is not possible to fix a sum when the post separation change in the value of 139 will be determined only when the underlying assets are sold, and net proceeds can be distributed equally.

Realizing the interest in 139

90The parties were not able to resolve contentious issues related to 139 despite their best efforts to do so.

91Having found that the husband has a one-half interest in the shares of 139, I do not want to set the parties up for another dispute about how they are going to realize their respective interests in 139.

92Section 10(1)(c) of the FLA allows the court to order that property be sold for the purpose of realizing an interest in it.

93This section provides a substantive power to the Court, designed to enable it to complete the resolution of a question of ownership, referred to in s. 10. In Cannell v. Cannell, 2003 O.J. No. 734, the court held that “court must have jurisdiction to divide proceeds of jointly owned property being held in trust.”²

94The process of sale has already started. When the husband gave up management of 139 in October 2023, the wife, with the help of her brother, took on this responsibility. As stated earlier, the husband was aware that the wife did not want to manage 139 and that it was her intention to sell the corporate assets and wind up the company. She has already sold 140 Dundas Street. She is trying to sell 392–396 Clarence Street.

95In order to reduce, and hopefully avoid, the potential for further dispute, it is ordered that the assets of 139 be sold and the net proceeds be divided equally between the parties. As the wife is now the sole officer and director of the company, she shall be authorized to take the reasonable steps necessary to wind up 139, including engaging third parties to provide needed services. She may also claim management fees for her efforts to wind up the corporation in the same manner the husband did post-separation.

Issue #2—What is the value of 139 for the calculation of the parties’ respective NFPs?

96As the value of the shares in 139 is owned equally by the parties, the amount to be included in their respective NFP calculations need no longer be a matter of contention between them.

97I will accede to the submission of the wife and value 139 in an amount midway between the respective valuations submitted by the parties. This is consistent with how the parties resolved other valuation differences.

98The wife claims that 139 was valued at $1,191,000, and the husband at $772,000, on valuation date.

99The average of these two values is $981,500. Therefore, the amount of $490,750 is the one-half value to be included in each party’s NFP calculation.

Issue #3—What is the value of household contents and what is to be done with them?

100The wife obtained appraisals of the contents of 1117 The Parkway (“1117”) and the cottage from Gardner Galleries.

101Gardner Galleries appraised the contents of 1117 as of July 8, 2019 in the amount of $7,515. This appraisal report was admitted into evidence on consent. The appraiser was not required to testify. This is the best evidence as to the value of the contents at 1117 on the date of separation. These contents are jointly owned.

102The value to be included in each party’s NFP statement for these contents is $3,757.50.

103Ferguson Auctioneering and Appraisal appraised the fair market value of the contents of the cottage as of February 28, 2020. These contents were valued at $89,000.

104The husband purchased the cottage from himself and the wife on March 1, 2024. Included in the purchase price were household content items previously valued by Ferguson. The net value of those items previously valued was $31,500. According to the Ferguson report, the remaining items were valued at $57,500. The appraisal report was admitted into evidence on consent. The appraiser was not required to testify.

105The husband obtained values of some of those items that had been valued by Ferguson. The differences are as follows:

Cottage contents

• Pontoon
• ATV
• Seadoo
• Snowmobile

Ferguson $35,00 $4,300 $2,600 $4,300

Husband’s Appraiser $37,500 $4,800 $3,500 $4,500

106The persons who provided values on behalf of the husband did not indicate their respective qualifications to value the items in question. In these circumstances, I find that the Ferguson values to be more reliable.

107The values to be included in each party’s NFP statement for the cottage contents is $28,750.

108Because the husband believes that the household contents have no value, he requests they should be sold and the proceeds divided, or they should make a list of items, and each choose what they want.

109The wife opposes this request. She asks the court to consider the case of Moreno v. Hernandez, 2016 ONSC 5212, for the proposition that the Family Law Act does not provide for division of property in specie. A trial judge cannot redistribute property between parties under the equalization provisions of the FLA. I agree with this submission.

110While the court could order the sale of all the household contents, this would unnecessarily increase tensions between the parties. I also take into account that both parties still have a child, or children, living with them. Selling the household contents would be unnecessarily disruptive for all of them. Finally, I also take into account that the parties separated five years ago and those items that remain are likely to have diminished in value.

111I decline to make any further order with respect to household contents.

112The wife shall be entitled to a post-equalization adjustment of $28,750 on account of the cottage contents.

113The husband shall be entitled to a post-equalization adjustment in the amount of $3,757.50 on account of the 1117 household contents.

Issue #4—What amount is to be included in each party’s NFP statement on account of contingent income taxes to be paid on the disposition of their respective interests in the corporations?

114At the date of separation, the husband had interests in the following corporations: JACK, 186, KRS and SWOT (formerly 266).

115The husband commissioned the valuation report prepared by Ms. Poole detailing his contingent tax liability on the notional disposition of his interests in the four corporations.³

116Mr. Hoare also prepared a similar report, dated May 23, 2024.⁴

117Both experts agreed that the contingent tax to attribute to the notional disposition of JACK was between $36,523 and $36,544 as at the date of separation. As Mr. Hoare’s report was not provided until after he testified and was not tested by cross-examination, I will rely upon the Poole report for this purpose. The amount to be included in the husband’s NFP statement on this account is $36,523.

118Regarding 186, KRS and SWOT, Ms. Poole valued the contingent tax at $222,272. Mr. Hoare valued it at $228,360. The difference is modest. A review of their calculations indicates that the slightly different amounts are based upon a difference in proceeds available for distribution.

119In the Poole report, it is stated that the funds available for distribution were said to be the agreed upon value. On that basis, as well as for the reasons set out above, it is her calculation that will be relied upon as the contingent tax attributed to the disposition of these corporations, that is, $222,272. This is the amount to be included in the husband’s NFP statement.

120Ms. Poole also valued the wife’s date of separation contingent tax liability on the notional disposition of 139 at $60,282.⁵ This calculation was based upon 139 being valued at $772,000. However, as stated above, I have found that the valuation day value of 139 was $981,500. I also found that the wife held 50% of the shareholdings for herself and the other 50% for the husband. If the parties are not able to agree on the contingent tax liability on the notional disposition of 139 based on the value as found by me, they are to provide further submissions.

121The wife will owe capital gains on account of the sale of her interest in the cottage property. The wife has calculated this amount to be $140,154.97. The husband made no submissions to the contrary. This amount shall be included in the wife’s NFP calculation.

Issue #5—Is the wife entitled to a post-equalization adjustment on account of the payments she made towards the National Bank line of credit in excess of those made by the husband?

122The parties are joint debtors of a line of credit extended to them by National Bank.

123The line of credit is secured by a mortgage registered on title to 1117.

124The line of credit was used in part to purchase the cottage and complete renovations at 1117.

125At the date of separation, the amount outstanding on the line of credit was $319,657.97.

126After the parties separated, the wife made regular payments on the line of credit. The husband made payments towards the line of credit from May 2022 until January 2024.

127From the date of separation until April 2024, the wife paid $53,424.58 on account of the line of credit. The husband paid $30,345.08.

128The wife claims a post-equalization adjustment on account of her paying more on the line of credit than the husband. The amount claimed by her is $11,539.83.

129The wife bases her claim on the account being a joint debt that should be shared equally.

130As well, she argues that the delay in selling 1117 and paying off the line of credit was due to the husband’s refusal to see the property sold. In his email of July 6, 2020, the husband objected to listing the property for sale. It was not listed for sale until May 12, 2023, pursuant to the Order of Justice Munroe. The request for this order was made by the wife.

131The husband argues that he had to pay rent on an apartment, so the wife should be responsible for the mortgage on 1117. He also relies on Colquhoun-Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 ONSC 1509, in which the husband was required to pay spousal support. The support payments owing were made directly to the mortgagee. This had the effect of significantly reducing the outstanding principal owing on the mortgage. The wife claimed that the husband should not get any credit for the reduction of the mortgage principle because it was paid with support payments due her. The court denied the wife’s request on the basis that the wife, as occupant of the matrimonial home, was responsible for her living expenses, including those expenses associated with the matrimonial home.

132Colquhoun-Kelly can be distinguished from this case. The debt in question here is a line of credit that is secured by a mortgage on 1117. This line of credit was not used to purchase the property. In part, it was used to purchase the cottage, which is a benefit to the husband. The debt does not appear to be of the same character as the mortgage in Colquhoun-Kelly.

133I find that, as the debt is a joint one, not specifically incurred for the purchase of 1117, it should be shared equally by the parties.

134The wife is entitled to a post-equalization adjustment of $11,539.83 to April 2024 on account of payments she made on National Bank line of credit in excess of those made by the husband.

Issue #6—Is the Applicant entitled to exclude the value of certain property on account of it being traced to an inheritance?

135The wife abandoned this claim in submissions made at the end of the trial.

Issue #7—Should the husband reimburse the wife for the cost of repairing and staging the cottage for sale?

136The cottage was ordered to be listed for sale by Justice Munroe on May 12, 2023. The husband was responsible for getting the cottage ready for sale.

137As a result of information that she received from a realtor, the wife was concerned about how the husband had left the cottage. He started to do some repairs but did not complete them; for example, the kitchen had not been completely drywalled, there were holes in the basement ceiling and the deck was missing railings.⁶

138By order of Justice Campbell dated December 6, 2023, the wife was permitted to attend at the cottage for the sole purpose of making certain repairs.

139The wife hired a relative, who is a contractor, to affect the repairs and stage the cottage for sale. This work was done over a four-day period in December 2023.

140The wife was invoiced $28,815 for this work.⁷ To date, the wife has paid $8,000 on account of the work. I accept the wife’s evidence that she actually incurred this expense.

141The property was listed for $1.8 million. An offer was submitted in that amount by a third party. The husband submitted an offer in the amount of $1,800,100. The husband was able to purchase the property for this amount.

142The husband states that he spent money fixing the cottage. The amount he said he spent was $55,000. The wife discounts this work on the basis that it “made the cottage look bad.” The husband has not claimed reimbursement for the expenses he incurred in repairing the cottage.

143What is conceded by the wife is that the husband paid fair market value for the cottage.

144The wife wants to be reimbursed for the expense she incurred to improve and stage the cottage. The husband concedes that the wife should be credited with $8,000 that she paid.

145Both parties benefited from the repairs and staging that were affected in that the property sold for its fair market value. The husband should reimburse the wife for one half of the cost she incurred in helping realize the purchase price. In these circumstances, the wife is to receive a credit in the amount of $14,407.50 for the repairs and staging she undertook.

Child support

146As the parents of four children, the parties had and continue to have child support obligations towards one another.

147In order to determine the parties’ respective child support obligations, it is necessary to determine:

a) With whom a child lived while entitled to child support; and

b) The income of both parties.

148During the trial, the parties were able to agree on:

1. The question of where each child lived, that is, with which parent;

2. When each child was a child of the marriage and thereby entitled to child support⁸; and,

3. The wife’s income for the purposes of calculating child support.

149What remained in issue at the trial was the husband’s income for child support purposes.

Issue #8—What was and is the husband’s income for child support purposes?

Legal considerations

150The first step in determining a spouse’s income is to use the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” in that spouse’s T1 General Income Tax Return: see Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“CSG”), s. 16.

151The next step is to adjust that income calculation in accordance with Schedule III of the CSG, (see s. 16).

152Once these two steps are completed, the court may look at CSG ss. 17 to 20 to consider whether those provisions apply, and if so, what effect should be given on the facts of the case: Vincent v. Vincent, 2012 BCCA 186, at para. 35.⁹

153If the Court is of the opinion that the determination of a spouse’s annual income under s. 16 would not be the fairest determination, s. 17 of the CSG allows the court to have regard to the last three years of income and determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation of income, or a receipt of non-recurring amounts during those years.

154There is no requirement that the income be averaged over those three years, rather the objective is to use a method that is the fairest, that is, consistent with the objectives set out at s. 1 of the CSG.

155Section 18 of the CSG provides that, where a spouse is a shareholder, officer, or director of a corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of a spouse’s annual income as defined under s. 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the spouse for the payment of child support, the Court may determine a spouse’s annual income to include all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation.

156Section 18 gives the court discretion to deal with a situation where a spouse is able to manipulate or control their income as a shareholder, officer, or director of a corporation such that s. 16 income does not fairly reflect the money available for the payment of child support: Vincent, para. 37.

157Section 19 allows for income to be imputed to a spouse in a number of situations, including where income information was not provided.

Application of legal considerations

158The husband is the majority (60%) shareholder of J.A.C.K. Realty Inc. This company is a real estate brokerage using the Colliers International name. It specializes in the sale and leasing of investment properties. The husband is the president of JACK, the broker of record, and real estate agent.

159The husband is also the majority (60%) shareholder of 1865566 Ontario Inc. 186 owns rental property in London and shares in a company that owns land in Thornbury, Ontario.

160The husband is the sole shareholder of:

a) Kirwin Realty Services Inc. (“KRS”): this corporation has very little money¹⁰ to be added to the husband’s income for child support purposes;

b) 2660625 Ontario Inc., which operates as S.W.O.T. Management Inc. (“SWOT”), is a real estate management and rental company. It owns real property in London; and,

c) Kirwin and Associates Inc., which is a real estate management and appraisal consulting firm.

161Both parties retained experts to provide opinion evidence on the income available to the husband from these corporations, to provide support from the years 2018 to 2022.

162The wife retained James Hoare and the husband retained Louise Poole.

163Both experts were qualified without objection to provide opinion evidence regarding income the husband has and had available to provide child support.

164It was Mr. Hoare’s opinion that the husband had the following amounts of income with which to pay support:

165The basis of Mr. Hoare’s calculations was summarized by him at page 18 of his report as follows:

166It is Ms. Poole’s opinion that the husband had the following amounts of income with which to pay support:

167Ms. Poole explained that Scenario A is meant to be the husband’s actual income in the year noted. Scenario B adjusts for non-recurring items, as allowed for in the CSG, and may be considered when determining the husband’s future income.

168I have not included in these Reasons all of the schedules that were compiled to arrive at these figures.

169Counsel and the experts identified five differences in the approaches taken by the experts, and which explain why their conclusions as to the husband’s income differ.

1. Accounting for dividends

170Mr. Hoare included dividend income received by the husband from his corporations in determining the income he had available to pay child support.

171In doing so, Mr. Hoare followed s. 5 of Schedule III of the CSG, which provides as follows:

5 Replace the taxable amount of dividends from taxable Canadian corporations received by the spouse by the actual amount of those dividends received by the spouse.

172Ms. Poole did not suggest that the dividend income received by the husband from his corporations was other than dividend income from taxable Canadian corporations.

173However, Ms. Poole did not include dividend income when paid to the husband as being available for child support purposes. Instead, she attributed income to him based on the year the corporate income was earned and was added to its retained earnings. The reason Ms. Poole did not consider the dividend as income for child support purposes is because the corporate income was earned in a prior year. In this case, the dividend paid in 2020 (of $20,000) would have been paid on 2019 corporate income. As 2019 was the year the parties separated, the corporation was valued for equalization purposes as at that time and, therefore, there would be double counting of this value: once for property and once for child support.

174Both experts acknowledged that they have seen dividends treated both ways in determining income available for support analyses. Mr. Hoare chose not to use the method followed by Ms. Poole because the CSG provide otherwise.

175I agree with Mr. Hoare’s approach with respect to dividends in this case. This type of income is specifically provided for in the CSG. It reflects income that was actually available in a particular year to the support payor out of which child support could be paid. Dividend income is a source of income set out under the heading “Total income” in a T1 General form. It is then adjusted in accordance with Schedule III. This approach is consistent with objectives of the CSG, which include ensuring children benefit from the financial means of their parents¹¹in the year the money is received by the payor.

176Any possibility of double counting can be addressed when determining the amount of pre-tax corporate income to be included as income for child support.

177In this case, the difference in the two experts’ approaches resulted in a modest difference in their calculations: $8,000 over a four-year period.

2. Working capital analysis

178Working capital is the amount of cash or other current assets a company has available after current liabilities are accounted for. A corporation must have sufficient current assets to meet its ongoing liabilities. This definition is not disputed by the experts.

179Mr. Hoare included intercompany assets and liabilities from related companies as current assets and liabilities. Ms. Poole treated them as long-term assets and long-term liabilities, and therefore not part of the working capital analysis. According to Ms. Poole, these loans were not liquid and, consequently, not available to the corporation to be paid out.

180Ms. Poole’s analysis results in fewer funds being available for support purposes.

181This difference in analysis also relates to the third difference, that is, the treatment of intercompany accounts considered below.

3. Intercompany loans

182Ms. Poole’s theory is that the money loaned, especially by JACK to the other companies to buy real estate, is akin to a long-term loan. The money is not readily available to the corporation to meet its ongoing or current liabilities.

183The problem with this analysis is that, in the context of determining income available for child support purposes, Ms. Poole deals with what income is available for child support purposes after the fact. That is, she considers the working capital analysis after the husband has decided what to do with the money JACK had available. He chose to give intercorporate loans.

184On this basis, I prefer Mr. Hoare’s analysis, in that at least 60% of the monies available in JACK are available for child support purposes before the decision is made by the husband to invest it.

185Another difference identified by Ms. Poole is that a portion ($44,000) of the long-term portion of debt owed by SWOT to Libro ($1,286,165) was a current liability and should have been factored as such by Mr. Hoare. As a consequence, SWOT’s working capital available is overstated by $44,000. This is a convincing criticism of Mr. Hoare’s analysis. This can be taken into account when determining the actual amount of pre-tax profits based on all the evidence presented in this trial.

186However, and while the funds are in JACK’s account, it is the husband who decides what to do with them: whether to make them available for support purposes or to apply them elsewhere where they are no longer available for support purposes. Mr. Hoare’s analysis considers the amount available for child support purposes before the husband has decided what to do with the funds.

187I am not persuaded that the husband was required for business purposes to direct the monies available the way he did in JACK for investment purposes before taking into account what amount should be available for child support purposes. Mr. Hoare testified that the husband “moves money back and forth between the various companies as he deems necessary.”

188From 2021 to 2022, JACK’s balance sheet disclosed that “due from related parties” increased from $368,811 to $514,000. This increase was derived from money earned by JACK. JACK loaned that money to another related corporation. This is consistent with the finding that it is the husband, as majority shareholder, who decides what to do with the money.

4. Anticipated capital expenditures

189It is a reasonable business practice to set aside money for anticipated capital expenditures. These are funds that will be available to pay, for example, a new roof and other costs of maintaining, preserving, and replacing corporate assets. Money set aside for this purpose is not available to be withdrawn for the purpose of child support.

190Mr. Hoare allowed for money to be maintained in anticipation of JACK’s needed capital expenditures. He did this by allowing for a current ratio according to the industry statistics, for example, in 2022 of 2.5. This means that the industry statistics for operating real estate companies in that year was that a company should have a current ratio of 2.5, that is, for every dollar in current liabilities, it will need $2.50 of current assets to operate the company.

191In her analysis, Ms. Poole also assumed that it was appropriate to use the industry statistics in her income for support analysis. However, and in addition to the industry statistics, Ms. Poole made the following assumptions:

192Ms. Poole’s evidence is that Mr. Hoare used the industry statistics in relation to JACK but not with respect to the numbered companies, which will need to repair and replace assets. With respect to JACK, Ms. Poole used both the industry statistics and the specific claims by the husband.

193Regarding the $300,000 capital expenditures relied upon by Ms. Poole, that was based on the husband’s assessment. I accept Mr. Hoare’s evidence that by taking into account the industry standard and the additional $300,000 “advanced by JACK”, they are double counting what will be needed for capital expenditures.

5. Money set aside by JACK to purchase property in Collingwood

194The husband wants to purchase property in Collingwood so that another real estate brokerage office can be opened there. The husband is choosing to finance the acquisition of property in Collingwood by setting aside corporate funds. He estimates that the purchase price will be $1.5 and that 30% ($375,000) will be needed as a downpayment. The difference in the expert opinions, according to Ms. Poole, is based on “underlying facts and assumptions that have been made.”

195The husband did not convincingly explain why it was necessary to purchase a property instead of renting premises as has been the case. It is not reasonable to set aside monies for the purposes proposed when he has child support obligations to fulfill.

196A further consideration related to the expert reports is that Ms. Poole assumes, and the husband argues, that her analysis is consistent with the parties’ business practices, both prior to and subsequent to separation: property was acquired to accumulate wealth. I agree that this is a relevant consideration to take into account under a s. 18 analysis. It reflects the expectations of the parties absent an unanticipated change in circumstances. However, in this case, the evidence revealed that Ms. Poole had prepared an earlier report based on three years: 2018, 2019, and 2020. In her first report, Ms. Poole calculates the husband’s retrospective (i.e., actual) income, for child support purposes in 2019 at $344,893. In the second report, income for that year was calculated at $269,376. For 2020, the first report found the husband to have income of approximately $18,000 more than the second report.

197The second report changed from the first report in large measure because the husband provided the valuator with more information about proposed debt and capital expenditures, including the Collingwood expansion. The change in values was not because of a change in valuation principles. These additional factual assumptions worked to reduce the total overall income available that the husband claims he had or will have for child support purposes. It was not explained why the subsequent assumptions were not identified and considered in the first report.

Section 19 considerations

198In determining the income to be attributed to the husband for child support purposes, I also must take into account that the husband was asked for his 2023 financial information, but this was not provided to the wife nor to Mr. Hoare. It should have been provided, as child support calculations should be based on the most recent information available.

199The wife asked that the husband’s lifestyle be considered in determining his income for child support purposes. She relied upon the total expenses the husband claims he incurs each month. In his financial statement sworn May 10, 2024, the husband claims to have monthly expenses of $26,008.54, or $312,102.24 per year. In that same financial statement, the husband claims he has annual income of $230,380.

200The wife also asks that I consider the husband’s ski membership fees and trips he took to the Bahamas, which she claims are not set out within the financial statement.

201The lifestyle expenses relied upon by the wife do not constitute income but may be evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the husband has more income available to him. The financial statement does not explain how the shortfall in his budget is made up.

202A final consideration raised by the wife is the pattern of income sharing that existed between the parties while they cohabited. The wife’s uncontradicted evidence was that she would use her income to meet the family’s household expenses and whenever more was required, it would be provided by the husband. I infer that his financial contribution came from his business interests.

Conclusion

203I considered the factors set out above in determining a fair and reasonable income upon which the husband’s child support obligations ought to be calculated.

204The pre-tax income available to the husband is derived primarily from JACK and SWOT.

205In his analysis, Mr. Hoare allocated all of SWOT’s pre-tax income and 60% of JACK’s pre-tax income to the husband.

206In order to recognize

a) the husband’s long-established investment strategy; and

b) the difference in analysis between Mr. Hoare and Ms. Poole as it relates to their analysis of working capital, corporate savings to meet capital expenses and to purchase a Collingwood office,

the percentage of pre-tax profits notionally available to the husband for child support purposes will be reduced from those calculated by Mr. Hoare and increased from those calculated by Ms. Poole. Doing so allows the husband the ability to continue his investment strategy and, at the same time, ensures that he recognize and pay a fair and reasonable amount of child support. This result can be achieved by allocating to the husband one half of the pre-tax income of SWOT and 30% of the pre-tax income of JACK.

207On this basis, I find that the husband has had the following income for child support purposes:

Year Income 2019 2020 2021 2022 $328,000 $310,000 $285,500 $223,500

208In order to arrive at a fair and reasonable determination of the husband’s 2023 and current income, I will rely upon a pattern of his income during the last three years that corporate data was provided.

209On this basis, I find that the husband’s income for the calculation of the child support obligations in 2023 and 2024 is $273,000 in each year.

Issue # 9— The calculation of retroactive child support

210The parties agreed on other components necessary to determine the amount of child support payable from the date of separation. This includes the wife’s income¹² and where each child was living.¹³

211Based on the determination of the husband’s income from 2019 to the present, counsel are to recalculate the child support that was due from the parties to each other on account of child support to May 31, 2024. If the parties are not able to agree on this or any other calculation, counsel are to appear before me, as arranged by Trial Coordination, to provide their respective calculations and submissions.

212The husband is to be given credit for the following child support he has paid:

Year Support Paid 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 $33,151.79 $21,532.32 $29,187.43 $19,502.51 $15,323.00 $158.22¹⁴

213In addition, the husband is to receive credit for insured expenses he paid but were reimbursed to the wife in the amount of $11,521.49.¹⁵

214If I have not correctly calculated these or any other amounts, counsel may make further submissions.

Issue # 10—How are Section 7 expenses to be shared?

215Section 7 expenses are to be shared based on the wife’s 2024 income of $101,551.08 (27%)¹⁶ and the husband’s income of $273,000 (73%).

Spousal support

Issue # 11—Is the wife entitled to spousal support?

216The wife asks for spousal support from the husband for an indefinite period, both on a compensatory and non-compensatory (needs) basis. She asks that this spousal support be paid from the date of separation.¹⁷

217The husband submits that the wife has not established an entitlement to spousal support. In the alternative, if entitlement is established, that his income for the determination of his spousal support obligation be based upon the opinion of Ms. Poole referred to above.

Entitlement: legal considerations and discussion

218The factors and objectives of spousal support are set out in ss. 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), (the “Act”), as follows:

Factors

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

Objectives of spousal support order

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

219The first step when considering a spousal support claim is to determine whether a spouse has established entitlement.

220The bases for entitlement to spousal support relevant to this case are compensatory and non-compensatory.¹⁸ Compensatory claims are based on the recipient’s economic loss or disadvantage as a result of roles adopted during the marriage. It also arises where the recipient has conferred an economic benefit on the payor without adequate compensation.

221The concept of economic advantage and disadvantage arising from the marriage is the foundation for the principle of compensatory support: see Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, at para. 43.

222The common markers of a compensatory claim include being home with children full-time or part-time and being a “secondary earner.”

223In this case, the wife did subordinate her career to that of the husband. She took parental leaves following the births of their four children. Even after she returned to work, it was on a part-time basis until 2017. The wife worked part-time so that she would be able to provide needed care for the children. The eldest child needed extra care because of the illness he suffered beginning in his teenage years. As well, during the last ten years of the marriage, the husband was not often home until evenings, when he described having a “cold supper” waiting for him. I also take into account that, because of the wife’s inflexible work schedule as a teacher, it was the husband who took the children to needed appointments when she could not.

224In these circumstances, the wife was not able to contribute to her pension in an amount she would have if she worked full-time. This means she will receive less of a pension. This consequence was mitigated by contributions made to the pension during the marriage, to compensate for parental leaves.

225Also in this case, the wife was the secondary earner through most of the marriage.

226The other basis for spousal support entitlement is non-compensatory, or on a needs basis. This includes a need for spousal support to address a significant decline in the standard of living from the marital standard. This needs-based support “reflects the economic interdependency that develops as a result of a shared life, including significant elements of reliance and expectation, summed up in the phrase ‘merger over time’.”¹⁹

227In this case, the parties lived together for 24 years. Their economic lives were integrated. Family expenses were paid out of the wife’s employment income and income the husband withdrew from his businesses. The husband’s plan for the family’s wealth accumulation was the “slow burn” of investing in real estate.

228During the marriage, the husband was able to develop his business interests and follow his wealth accumulation strategy. This benefit to the husband continues to accrue to him post-separation. He continues to acquire property and expand his business interests.

229The husband’s income is substantially more than the wife’s income. Consequently, she has not been, nor will she be, able to maintain the same standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. She is selling the matrimonial home and will acquire a less substantial property. Subsequent to the separation, the husband arranged to purchase and maintain possession of the family cottage.

230The husband argues that, since separation, he has gone into “considerable personal debt,” such that he is not able to contribute to an RRSP and used TFSA funds to pay child support and post-secondary education expenses. However, the husband does not argue that it is because income is not available, rather the evidence is that his circumstances arise because of his spending and investment priorities.

231In determining entitlement, I must also take into account the means that will be available to the parties post-separation. Both will have the benefit of the wealth accumulated to the date of separation, and which has grown since.

232In summary, the wife has suffered “hardship,” as contemplated in the Act, because of the reduction in her standard of living. Her available income cannot sustain what the parties enjoyed while cohabiting. This has been the case since the parties separated. The wife has and will need support to maintain to a limited extent her pre-separation standard of living.

233Based on a consideration of the factors and objectives of spousal support, as provided for in the Act, I find that the wife has established entitlement both on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis.

Amount and duration

234The second step in the spousal support analysis is to determine the amount and duration of spousal support.

235The parties submitted that these issues be determined having regard to the SSAG. They provided calculations, however they were not based on the husband’s income as I found it to be.

236I find, based on the factors set out above, that the entitlement to spousal support both on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis is moderate and, therefore, having regard to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”), is in the low - to mid - range.

237Subject to receiving further submissions on behalf of the parties and having regard to the factors considered above when determine entitlement, I am of the opinion that the duration of spousal support should be for an indefinite period. This does not appear to be a case where a time limited or review order is warranted.

238If the parties are unable to agree on the amount and duration of spousal support, they are asked to provide this court through counsel with supporting submissions and calculations retrospective to the date of separation and prospective spousal support, based upon the findings provided for in these Reasons.

Divorce

239All of the requirements for a divorce to be granted will be met once the issue of child support has been determined. A divorce order will then be granted.

Summary

240In these Reasons, I made findings on the issues raised by the parties with respect to property, child support and spousal support.

241The calculations they provided in submissions were based on amounts that are different from those determined by me.

242Therefore, I ask that the parties recalculate:

1. The NFP statement and post-equalization adjustment statement;

2. Child support calculations; retrospective and prospective;

3. Spousal support calculations based upon the SSAG; retrospective and prospective, based on the findings made, and if they are not able to agree, their submissions in support.

243In summary, the following are the findings made:

Property

1. The husband has a 50% interest in 139;

2. The value of 139 at the date of separation was $981,500;

3. The assets of 139 shall be sold and the net proceeds are to be divided equally between the parties. As the wife is now the sole officer and director of the company, she shall be authorized to take the reasonable steps necessary to wind up 139, including engaging third parties to provide needed services. She may also claim management fees for her efforts to wind up the corporation in the same manner the husband did post-separation.

4. The value of each party’s household contents in the London matrimonial home at the date of separation was $3,757;

5. The value of each party’s household contents at the cottage matrimonial home was $28,750;

6. The wife is entitled to a post-equalization adjustment on account of the cottage contents of $28,750;

7. The husband is entitled to a post-equalization adjustment on account of the London matrimonial home household contents in the amount of $3,757;

8. The husband’s contingent tax liability with respect to JACK is $36,523;

9. The husband’s contingent tax liability with respect to 186, KRS and SWOT is $222,272;

10. The husband’s and wife’s contingent tax liabilities with respect to 139 require further submissions based upon its value being $981,500.

11. The wife’s contingent capital gains liability with respect to the sale of her interest in the cottage was $140,154.97 at the date of separation;

12. The wife is entitled to a post-equalization adjustment of $11,539 to April 2024 on account of payments she made to the National Bank line of credit in excess of those made by the husband;

13. The wife is entitled to a post-equalization adjustment of $14,407.50 on account of costs incurred by her for repairing and staging the cottage for sale.

Child support

14. The husband’s income for child support purposes retrospectively and prospectively is:

Year Income 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 $328,000 $310,000 $285,500 $223,500 $273,000 $273,000

15. The husband is to be given credit for child support payments he made as follows:

Year Support Paid 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 $33,151.79 $21,532.32 $29,187.43 $19,502.51 $15,323.00 $158.22

16. The wife owes the husband $11,521.49 on account of insured expenses paid by the husband but reimbursed to the wife.

17. The 2024 prospective s. 7 expenses are to be shared 73% by the husband and 27% by the wife.

18. The wife is entitled to spousal support.

19. The husband’s income for spousal support purposes is the same as it is for child support purposes.

20. The amount of spousal support is to be in the low-range to mid-range of the SSAG.

244It is anticipated that with these findings, the parties, with the help of their experienced and skilled counsel, will be able to resolve the outstanding calculations and issues.

245If the parties are not able to agree on these calculations and issues, they are to:

a) Provide their respective calculations and submissions in writing; and,

b) Appear before me to make further oral submissions.

246The parties shall advise the Trial Coordinator within 14 days of the release of these Reasons whether they have agreed on the outstanding calculations and issues and provide a consent accordingly. They are to appear before me in person, on a date that is convenient for all and as arranged by the Trial Coordinator to address these outstanding issues.

247Once all these issues are resolved either on consent or by the Court, the parties may address any other outstanding issues, including costs.

Footnotes

1. 1The exceptions provided for in this section are not relevant here.
2. 2See Hainsworth, T.W. (2024). Ontario Family Law Act Manual (2nd ed.). Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, Toronto.
3. 3See Exhibit 46.
4. 4See Exhibit 52.
5. 5See Exhibit 46.
6. 6See Exhibit 16.
7. 7See Exhibit 12.
8. 8See Exhibit 21.1.
9. 9Section 20 is not relevant in this case.
10. 10$666 according to Mr. Hoare’s report, p. 117.
11. 11see CSG s. 1(a).
12. 12See Exhibit 7.
13. 13See Exhibit 21.1.
14. 14See Exhibit 51.
15. 15See Exhibit 10.
16. 16See Exhibit 11, Tab 5, p. 3.
17. 17See [D.B.S. v. S. R.G., 2006) 2006 SCC 37, 2 S.C.R. 231 (SCC), at para. 2. The request is that the payor be “ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before.”
18. 18See Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide, (April 2016), ch. 3.
19. 19See The Revised User’s Guide, Chapter 3 (a).