Thomas Sloan Heintzman

The appellant mortgagee appealed an order staying its action against one corporate respondent after a foreclosure action had been converted to one for judicial sale.

The court held that the consent order arising from the negotiations was clear and unequivocal, and did not result from mistaken intentions or a failure to reflect the parties' agreement.

The appellant knew it had to choose which defendant would be the subject of judgment and that consequences flowed from that choice.

By signing judgment against another defendant, the appellant's right to recover against the respondent corporation was terminated by s. 20(3) of the Mortgages Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent investment dealer entered into a fidelity insurance contract with the appellant.

After discovering employee fraud, the respondent filed a proof of loss.

The appellant rescinded the bond, alleging misrepresentation in the application, and later brought a motion for summary judgment arguing the respondent failed to commence legal proceedings within the 24-month contractual limitation period.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the motions judge's summary judgment in favour of the appellant, holding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the discovery of the loss, and that the contractual limitation period survived the appellant's wrongful rescission of the contract.

The respondent was a client of the appellant, a real estate broker.

The appellant negotiated to purchase a commercial building on behalf of the respondent.

The vendor rejected the offer and made a counteroffer.

The appellant rejected the counteroffer but signed it back.

The vendor advised the appellant of the amount it would accept.

Instead of conveying this information to the respondent, the appellant arranged for his wife to purchase the property, which was then transferred to the appellant and his wife.

The respondent sued for breach of fiduciary duty and sought a constructive trust over the property, abandoning his claim for damages because the property's market value had decreased.

The trial judge found a breach of duty but refused a constructive trust because there was no unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the property conveyed to the respondent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a constructive trust can be imposed for a breach of fiduciary duty even without unjust enrichment, based on good conscience, to ensure fiduciaries remain faithful.

The appellant union sought judicial review of a CRTC decision regarding who could perform installation work on a telephone company's support structures, arguing it was denied natural justice because it did not receive notice of the proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the union's interest in the telecommunications policy decision was purely indirect and did not trigger the audi alteram partem rule.

Furthermore, the Court found that the governing statute placed the obligation to notify employees on the employer, not the CRTC, and that the CRTC did not err by failing to defer to labour arbitration board decisions.

The CRTC ordered British Columbia Telephone Company (BC Tel) to permit cable companies to install their own cables on BC Tel's support structures.

However, a labour arbitration board had previously ruled that allowing cable companies to perform this work violated BC Tel's collective agreement with the Telecommunications Workers Union.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the CRTC decision, finding it exceeded its jurisdiction by requiring BC Tel to violate its collective agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the CRTC had jurisdiction to make the order and was entitled to curial deference.

The Court established that where two administrative tribunals issue operationally conflicting decisions, the courts must determine which takes precedence based on legislative intent.

In this case, the CRTC's broad policy-making decision took precedence over the labour arbitration board's interpretation of a private collective agreement.

The Attorney General of Newfoundland appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of Clause 2(e) of Part I of a statutory lease executed pursuant to the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited (Lease) Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that both the Trial Division and the Court of Appeal had arrived at the correct construction of the clause, albeit by different routes.

The CRTC appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision that set aside its renewal of CTV's broadcasting licence.

The CRTC had imposed a condition requiring CTV to broadcast a specified number of hours of original new Canadian drama.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the CRTC had jurisdiction to impose the condition but breached natural justice by not giving adequate notice of the specific condition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the CRTC's appeal, holding that the CRTC had the jurisdiction to impose the condition under s. 17(1) of the Broadcasting Act and that there was no breach of natural justice, as CTV had sufficient notice that Canadian drama offerings would be discussed.

The Court also dismissed CTV's cross-appeal regarding the composition of the hearing panel.

The appellant appealed from a judgment dismissing appeals from orders prohibiting the prosecution of the respondents for killing seals on a Sunday, contrary to section 15 of the pre-Confederation Newfoundland Seal Fishery Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 15 fell within the exclusive legislative competence of the federal Parliament under its jurisdiction over Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries.

The Court found that federal Seal Protection Regulations, which did not prohibit Sunday hunting, altered the pre-Confederation law and rendered section 15 ineffective.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding its business tax assessment.

The issue was whether leasing photocopiers constituted the sale of a 'service' under s. 7(1)(e) of the Ontario Assessment Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, holding that 'services' must bear its ordinary meaning as the product of the work of the person supplying it.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was found assessable under the catch-all provision in s. 7(1)(j) rather than s. 7(1)(e).