Thomas Calhoun Hunter

The Applicant sought $1,010 in costs as the successful party to a motion brought by the Respondent.

The Respondent argued against a costs order due to his inability to pay and the Applicant's representation by a staff lawyer at ILSO.

The court considered the Respondent's delay in complying with a previous order to collapse his RRSP and apply proceeds to an outstanding costs award.

Despite the Applicant's claim for costs based on counsel's time, the court awarded partial costs, fixing them at $600, to be added to existing outstanding costs.

The Respondent was also prohibited from bringing a motion to change until all costs are paid in full.

Opposition to a bankrupt’s discharge under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act by both the trustee and a former spouse creditor.

The court found numerous breaches of the bankrupt’s statutory duties, including failure to disclose assets, failure to keep the trustee informed of his address, and failure to provide required financial documentation.

The bankrupt had also reaffirmed a vehicle loan post‑bankruptcy while retaining the benefit of the vehicle but then ceased making payments, leaving a co‑obligor exposed.

The court held that reaffirmation of a debt through conduct during bankruptcy may render the debtor liable notwithstanding the bankruptcy.

Given the misconduct, the court granted a conditional discharge requiring payment to the trustee and permitting the opposing creditor to pursue reimbursement relating to the reaffirmed vehicle loan.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a prior order seeking to terminate child support and special expenses for two adult children attending post-secondary education.

The court considered the definition of “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act and the application of sections 3 and 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

Applying the factors from Rosenberg v. Rosenberg and related authorities, the court found both children remained financially dependent while enrolled full-time in post-secondary programs and therefore continued to qualify as children of the marriage.

The court rejected the request to reduce basic child support to zero and held the Guidelines table amount remained appropriate.

The father was also ordered to contribute one-third of the children’s post-secondary education expenses beginning with the 2015–2016 academic year, conditional on proper disclosure of educational details.

Following a trial on spousal support where the applicant was the more successful party, both parties sought costs.

The court found that the respondent failed to make reasonable offers to settle and maintained an unreasonably high demand for spousal support, which necessitated the trial.

The applicant was awarded costs fixed at $45,000 on a partial recovery basis.

After the parties settled all substantive family law issues by Minutes of Settlement, the court was required to determine entitlement to and quantum of costs.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that where litigation resolves by settlement, the “divided success” approach is generally appropriate rather than a strict winner‑loser analysis.

Reviewing the pleadings, offers to settle, and final settlement terms, the court found divided success on most issues but concluded the applicant was more successful regarding the central property dispute involving the matrimonial home.

The court also found the respondent’s delays in disclosure and negotiations contributed to prolonging the litigation.

Partial costs of $17,500 were awarded to the applicant.

Following a 24‑year marriage without children, the primary issue at trial was spousal support after separation and equalization of property.

The respondent sought significant retroactive and ongoing support based on disability and medical expenses, while the applicant argued he should not pay ongoing support after retirement and relied on the principle against double recovery from pension income.

The court awarded retroactive and interim support largely within the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and imputed employment income to the applicant for one additional year due to a retirement decision made shortly before trial.

After June 2016, the court declined to order further support, holding that the respondent had not established an exception to the rule against “double dipping” articulated in Boston v. Boston.

The court also granted a divorce and required the applicant to maintain life insurance to secure the temporary support obligation.

The applicant sought various parenting, support, and enforcement orders following the respondent’s failure to comply with disclosure obligations and court orders, resulting in his pleadings being struck and the matter proceeding as an uncontested trial.

The court addressed issues including custody, access, retroactive child support, extraordinary expenses, imputation of income, life insurance security, relocation, and restraining relief.

Applying the best interests of the child under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court declined to terminate access entirely but ordered supervised access at the discretion of the custodial parent and guided by professional recommendations.

The court ordered retroactive child support, retroactive special and extraordinary expenses, ongoing child support based on imputed income due to the respondent’s failure to disclose income information, and repayment of joint debt.

Requests for a restraining order and vesting orders were denied.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office sought a warrant of committal against a support payor for failing to comply with a final default hearing order requiring payment of substantial spousal support arrears and costs.

The arrears exceeded $899,000 at the time of the motion.

The court considered whether the payor had demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the prior default hearing sufficient to explain his non-payment under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.

The respondent argued inability to pay based on caregiving responsibilities for his elderly mother, alleged issues with court file documentation, unsuccessful attempts to vary support, and a rejected settlement proposal involving his RRSP.

The court rejected these explanations, found no material change in circumstances, and concluded the respondent had wilfully disregarded court orders.

A warrant of committal was granted with intermittent incarceration to encourage compliance with the support obligations.

Following competing motions regarding custody and access, the court had granted the mother sole custody while permitting the father increasing unsupervised access subject to counselling.

Both parties achieved partial success, though the applicant was more successful overall.

In determining costs, the court considered the principles under the Courts of Justice Act and the Family Law Rules regarding success, reasonableness of conduct, proportionality, and the absence of settlement offers.

The applicant sought full or substantial indemnity costs based on the respondent’s past conduct, but the court found that such conduct had already been addressed through the substantive custody and counselling orders.

Costs were therefore awarded on a partial indemnity basis, reduced to reflect duplication and excessive docketed hours.

In a family law motion, the respondent sought an order settling the wording of minutes of settlement executed by the parties after negotiations in court.

The parties had signed handwritten Minutes of Settlement but later exchanged revised typed versions containing additional terms, which prevented final agreement.

The court determined which provisions from the black-lined version of the minutes would form part of the final order and added clarifying provisions regarding international travel with the children, asset division, and confirmation of closure of joint lines of credit.

The court held that the binding settlement was the one entered on January 23, 2013, subject only to the agreed amendments addressed during the motion.

The respondent’s request for costs was dismissed.

The appellant father appealed a Divisional Court decision that overturned a motion judge's finding denying the respondent mother retroactive child support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded that a 1997 amending agreement continued in force until 2005 and provided reasonable child support.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's finding that the father had shared custody of the son more than 40% of the time, making section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines applicable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal and child support, arguing the trial judge failed to award compensatory support, failed to discount the respondent's business expenses, and improperly imputed an income of $40,000 to her based on expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the compensatory aspects of support under Moge, properly assessed the respondent's income, and made no error in qualifying the expert or imputing income to the appellant given her failure to make reasonable efforts to obtain employment.

The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's order varying child support and dismissing her claim for retroactive support.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in applying the 40% shared custody rule without a trial, improperly averaging the father's income over five years under section 17(1) of the Guidelines, and dismissing the retroactive support claim.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in D.B.S., the Court awarded the mother $40,879.73 in retroactive child support dating back to her effective notice in 2001.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment that granted custody of her child to the respondent father and found her in contempt.

The trial judge had proceeded with the trial in the appellant's absence after she failed to attend a scheduled mini pre-trial, and refused her counsel's requests for an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge denied the appellant procedural fairness and the right to be heard.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the issues of custody and contempt, conditional on the appellant paying the respondent's costs thrown away.