COURT FILE NO.: FC-13-2407-0

DATE: 2015/09/11

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: KELLY BETH MCNAUGHT, Applicant

AND

BERNARD KEN MCNAUGHT, Respondent

BEFORE: Shelston J.

COUNSEL: Thomas R. Hunter, counsel for the Applicant

Tanya Parker Wallace, counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: August 6, 2015 (at Ottawa)

ENDORSEMENT

Introduction

[1] The issues before me are whether or not the applicant is entitled to costs where the parties settled all issues by Minutes of Settlement signed in June 2015 and if she is so entitled in what amount?

[2] Pursuant to those Minutes, the issue of costs was to be resolved as follows:

The issue of costs of the Application shall be determined by way of a motion for summary decision of a legal issue, pursuant to Rule 16(12) of the Family Law Rules.

[3] The applicant seeks costs on a full indemnity basis based on the allegation that the respondent acted unreasonably in that he ignored letters sent in 2013 inviting him to negotiate an agreement which required the applicant to commence proceeding and secondly that his conduct prolonged the litigation, wasted court time at the settlement conferences and rendered negotiations to be extremely difficult as he failed to comply with a production order.

[4] She seeks costs on two scales with full indemnity being $38,935.05 and partial indemnity being $27,466.63. The respondent’s position is that there should be no costs to either party.

[5] Both parties filed detailed affidavits and the submissions were based on the pleadings and the offers to settle. During the motion counsel advised that the applicant had spent approximately $41,000 in legal fees and the respondent had spent $36,000 for a total of $77,000 in legal fees over a period of 21 months.

Jurisdiction of the Court

[6] The parties in the Minutes of Settlement agreed to resolve the cost issue by a motion for summary judgment. During oral argument, I advised the parties that the court’s jurisdiction is not a motion for summary judgment but it flows from the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, as amended, in assessing costs as an issue that is before the court. The parties agreed to proceed on that basis.

Background and Litigation History

[7] The parties were married on May 25, 1990. They disagreed on the date of separation. There are three children of the marriage Jodi, born May 31, 1995; Matthew, born July 14, 1997; and Leah, born January 30, 1991.

[8] The parties resided together in the matrimonial home during the litigation. The applicant left after signing the Minutes of Settlement in June 2015.

[9] The applicant is employed at Canada Post and earns approximately $62,000 per year. The respondent has not been employed since 2007 and lives off his investments (mainly from an inheritance of $450,000) to pay for his expenses.

[10] By letter dated July 11, 2013, counsel for the applicant wrote to the respondent inviting him to negotiate a separation agreement and afforded the respondent the opportunity to buy out the applicant’s interest in the matrimonial home and if he could not do so, she would and if she could not do so, the property would be sold. The respondent did not reply so a second letter was sent dated August 8, 2013. The respondent did not formally reply to either letter but told the applicant that she would hear from his lawyer. She never did.

[11] Left with no other option, the applicant commenced proceedings on October 10, 2013 and the respondent filed an Answer and Claim dated December 13, 2013.

Case Conference

[12] Master MacLeod conducted a case conference on December 20, 2013 where the parties consented to an order for disclosure. At that time, Master MacLeod made no endorsement as to costs.

[13] The disclosure was to have taken place by February 3, 2015. The respondent’s disclosure was not completed by that date even though on February 3, 2015 counsel for the respondent indicated that they were working on the disclosure.

Motion for Contempt and Striking Pleading

[14] Eventually, the applicant grew tired of waiting for the disclosure that should have been provided and brought a motion seeking an order that the respondent be found in contempt of the order of Master MacLeod; an order striking the respondent’s Answer and an order for costs.

[15] The matter proceeded before Justice Minnema, who in his endorsement dated June 6, 2014, made the following comments:

… I am not satisfied that a sincere effort has been made to comply with the order.

… The Applicant should not have to hound the Respondent for disclosure that was ordered on consent, and that is a normal, obvious, and necessary part of the litigation process. The Applicant is entitled to a timely resolution of the issues. No motion should have been necessary. Many of the productions were and are from institutions and readily available upon request.

… The Respondent has behaved unreasonably. Again, this motion should not have been necessary. …

[16] Justice Minnema ordered that the respondent satisfy the outstanding disclosure by June 30, 2014 and ordered that he pay $5,500 all-inclusive in costs.

Phase One Negotiations

[17] After the respondent provided the disclosure by the end of June 2014, the parties entered into phase one of the negotiations.

[18] The applicant submitted her first offer to settle dated July 31, 2014 with various options regarding the matrimonial home including transfer to the respondent or sale. A Net Family Property Worksheet dated July 31, 2014 was attached and the offer indicated that the value of the matrimonial home to be $325,000. The worksheet was based on the evidence disclosed to date.

[19] The respondent had received $450,000 as an inheritance paid in one installment of $400,000 and a second installment of $50,000 as set out in the respondent’s Answer. The $50,000 second part of the inheritance was not included in the Net Family Property Worksheet dated July 31, 2014 prepared by the applicant and was not factored into her calculation of the Net Family Property Statement. The offer was not accepted.

[20] Correspondence was exchanged between counsel in August 2014 dealing with the property issues as well as the non-property issues such as custody and child support.

[21] By September 2014, the respondent had applied for a mortgage with the intention to buy out the applicant’s share in the matrimonial home. He was approved subject to certain conditions including that the matrimonial home was appraised at $325,000. The respondent advised that an appraisal had been completed but he made no further action to advance the case.

[22] As there was no further movement on the file, the applicant set a settlement conference date for January 16, 2015 to move the matter forward.

Settlement Conferences

[23] Three days before that settlement conference set for January 16, 2015 the respondent provided disclosure regarding a second inheritance of $50,000. The applicant alleges that she was taken by surprise as this amount was never previously disclosed and the two accounts where the funds were deposited were also not disclosed. As a result of that disclosure, the settlement conference needed to be adjourned even though the parties attended on January 16, 2015 before Justice Sheffield. The respondent denied it was late disclosure but the respondent admitted that all parties were using net family property statements that did not refer to the $50,000 deduction.

[24] The respondent could not receive the appraisal as it was done for the bank but on January 23, 2015he received am email from the bank manager that the appraisal valued the value at $325,000.

[25] The matter was adjourned to February 6, 2015 for the continuation of the settlement conference in the hope that the parties would have appraisals completed on the matrimonial home. On February 6, 2015 the settlement conference was not productive as the appraisal from the respondent was only received on February 3, 2015. It valued the home at $280,000 and the applicant did not have enough time to have her own appraisal conducted by February 6, 2015. Justice Sheffield endorsed the record:

No resolution. Matter may be trial listed on next available list. Costs issue reserved to trial judge.

Phase Two Negotiations

[26] The applicant submitted her second offer to settle dated February 10, 2015. At this point, the parties entered into phase two of the settlement negotiations. The applicant submits that by February 2015, the non-property issues were resolved.

[27] On February 25, 2015 the applicant forwarded an appraisal of the matrimonial home at $300,000. The applicant proposed that the parties use the mid-point value of $290,000.

[28] On March 2, 2015, for the first time, the respondent submitted an offer to settle. On March 3, 2015 the applicant responded to the offer to settle accepting all the terms except for three points:

(1) paragraph 11 regarding the wording;

(2) paragraph 39 indicate there were no credit cards;

(3) requesting $14,000 in costs.

[29] The respondent submitted a second offer to settle received on March 10, 2015. On March 11, 2015 counsel for the applicant wrote back to deal with minor amendments to the agreement and accepted the wording in paragraph 11 for the sake of settling the matter once and for all and requested costs of $12,000.

[30] By letter dated March 15, 2015, the respondent submitted a third offer to settle which included the following paragraph:

I therefore enclose Mr. McNaught’s Offer to Settle which incorporates all matters (including the wording changes requested by your client in your letter of March 11) save and except the issue of costs. With respect to costs, should we be unable to settle this issue through further negotiations, they shall be determined by way of summary judgment motion on a date to be set by the trial coordinator.

[31] The final Minutes of Settlement were signed in June 2015 which incorporated the respondent’s third offer and left the issue of costs to be determined.

The Parties’ Positions

[32] The applicant’s position is that she should have her costs based on:

(a) The matter should have been settled in the fall 2013 rather than having wait almost two years and after both parties spent over $77,000 in total legal fees. She submits that it was a travesty that the parties had to complete pleadings, attend the case conference, bring a motion for compliance with the disclosure and attend two settlement conferences;

(b) She submits that in the letter dated July 11, 2013 sent to the respondent, the applicant invited the respondent to negotiate a settlement. The letter proposed various options regarding the matrimonial home;

(c) A follow-up letter was sent on August 8, 2013. The respondent failed to respond requiring the applicant to commence proceedings on October 10, 2013. The respondent replies that he was not in good health and that he was seeking legal advice;

(d) The respondent delayed the matter and failed to disclose in a timely manner; and

(e) That she was the successful party as her position that the respondent would buy her out of the matrimonial home was the final settlement.

[33] The respondent’s position is that there should be no order as to costs because:

(a) If a successful party must be chosen, the respondent was clearly the successful party on the matters at issue;

(b) In the alternative, neither party should be entitled to costs given that all substantive matters were resolved on consent; and

(c) His conduct during the litigation did not constitute bad faith to justify full indemnification of the applicant’s legal fees.

Comparison of Pleadings, Offers to Settle and Minutes of Settlement

Custody, Decision-Making and Timesharing

[34] The applicant sought sole custody of Jodi and Matthew. The respondent sought joint custody and primary care of Matthew.

[35] The applicant’s offer dated July 31, 2014 offered that Jodi and Matthew would reside with the parents on a week-on, week-off basis and that all decisions would be made jointly but that the applicant would have final decision-making authority.

[36] In the applicant’s second offer dated February 10, 2015 the applicant agreed that the only child subject to a custody order was Matthew and that he would alternate residences on a two- week on, two-week off and that all major decision affecting the children (which included Leah and Jodi, who were over the age of majority) would be made jointly by the parties.

[37] The respondent’s offer dated February 27, 2015 mirrors the applicant’s offer of February 10, 2015 and resolves the issue of custody and access. The Minutes of Settlement confirm same.

Child Support and Contributions to Special and Extraordinary Expenses

[38] The applicant sought child support for Leah, Jodi and Matthew and section 7 expenses retroactive to October 2012. The respondent claimed support for the three children as of December 2013.

[39] In the applicant’s offer dated July 31, 2014 she sought to impute an income of $50,000 to the respondent. However, in her offer she requested no table child support to be paid or received and that the parties will each be responsible for their childcare expenses, an obligation for the parties to exchange financial disclosure each year and that each of them would be responsible for half of the special and extraordinary expenses.

[40] The applicant’s offer dated February 10, 2015 was the same as her offer dated July 31, 2014 except for imputing the respondent with an income of $40,000.

[41] In the respondent’s offer dated February 27, 2015 there is no table child support to be paid or received, there is an obligation for disclosure and there is an issue with respect to each of them paying half of the special and extraordinary expenses.

[42] There was a dispute between the parties with respect to the wording of paragraph 11 in the Minutes of Settlement regarding imputing an income to the respondent but by March 2015 that dispute was resolved and no support was payable.

Post-Secondary Educational Expenses

[43] Neither party sought this specific head of relief. In the applicant’s offer dated July 31, 2014 she offered that the RESP (Registered Educational Savings Plan) set up for Matthew and Jodi should continue and that the children should be responsible for their own expenses once the RESP had been exhausted and that the parties would share equally in the child tax credit.

[44] In the applicant’s offer of February 10, 2015 the offer is effectively the same.

[45] In the respondent’s offer dated February 27, 2015 he mirrors the applicant’s offer of February 10, 2015. The Minutes of Settlement confirm that agreement.

Life Insurance

[46] Both parties sought life insurance protection. In the applicant’s offer of July 31, 2014, each party was to maintain their existing life insurance policies for the children and that the parties authorize a lien or first charge to be registered against their respective estates for the full amount of life insurance policies if either of their policies are not in effect or in full force at the time of their death.

[47] In the applicant’s offer dated February 10, 2015 she proposes to maintain a life insurance policy through her employment which has a face amount of twice her annual salary designating the children as the beneficiaries; requiring the respondent to designate the children as the irrevocable beneficiaries of his life insurance policy with Sun Life; that the respondent shall not encumber the policy; as well as obligations regarding receiving copies of their respective life insurance policies; permitting the trustees to communicate directly with the insurer, as well as authorizing a lien in the event the policies were not in place at the time of death.

[48] In the respondent’s offer dated February 27, 2015 he mirrors the applicant’s offer of February 10, 2015 regarding life insurance and the Minutes of Settlement confirm that agreement.

Medical, Dental, Drug and Health Expenses for Children

[49] Only the respondent sought this relief. However, in the applicant’s offer of July 31, 2014 she agrees to maintain Matthew and Jodi under her extended health plan through her employment and anything not covered by her employment would be a section 7 expense to be paid equally by the parties.

[50] In the applicant’s offer of February 10, 2015 the provision is repeated and in the respondent’s offer of February 27, 2015 the provision is repeated and accepted.

Medical Expenses for Respondent

[51] This relief was requested by the respondent but not included in the final Minutes of Settlement or part of any offer to settle.

Non depletion Order

[52] This was requested by the applicant but was not part of any offer to settle or the Minutes of Settlement.

Exclusive Possession of Matrimonial Home

[53] This relief was sought by the applicant but was not part of any offer to settle or the Minutes of Settlement.

Carrying Costs, Occupation Rent, Partition and Sale of Matrimonial home

[54] The applicant sought reimbursement of carrying costs from October 2012 while the respondent sought occupation rent and partition and sale of matrimonial home. This relief was not included in the final Minutes of Settlement or part of any offer to settle.

Spousal Support

[55] Neither party sought spousal support. There is nothing in the applicant’s first offer dated July 31, 2014 regarding spousal support but there is a mutual waiver of spousal support in her offer of February 10, 2015 and a waiver of spousal support in the respondent’s offer of February 27, 2015. The Minutes of Settlement confirm that there is no spousal support.

Property

[56] This issue proved to be the most difficult part of the litigation and upon which the applicant’s counsel indicated ninety-five percent of the time was spent resolving.

[57] It took until March 2015 to reach an agreement where the respondent agreed to buy out the applicant’s interest in the matrimonial home. Further, she indicates that from July 2013 to March 2015 the matrimonial home was always inserted as an asset on the respondent’s side of the Net Family Property Worksheet at $325,000 until February 2015 when the appraisals were obtained. The only change in the calculation of the Net Family Property was the change in the value of the house and the $50,000 inheritance.

[58] Further, the applicant indicated that the respondent’s insistence that the date of separation was in October 2013 resulted in approximately an $8,000 difference in the equalization calculation. When the parties settled they took the mid-point between the equalization payment owing as of October 2012 and October 2013.

[59] In the applicant’s first offer dated July 31, 2014, based on the assumptions set out in the offer, the respondent would pay to the applicant $32,879.66. In her second offer dated February 10, 2015 (which was prepared after the $50,000 second inheritance payment was included in the calculation of the Net Family Property Statement) the offer was based on the respondent purchasing the applicant’s interest in the matrimonial home at the fair market value agreed to by the parties. That procedure required obtaining a second appraisal of the home and in the event there was a disagreement between the final appraisal values, that a third party appraiser would be designated as the arbitrator.

[60] In the respondent’s first offer dated February 27, 2015 he offered to purchase the applicant’s interest in the matrimonial home, determining the fair market value to be $290,000 and indicating that the Net Family Property payment owed by the applicant to the respondent would be $604.07. The respondent submitted an offer dated March 10, 2015 which mirrored the final Minutes of Settlement.

[61] The parties settled all issues but costs.

The Law

[62] What is the test to apply in deciding costs when the parties settled all issues outstanding between them in the litigation?

[63] In Davis v. Davis, 2004 19156 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Perkins held at para. 3:

[3] … I think that in order for there to be a “successful” party, there must be a declared winner or loser on the issues. That declaration will ordinarily come from a judge, after argument. In this case, we have in effect minutes of settlement. I find that the “divided success” approach of r. 24 (6) is more appropriate here than the winner/loser approach of r. 24 (1).

[64] In Benoit v. Kerr, 2014 ONSC 5401, Justice McGee had to determine the issue of costs when parties settled mid-way through the trial. He held at paras. 18 and 22:

[18] Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules sets out the basic assumption that a successful party is entitled to costs. Success can be most easily measured by comparing the result obtained (final order) with the result sought (pleadings) and the offer to settle.

[22] In this claim for costs, the primary analysis is the relationship between the father’s offers to settle and the final order resulting from the minutes of settlement.

[65] In A.C. v. G.K. 2015 ONCJ 399, Justice Murray considered the positions taken by the parties to determine that success was divided but that one party was more successful than the other party. In that case, the issues were the amount of table child support based on the payor’s income and a claim for contribution to retroactive section 7 expenses. She decided that the payor was more successful and granted $3,000 in costs (36% of the costs claimed).

[66] The Family Law Rules do not define bad faith but it is generally accepted to include deception, duplicity and the intent to inflict harm or to conceal relevant information as was stated by Justice Mackinnon in Johnstone v. Locke, 2012 ONSC 1717.

[67] In the case of Leonardo v. Meloche, 2003 74500 (ON SC), 2003 CarswellOnt 1920, Justice Blishen found that a party who was in breach of an order to provide disclosure in a matrimonial proceeding was not an act that constituted bad faith as it was not intended to deceive, mislead or intentionally breach when all the evidence was reviewed. However she did consider the action to be unreasonable and in that case to be significant.

[68] Parts of Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules are applicable in this matter:

(a) Under Rule 24(1) there is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion, enforcement, case or appeal;

(b) Despite Rule 24(4), a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs in order to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs. That is not the case in this matter;

(i) the party’s behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle;

(ii) the reasonableness of any offer the party made; and

(iii) any offer the party withdrew or failed to accept.

(d) Rule 24(6) states that if success in a step in a case is divided, the court may apportion costs as appropriate.

(e) Rule 24(8) states that if a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.

(f) Rule 24(10) states that costs are to be decided promptly at each step of the case by the judge or person who dealt with that step in a summary manner as to who is entitled to costs and to set the amount of costs.

(g) Rule 24(11) states that a person setting the amount of costs shall consider:

(i) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;

(ii) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case;

(iii) the lawyer’s rates;

(iv) the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witness, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of order;

(v) expenses properly paid or payable; and

(vi) any other relevant matter.

Analysis

[69] I agree with Justice Perkins in Davis that where the parties settle the issues in litigation, the “divided success” approach of Rule 24(6) is more appropriate than the winner/loser approach of Rule 24(1). To determine divided success, the court must review the pleadings, the offers to settle and the final Minutes of Settlement.

[70] On all the non-property issues, I find that there was divided success when comparing the relief sought in the pleadings, the positions taken in the various offers and the terms of the final Minutes of Settlement.

[71] With the issue of property, I agree that the applicant’s original position that the respondent buy her out of the matrimonial home made in July 2013 was accepted by the respondent by March 2015. I find that the applicant was more successful on this issue.

[72] While the applicant’s first offer dated July 31, 2014 sought an equalization payment of $32,789 that was based on the value of the matrimonial home at $325,000 and that offer did not take into consideration the $50,000 excluded property. In my view, the offer made by the applicant at that time was based on the evidence that existed at that date. The respondent made no formal offer until February 27, 2015.

[73] The evidence discloses that the respondent was to make attempts to secure financing which he did by September 2014. Despite this information, nothing moved forward requiring the applicant to set a settlement conference.

[74] The first settlement conference was ineffective. The evidence is contradictory as to whether or not the evidence was disclosed in February 2014 or January 2015. What is not in question is that both parties were working on equalization calculations without the $50,000 inheritance up to January 2015. As well, the settlement conference was ineffective because the respondent did not have evidence that he had current financing to buy out the applicant’s interest in the matrimonial home.

[75] The second conference was also ineffective as the respondent provided his own appraisal of the matrimonial home three days before the February 6, 2015 settlement conference leaving the applicant with insufficient time to obtain her own appraisal which she did by February 25, 2015.

[76] The difference between the appraisals was $20,000 and the parties agreed on a mid-point value of $290,000. By April 2, 2015, the case was settled.

[77] The major issue was the matrimonial home. The respondent sought its sale in his pleading. The applicant had offered from the beginning that the respondent buy her out as one option. The settlement negotiations all revolved around the respondent buying out the applicant’s interest which eventually transpired.

[78] The applicant submits that her offer dated February 25, 2015 satisfies the requirements of Rule 18(14). Upon my review of the record, the applicant made a formal offer to settle dated February 10, 2015 that she amended by letter dated February 25, 2015. The applicant submits that since the offer was not accepted, she should have her costs from the date of the offer.

[79] In my view, Rule 18(14) is not applicable as the parties settled this matter on terms that are not exactly as set out in the offer dated February 10, 2015 as amended by the letter dated February 25, 2015. Further to be a proper offer to settle, pursuant to rule 18(4) the offer must be signed by both the applicant and her lawyer. The letter dated February 25, 2015 does not meet the test as an “offer to settle” to engage Rule 18(4) but can still be considered by the court in deciding costs.

[80] In my view, the actions of the respondent delayed the settlement of this matter and that his actions were unreasonable in the circumstances. In assessing the quantum of costs, I can take these factors into consideration. In my view, this is not a case for full recovery or substantial indemnity after reviewing the party’s original claim for relief, the offers to settle and the final Minutes of Settlement. After reviewing all the factors set out above, the applicant is entitled to some costs.

[81] I have considered the legal principles and factors in Rule 24 in relation to this matter:

(1) The issues were not complex or difficult but they were important to being resolved as the parties were living together. Despite the invitation to settle in July 2013 it took until March 2015 to settle this matter.

(2) Had the respondent engaged in settlement negotiations in the summer 2013, I doubt that litigation would have been required. The respondent consented to a disclosure order then delayed requiring an appearance before Justice Minnema to deal with his default. The respondent delayed in obtaining mortgage financing and forwarding that information to the applicant.

(3) The settlement conferences were also ineffective because of the lateness by the respondent in proving the appraisal of the matrimonial home.

(4) The first offer to settle made by the respondent was on February 27, 2015.

(5) The respondent either failed to disclose the second installment of inherited money of $50,000 or failed to calculate the Net Family Property Statement properly taking the $50,000 into consideration until January 2015. Either way this error delayed settlement.

(6) No objection was made as to Mr. Hunter’s hourly rate or any of the expenses.

(7) I did not consider the costs incurred before the litigation commenced. I also did not consider the costs at the case conference as there was no endorsement made. Based on Islam v. Rahman, 2007 ONCA 622, costs are to be decided at each step and if they are not reserved, I have no jurisdiction to award costs.

(8) As costs were reserved for the settlement conference, I have reviewed those costs and other costs not related to a step in the proceeding such as preparation of pleadings, financial statement, preparation of offers to settle, interviews and correspondence.

[82] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), held that the court’s role in assessing costs is not necessarily to reimburse the litigant for every dollar spent on legal fees but the award of costs must be fixed in an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular proceedings.

[83] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395 at para. 8 indicated that family law costs rules are designed to foster three important principles:

(1) to partially indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation;

(2) to encourage settlement; and

(3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants.

Order

[84] Based on the above, I fix costs at $17,500 all-inclusive payable by the respondent to the applicant within 60 days.

Costs

[85] I am inclined to make no order as to costs of this motion. However, the applicant may submit brief costs submissions of no more than three pages no later than September 25,2015 and the respondent shall have until October 9, 2015 to respond. Any reply to such response shall be due within 7 days thereafter.

Shelston J.

Released: September 11, 2015

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

RE: KELLY BETH MCNAUGHT,

Applicant

AND

BERNARD KEN MCNAUGHT,

Respondent