Thomas A. Schuck

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of five counts of second-degree murder after setting fire to a home, killing his intimate partner and four children.

The Crown sought a 25-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 18 years, citing Gladue factors.

The court found that the extreme gravity of the offences and the compelling aggravating factors, including the creation of a firetrap and the vulnerability of the victims, meant the offender's moral blameworthiness was not diminished despite significant Gladue factors.

The court imposed a life sentence with 25 years of parole ineligibility.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Archie McKay for five counts of first-degree murder following a fatal house fire in Kitchenuhkoosib Inninuwug, Ontario.

The court reviews extensive circumstantial evidence, including expert testimony, extrinsic misconduct, and ante-mortem statements, to determine whether McKay deliberately set the fire and possessed the requisite intent for murder.

The court finds McKay guilty of second-degree murder in relation to all five victims, concluding that the evidence does not establish planning and deliberation or criminal harassment necessary for first-degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased, Geraldine Chapman, made to four individuals (Cheryl Meekis, Stewart Albany, Tom Chapman, Thyra Chapman) under the state of mind or principled exceptions to the hearsay rule in a first-degree murder trial.

The court assessed the relevance, necessity, and reliability of each set of statements.

Statements to Cheryl Meekis were ruled inadmissible due to lack of relevance and witness credibility issues.

Statements to Stewart Albany regarding fear/worry were admissible under the state of mind exception, while those alleging direct threats were inadmissible under the principled exception due to insufficient reliability.

Most statements to Tom Chapman were inadmissible, being deemed irrelevant or the witness's conclusions/biased interpretations.

Statements to Thyra Chapman regarding accusations of cheating and property damage were admissible under the principled exception, as their substantive reliability was established.

The Crown applied to admit three out-of-court statements made by three witnesses under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule during a trial for first-degree murder.

The statements included a police interview report and two sets of medical notes.

The court applied the four-part test for past recollection recorded, assessing reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and present voucher for accuracy.

The court admitted the police statement with redactions and one set of medical notes in full, but excluded the psychiatric consult note due to reliability concerns regarding the source of the recorded information.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow six witnesses to testify remotely at a first-degree murder trial.

The witnesses included one civilian and five medical professionals, two of whom were proposed expert witnesses.

The court granted the application for the civilian witness due to her documented health issues and panic attacks related to traveling.

However, the court dismissed the application for the medical professionals, finding that the presumptive rule of in-person testimony should not be displaced merely for the convenience of busy professionals, especially given the seriousness of the charges and the high materiality of the expert evidence.

This is an application by the Crown in a first-degree murder trial to admit 'extrinsic misconduct evidence,' comprising police occurrence reports, 911 calls, and ante-mortem statements of the deceased, Geraldine Chapman, to friends and family.

The accused, Archie McKay, is charged with five counts of first-degree murder arising from a fire that killed Ms. Chapman and four children.

The Crown seeks to admit this evidence to prove the underlying offence of criminal harassment (s. 231(6) of the Criminal Code), establish the accused's state of mind (intent), and demonstrate motive and animus, which are probative of identity.

The accused argued that much of the evidence was irrelevant, lacked probative value, or was unreliable.

The court conducted an individual analysis of each piece of evidence, ruling some admissible for narrative, context, animus, motive, and to prove elements of criminal harassment, while deeming others inadmissible due to lack of relevance or probative value.

The admissibility of ante-mortem statements is subject to a further hearsay voir dire at trial.

Edward Raymond Gibbins pleaded guilty to uttering threats, confining individuals, careless use of a firearm, and discharging a firearm with recklessness.

The incident involved him confronting victims with a shotgun over a property dispute, threatening them, and firing the weapon.

The Crown sought a four-year custodial sentence, while the Defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the accused's moral culpability (including alcohol influence and lack of prior record), and mitigating/aggravating factors.

The judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearm offences, ultimately imposing a custodial sentence.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting ten civilian witnesses from a remote First Nation community (Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug) to testify remotely via video in a first-degree murder jury trial.

The accused opposed the application, arguing that remote testimony would compromise trial fairness, particularly regarding the jury's ability to assess witness credibility and demeanour, given the seriousness of the charges and the contested issues of the fire's cause and criminal harassment.

The court granted the application in part, allowing four witnesses (William Cromarty, Alfred Beardy, Jennaya Shoomin, and Karla Cutfeet) to testify remotely due to their limited anticipated evidence or personal circumstances (age, mobility, school attendance).

However, the court denied remote testimony for six other witnesses (Bella Chapman, Solomon Begg, Thyra Chapman, Kristina Winter, Tiana Meekis, and Candace Crowe), deeming their anticipated evidence too crucial to be compromised by the limitations of video testimony.

The order for remote testimony was made conditional on various factors, including technical reliability, secure location, technical support, police presence, and proper oath administration.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and other related offences stemming from a series of violent, unprovoked assaults on senior citizens in their homes, fueled by methamphetamine intoxication.

Crown and defence jointly submitted a parole ineligibility period of 13 years for the murder convictions.

The judge considered whether this joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, weighing the horrific nature of the crimes against the certainty gained by avoiding a lengthy trial with uncertain outcomes regarding the accused's mental state and potential for a manslaughter conviction.

The court accepted the joint submission, sentencing the accused to life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility, along with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

The accused, Allan Yerxa, was charged with manslaughter for the stabbing death of George Tait.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the accused's out-of-court statements, including text messages and a police interview where he confessed to stabbing the victim twice.

The defence argued that the confession was unreliable due to inconsistencies (victim suffered seven stab wounds, not two), lack of independent corroborating evidence (no eyewitness, video, cell phone, or forensic evidence placing the accused at the scene), and the accused's vulnerability during the interview.

The defence also raised self-defence as an alternative.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the truthfulness of the inculpatory portion of the accused's confession beyond a reasonable doubt, citing the significant inconsistencies and the complete absence of independent corroborating evidence.

The court also noted the presence of other individuals with a propensity for violence who were in the vicinity at the time of the stabbing.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

In the alternative, the court also found that if the confession were accepted as truthful, the accused's actions could be considered self-defence given the victim's size, intoxication, and initial aggression.

The accused, an 18-year-old Indigenous male employed as a guitar teacher at a youth center, was convicted of two counts of sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The first victim was a 12-year-old girl whom the accused met through his employment, lured to his home, and sexually assaulted.

The second victim was also 12 years old; the accused met her through Facebook, took her to an empty apartment, and raped her.

The accused had a prior youth conviction for the same offense and committed the second assault while on bail for the first.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody reducing the remaining sentence to approximately two years and four months.

The court also imposed a lifetime section 161 order restricting contact with children, prohibiting employment with children, and restricting access to public spaces where children gather.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing the death of three people after operating an overloaded, ill-equipped boat in severe weather while impaired by alcohol, despite police warnings.

The court considered the accused's Indigenous background and intergenerational trauma detailed in a Gladue report.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, the court sentenced the accused to 18 months in custody followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order and a qualified boating prohibition.

The accused, an Indigenous man with a lengthy criminal record including two prior sexual assaults, was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a 14-year-old complainant.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and vulnerable when the accused followed and sexually assaulted her.

The court considered Gladue factors but found that the gravity of the offence, the accused's predatory behaviour, and the need for denunciation and separation from society necessitated a lengthy penitentiary term.

The accused was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime section 161 prohibition.

The accused, an Indigenous man struggling with drug addiction, pleaded guilty to multiple offences including breaking and entering, theft, and the unauthorized transfer of a restricted firearm.

The court considered a constitutional challenge to the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code.

Following coordinate jurisdiction decisions, the court found the mandatory minimum violated s. 12 of the Charter and declared it of no force or effect.

Applying Gladue principles and noting the accused's significant rehabilitation efforts, the court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence followed by 12 months of probation.

The Crown applied to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused, Jonathan Green, who was charged with sexual assault.

Green argued the statement was involuntary due to the absence of a standard caution and right to counsel.

The court found that Green was not detained and was not initially a suspect when he voluntarily attended the police station.

Although the police questioning later shifted to directly implicating Green without a caution, the court determined that Green was not compelled or overborne, and no inducements or oppression were present.

The court ruled the statement voluntary and admissible in evidence.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing institutional and Crown delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 27.5 months.

The court deducted three months of delay attributable to bringing the application, resulting in a net delay of 24 months.

As the delay fell below the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan, the onus was on the accused to show the delay was unreasonable.

The court found the accused failed to demonstrate that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, particularly given the transitional tolerance for institutional delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and failure to comply with an undertaking.

The Crown alleged that the accused punched the complainant in the face, causing serious injuries including a transected pancreas, splenectomy, and complex facial fractures requiring surgical intervention.

The accused made admissions via Facebook to the complainant's mother that he was responsible for the assault.

The defence argued that the extensive injuries could not have resulted from a single punch and that the Crown failed to establish causation.

The court found the Crown had not proven causation for the aggravated assault charge but convicted the accused of simple assault based on the admitted punch to the face.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of incest involving his seven-year-old daughter, with two occurrences of digital penetration and anal intercourse occurring in January 2013.

The accused had a prior conviction for invitation to sexual touching when he was 17 years old.

The Crown sought a sentence of seven to ten years, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of five years.

The court imposed a sentence of eight years, finding that five years was insufficient given the aggravating factors including the position of trust, the young age of the victim, the prior sexual offense, the continued offending after being caught once, and the victim's severe psychological impact.

The court considered Gladue factors as the accused is an Aboriginal offender but found they did not warrant a lower sentence in these circumstances.

The appellant human rights commission appealed a Court of Appeal decision reversing a tribunal finding that the respondent's flyers contravened the provincial hate speech prohibition.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code's prohibition on hate publications but struck the words "ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of" as not rationally connected to the legislative objective and not minimally impairing of Charter-protected expression.

The Court confirmed the modified Taylor definition of "hatred" as restricted to "detestation" and "vilification" and reinstated the tribunal's findings with respect to two of four flyers, while agreeing that two other flyers did not meet the threshold.