Tara MacDougall

In a child protection trial, the father served a summons to compel the 12-year-old child to testify.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to quash the summons, supported by the applicant society and the mother.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that compelling the child to testify posed a significant risk of emotional harm and that the father's primary purpose was to impeach her credibility rather than prove material facts.

The court also ruled on the father's request to introduce the entirety of the child's police interview video, holding that only specific prior inconsistent statements relating to substantive issues, and not collateral facts, could be admitted.

In a child protection application, the applicant sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the child to child protection workers and a counsellor for the truth of their contents.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the threshold reliability of these hearsay statements.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court evaluated the circumstances under which the statements were made, including the child's spontaneity, the absence of leading questions, and the timing of the recordings.

The court found that the majority of the statements met the threshold reliability test and were admissible, with the exception of one response to a directive question.

In a child protection summary judgment motion, the applicant society sought a protection finding and a final custody order in favour of the mother based largely on the child’s out-of-court statements alleging abuse while in the father’s care.

The court held that, although necessity was established, threshold reliability was not, because the evidentiary record relied heavily on layered hearsay without better available evidence such as direct affidavits, notes, an expert report, or the police interview video.

Excluding the hearsay, the remaining evidence did not permit the court to reject the father’s theory of improper influence over the child.

The court found a genuine issue requiring trial and dismissed the motion.

The maternal grandparents of two Crown wards brought a motion for leave under s. 65.1(5) of the Child and Family Services Act to bring a status review application.

The children had been in care for over four years, and the children's aid society had recently identified an adoptive family and was preparing to place the children for adoption.

The court applied the five-part test for granting leave and found that the grandparents failed to demonstrate unusual circumstances or a prima facie case that a status review would result in the children being placed in their care.

The court emphasized the children's need for permanency and stability, and dismissed the motion for leave.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking Crown wardship for a 15-year-old child and a custody order to the paternal grandmother for a 14-year-old child.

The children were apprehended due to physical altercations and parent-child conflict.

The mother ultimately did not oppose the Crown wardship but sought conditions on access, and initially contested the custody order for the younger child.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, determined the children were in need of protection, and granted the Society's motion, ordering Crown wardship for the older child and custody to the paternal grandmother for the younger child.