Stribopoulos

The accused was tried on six historical charges involving two complainants, including sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault.

The Crown applied to have the complainants' testimony admitted as similar fact evidence between the counts.

The court admitted the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed any prejudice.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's testimony and accepted the evidence of the complainants.

The court found the accused guilty on all six counts, concluding he used his position of religious authority and trust to sexually abuse the complainants.

The accused, facing historical sexual abuse charges, brought an application to exclude a recorded telephone conversation between himself and the complainant.

The accused argued the recording was more prejudicial than probative.

The court found the recording had significant probative value, as the accused's failure to deny the allegations and his apology could be construed as an admission.

The court also found no moral or reasoning prejudice would result from its admission.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought an application to sever charges of sexual assault and assault from charges of assault, mischief, and criminal harassment, all involving the same complainant.

The accused argued that trying the counts together would cause prejudice by inviting propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were factually and legally intertwined, the evidence was not complex, and a limiting instruction to the jury would adequately address any risk of prejudice.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States on charges of human smuggling, applied for release on bail.

The United States alleged the applicant led a scheme to smuggle Indian nationals into the US from Canada.

The court found that the applicant failed to justify his release on the primary ground, as he posed a significant flight risk given his tenuous immigration status in Canada, lack of assets, and the strong case against him.

The court also found detention was necessary on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breaching a recognizance after a five-year-old child was found severely beaten in a wooded area.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's motive stemming from a deteriorating relationship with the child's mother, his opportunity to commit the crime, pattern bruising on the child matching the accused's shoes, and the child's DNA found under the accused's fingernails.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused committed the assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the death of his friend, who was found beaten to death in his rented room.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the direct evidence of the accused's ex-wife, who testified that the accused confessed to the killing during a drunken phone call.

The court accepted the ex-wife's testimony, finding it corroborated by cell phone records and non-public details of the crime scene.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the court found he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder given the brutality of the assault and his subsequent actions to conceal the crime.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, moved for an injunction to block the impending sale of the corporation's sole real estate asset to a third party.

The plaintiff had previously initiated an oppression action against the majority shareholders and directors, alleging mismanagement and conflicts of interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the propriety of the sale.

However, the court dismissed the motion because the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm, as any potential losses were quantifiable and could be compensated through a damages award against the directors personally.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his estranged wife, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to elicit evidence that the complainant was having an extramarital affair.

The accused argued this evidence was necessary to explain why he ceased having a sexual relationship with her, contextualizing his defence.

The court held that evidence of the accused's belief that the complainant was having an affair was admissible as it was relevant to his credibility and inextricably interwoven with the narrative.

However, evidence of whether the affair actually occurred was inadmissible, as its probative value was marginal and substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the complainant's privacy and the proper administration of justice.

The offender was convicted of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after accelerating to 117 km/h in a 70 km/h zone and colliding with a left-turning vehicle.

The collision caused catastrophic, permanent traumatic brain injuries to a teenage passenger and serious injuries to the driver.

The Crown sought three years' imprisonment, while the defence sought six months.

The court weighed the profound impact on the victims against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and the fact that the victim driver's unsafe left turn contributed to the collision.

The offender was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused, a taxicab driver, was charged with second degree murder after running over an intoxicated passenger with his minivan.

The incident was captured on a residential surveillance camera.

The accused testified that he accidentally struck the victim while looking for oncoming traffic.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as irreconcilable with the video footage and internally illogical.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally drove his vehicle at the victim in anger and possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on a charge of first degree murder and committing him only for second degree murder.

The accused was alleged to have committed a drive-by shooting.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, which was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused to stand trial for first degree murder.

The parties separated after a seven-year marriage.

The applicant sought child and spousal support, arguing the respondent's income should include substantial funds he regularly received from his grandfather's company.

The respondent argued the applicant was intentionally unemployed and that the funds were gifts.

The court imputed a part-time income of $18,000 to the applicant, finding she could work despite her childcare responsibilities for their autistic child.

The court imputed $246,000 annually to the respondent, finding the family gifts were a settled pattern that entrenched their lifestyle.

The court ordered significant ongoing support and arrears, vested the respondent's interest in the matrimonial home in the applicant to satisfy an equalization payment, and ordered a charge on the respondent's condominium as security for support due to his history of deceit and risk of absconding.

The accused, charged with terrorism offences for allegedly attempting to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State, appeared for a mandatory detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court conducted a bail hearing 'from the ground up'.

The court found that the Crown's case was not overwhelmingly strong, as there was no direct evidence the accused intended to enhance the terrorist group's ability to carry out terrorist activities, nor any history of violence.

The court concluded that the accused's detention was not justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds, and ordered her release on a $100,000 surety bail with strict conditions, including a ban on social media and internet monitoring.

The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a serious intersection collision.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d).

The court found that police violated his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) rights by psychologically detaining him at the scene without providing rights to counsel, and violated his s. 8 rights by seizing his vehicle's airbag control module without a warrant and failing to file a report to a justice.

The court excluded the module data under s. 24(2).

However, relying on dashcam video from another vehicle, the court found the accused's driving—accelerating to nearly 50 km/h over the speed limit and passing a stopped vehicle in an intersection—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care and was a significant contributing cause of the collision.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and failed to object to inadmissible bad character evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the Crown had improperly elicited highly prejudicial bad character evidence, including allegations of violence, misogyny, and homophobia, without seeking a ruling on its admissibility.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that credibility was the central issue at trial and it was not apparent that the trial judge had disregarded the inadmissible evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

He was charged with possessing crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and a loaded restricted firearm.

The court found a material change in circumstances because disclosure revealed the Crown's case was significantly weaker than presented in the initial police synopsis, and the applicant proposed a more stringent release plan including GPS monitoring.

The court concluded that detention was not justified on either the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicant's release on strict conditions with three sureties.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of information provided to police by a confidential informer, arguing the informer was a material witness and the information was necessary to raise a reasonable doubt.

The court held that the 'innocence at stake' test is the sole exception to informer privilege, even for material witnesses.

While the applicant established that the privileged information was not available from any other source, the court found the application premature.

The court dismissed the application without prejudice, ruling that the trial judge would be in a better position to determine if the applicant could raise a reasonable doubt without the privileged information after the Crown's key witness was cross-examined.

The accused was charged with assault, aggravated assault, and robbery with a firearm.

The Crown brought an application for directions on whether the common law regime from Seaboyer or s. 276 of the Criminal Code applied to evidence it sought to adduce regarding a co-assailant's statement that the complainant had previously 'raped' the accused.

The court held that s. 276 only applies to evidence adduced by the accused.

Assuming the Seaboyer regime applied, the court ruled the evidence was admissible as it was highly probative of motive and did not invite prohibited twin-myths reasoning.

The plaintiff was struck by an unidentified driver while riding her electric scooter in a parking lot.

The driver fled the scene shortly after the collision while the plaintiff was being attended to by her husband and a friend.

The plaintiff sued her husband's automobile insurer under the unidentified automobile coverage.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to identify the driver.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a triable issue as to whether the plaintiff's failure to obtain the driver's information was reasonable given her injuries and shock immediately following the accident.

The three accused faced various charges relating to the importation of 29 kilograms of heroin and 600 grams of opium concealed in a shipping container of marble stone.

At the close of the Crown's case, all three accused brought motions for directed verdicts.

The court dismissed the motions brought by two of the accused, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer their knowledge and participation in the drug importation and trafficking scheme.

However, the court granted the motion for the third accused, the consignee of the shipment, finding no evidence reasonably capable of supporting an inference that he knew about the drugs, and entered not guilty verdicts on his charges.