COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-3348

DATE: 202090819

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

ELIZABETH MARIE LAMB

Ms. J. Hoffman and Ms. A. Broccolini, for the Plaintiff

Plaintiff

• and -

THE CO-OPERATORS GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and JOHN DOE

Mr. J. Beleskey, for the Defendant The Co-operators General Insurance Company

Defendants

HEARD: July 22, 2020, by Zoom videoconference.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Stribopoulos J.

Introduction

1The plaintiff, Ms. Lamb, initiated an action for damages she suffered when an unidentified motorist struck her as she drove her electric scooter through the parking lot of a plaza in Brampton.

2Ms. Lamb sues the unknown driver as "John Doe." And, she also sues her husband's automobile insurer, the defendant, Co-operators General Insurance Company.

3The insurance agreement between Co-operators and Ms. Lamb's husband provided coverage for Ms. Lamb, as the policy holder's spouse. It insured her for bodily injuries she suffered if struck by an "unidentified automobile," which means any other automobile where "the identity of either the owner or driver cannot be ascertained."

4In its statement of defence, Co-operators denies liability, in part, by pleading that Ms. Lamb's claim does not involve a situation in which either the owner or driver of the vehicle that struck her could not have been ascertained through reasonable means.

5On this motion, Co-operators seeks an order for summary judgment. It contends that the evidence on the motion overwhelmingly supports a finding that despite having "every opportunity" to identify the vehicle owner or driver, Ms. Lamb made no effort to do so. It follows, says Co-operators, that there is no triable issue concerning its potential liability, and, therefore, the court should dismiss Ms. Lamb's action.

6Ms. Lamb opposes the motion for summary judgment. She maintains that, in all of the circumstances, she did not unreasonably fail to identify the driver or record his license plate. In that regard, Ms. Lamb emphasizes her condition after being struck and injured, combined with the driver's swift departure from the scene following the accident.

7The decisive issue on this motion for summary judgment is whether there is a triable issue concerning the reasonableness of Ms. Lamb's failure to identify the driver who struck her or record the license plate of his vehicle.

8These reasons will proceed in three parts. The first part explains the burden on a plaintiff who sues their insurer for injuries caused by an "unidentified automobile" to establish that the identity of the owner or driver of that vehicle “cannot be ascertained.” The second part sets out a brief overview of the evidence filed on the motion, especially the events immediately after the accident. Finally, in light of the pleadings, the law, and the evidence, these reasons will address whether this is an appropriate case for summary judgment.

I. The Obligation on a Plaintiff to Take Reasonable Steps to Identify the Driver or Owner of the Vehicle

9The automobile insurance policy agreement between Ms. Lamb's husband and Co-operators included the O.P.C.F. 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement. The Insurance Act requires that every automobile insurance policy include such coverage: Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 265(1). The Act defines a "person insured under the contract" as including the policy holder's "spouse" if "struck by an uninsured or unidentified automobile": s. 265(2). The Act also defines an "unidentified automobile" as meaning "an automobile with respect to which the identity of either the owner or driver cannot be ascertained": s. 265(2) (emphasis added).

10Given the definition of an "unidentified automobile," the case law recognizes that for a plaintiff, like Ms. Lamb, to succeed in a claim against her insurer, she must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that she could not ascertain by reasonable means the identity of the driver or owner of the vehicle that injured her: see Vescio v. Peterman (1999), 1999 CanLII 2299 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (3d) 613 (C.A.), [1999] O.J. No. 4039, rev'd (1998), 1998 CanLII 14648 (ON SC), 37 O.R. (3d) 661 (Gen. Div.); Manuel v State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, 2016 ONSC 7066, at paras. 41-52; Shapiro v. John Doe, 2016 ONSC 2956, at para. 12; Hooper v. The Economical Insurance Group, 2015 ONSC 2745, at para. 42.

11In Leggett v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1992), 1992 CanLII 1263 (BC CA), 72 B.C.L.R. (2d) 201 (C.A.), 96 D.L.R. (4th) 123, leave to appeal refused [1992] S.C.C.A. No. 558, the British Columbia Court of Appeal addressed the very same requirement under the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 204. Like the Ontario legislation, s. 23(1)(a) of the British Columbia Act limited claims against the insurer to situations where: "the names of both the owner and the driver of the motor vehicle are not ascertainable" (emphasis added). Leggett helpfully explains the rationale for this requirement and the obligation it imposes on a plaintiff. For the court, Taylor J. writes at paragraphs 9 through 15:

9 ... protection against fraudulent claims is only one of the purposes of the requirement that the claimant show inability to identify the other driver and owner as a condition of being able to claim under the section. In my view the overall purpose of the section is to limit the exposure of the corporation to claims brought by persons who, in the matter of seeking to identify those responsible for the accident, have done everything they reasonably could to protect what ordinarily would be their own interests, and which, by virtue of the section, become the interests of the corporation.

10 The corporation's exposure under the section is limited to claims brought by those who could not have ascertained the identity of the parties responsible. It does not, in my view, extend to claims by those who have chosen not to do so.

11 I do not think the words "not ascertainable" should be strictly interpreted, so as to mean "could not possibly have been ascertained". I think they are to be interpreted with reference to subsection (5) so as to mean "could not have been ascertained had the claimant made all reasonable efforts, having regard to the claimant's position, to discover them". Where a person knows that he or she has been involved in a motor vehicle accident, but refrains even from recording the licence number of the other vehicle, when that number is visible and the claimant could, had he or she wished, reasonably have recorded it, such a claimant must, in my view, find it particularly difficult, and probably impossible, to establish that he or she made all reasonable efforts to discover the identity of the owner and driver of that vehicle for the purposes of the section.

12 The test seems to me to be subjective in the sense that the claimant must know that the vehicle has been in an accident and must have been in such a position and condition that it would be reasonable for the claimant to discover and record the appropriate information. But the claimant cannot be heard to say: "I acted reasonably in not taking the trouble to find out".

13 I think that in essence the test is that which was formulated by Hinkson, L.J.S.C. (as he then was) in King et al v. A.G. (B.C.) (1968), 1968 CanLII 595 (BC SC), 66 W.W.R. 223 (B.C.S.C.), following Rossiter v. Chaisson, [1950] O.W.N. 265 (Ont. H.C.). In the King case, which was decided under the then Section 108 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1960 Chapter 253, the judge (at p. 226) held the appropriate test to be whether the claimants had "pursued the investigation to identify the vehicle and its owner and driver as resolutely and resourcefully as they would have done in like circumstances" had there been no such provision. In order to accommodate the current statutory requirement in the present context, I would add, after the words "would have done in like circumstances", the words "if the claimant intended to pursue any right of action which he or she might have arising out of the accident".

14 In the present case the reason for failing to discover and record the required information was that the respondent had decided not to pursue any claim which he might have.

15 It is not, in my view, possible for this claimant to establish that he acted reasonably simply because the full extent of damage done was not known to him at the time of the accident--that is to say, in this case, because he did not then know he had suffered personal injury. The question, in my view, is not whether Mr. Leggett acted reasonably in deciding initially to abandon whatever rights he had, but whether he acted as a reasonable person would have acted who wanted to protect those rights, whatever they might prove to be.

[Emphasis added]

12Courts in Ontario, and in other provinces with comparable legislative provisions, have cited Leggett with approval: see Hooper, at paras. 37-39; Manuel, at paras. 46-48; Wilmot v. Manitoba Public Insurance Corp. (1995), 107 Man.R. (2d) 62 (C.A.), 1995 CanLII 16353 (MB CA), at para. 5; Donovan v. McCain Foods Ltd., 2004 NLCA 12, 237 D.L.R. (4th) 87, at para. 46; Webb v. Alberta (Administrator, Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Act), [2004] A.J. No 1618 (Q.B.), 9 M.V.R. (5th) 27, at paras. 9-10. Leggett supplies helpful guidance in deciding whether a plaintiff has established that they could not ascertain by reasonable means the identity of the driver or owner of the vehicle responsible for their injuries.

II. The Accident and its Aftermath

13In addition to the pleadings, in support of its motion, Co-operators also filed excerpts from Ms. Lamb's examination for discovery. In response, Ms. Lamb filed the entirety of that transcript, along with affidavits from her, her husband and the couple's friend, Mr. Easter. The transcripts from the cross-examinations of each on their respective affidavits also form part of the record. All these materials together provide the basis for the following summary.

a) The accident

14Late on the afternoon of Friday, August 14, 2015, Ms. Lamb had plans to celebrate her husband's birthday at a pub they routinely frequent, the Walkers Brew, located in a plaza at 14 Lisa Street, Brampton.

15According to Ms. Lamb, after work that day she went home to shower and dress before heading off to the pub at approximately 3:30 p.m., where she was planning on meeting her husband.

16Ms. Lamb travelled from her home to the Walkers Brew on her EcoReco Electric Scooter. At the time, she had owned the scooter for about a month. The scooter does not have a seat; it is a standing scooter. Ms. Lamb wore a helmet while riding her scooter. She would ride the scooter on sidewalks and pathways and across roadways at designated crosswalks.

17After arriving at the Walkers Brew plaza, Ms. Lamb entered the parking lot on her scooter. According to her evidence, she was travelling west along a designated traffic throughway in the parking lot.

18As she approached an intersecting traffic throughway that runs north/south through the parking lot, Ms. Lamb brought her scooter to a complete stop. There were cars parked in designated parking spots both to her right and across from her. Abutting the parked cars located across from her and to her right was a double-parked minivan.

19At that point, Ms. Lamb could see both her husband and Mr. Easter. They were standing in front of the Walkers Brew. The two men were chatting and having a cigarette. After waving to them, Ms. Lamb looked to her right and her left. With her way appearing clear, she proceeded forward on her scooter.

20Just as she began traversing the intersecting traffic throughway, Ms. Lamb saw the front bumper of a vehicle emerging from behind the double-parked minivan and approaching towards her from her right. At the time, Ms. Lamb's husband and Mr. Easter were both facing the parking lot. According to them, a car emerged from behind a double-parked vehicle, and it was travelling rather fast for a parking lot.

21Ms. Lamb responded to the sudden appearance of the oncoming vehicle by taking her right hand off the throttle of her scooter and raising it in the air to get the attention of the driver of the fast-approaching vehicle. Despite this, the vehicle continued forward. Ms. Lamb estimated that within a second or two of her first seeing it, the vehicle struck her.

22The vehicle made contact with Ms. Lamb, hitting her right arm and propelling her to the pavement. Ms. Lamb injured her right arm and right leg in the collision.

23Mr. Easter saw the accident. He described Ms. Lamb flying 4 to 5 feet after being struck. Mr. Lamb had been looking away at the moment of the impact and heard, but did not see, the collision.

b) Events immediately after the accident

24According to Ms. Lamb, as she lay on the pavement after being struck, she was injured and shocked. She remembers that within seconds her husband and Mr. Easter came to her aid, and she complained to them that she was in pain. They responded by examining her arm, leg and knee.

25Both Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter depose that after they went to Ms. Lamb, as she lay on the pavement, she complained to them about pain in her arm and leg, and especially pain in her knee. According to Mr. Easter, Ms. Lamb was not saying much, and what she did say was peppered with expletives. In Mr. Easter's view, both Ms. Lamb and Mr. Lamb appeared to be in shock.

26As she was lying on the pavement, Ms. Lamb remembers the driver emerging from his vehicle and surveying the damage to his car. He never spoke to Ms. Lamb. Nor did she talk to him. Ms. Lamb describes the driver as having brown skin and dark hair and driving a light coloured, possibly white, average size sedan.

27During cross-examination, Ms. Lamb conceded that while the driver was outside and surveying the damage to his vehicle, she would have had the opportunity to ask him his name and for his contact information. Pressed about her failure to do so, she testified: "I was in shock. I just got hit by a car," "everything was so fast," and "I was worried about what happened to me."

28Mr. Lamb deposes that while his wife lay on the pavement after the accident, the driver exited his vehicle. Mr. Lamb describes the driver as a young man with brown skin who appeared to be of East Indian ethnicity. Mr. Lamb remembers the man's car being a smaller grey or silver sedan. According to Mr. Lamb, the driver only appeared concerned with the potential damage to his vehicle. Mr. Lamb testified that they did not speak to the driver, and the driver did not speak to them.

29Mr. Easter describes the car that struck Ms. Lamb as being a black luxury-type vehicle. He describes the driver as a male between 30 and 40 years of age, of average build, and having brown skin. Mr. Easter confirms that after exiting his vehicle, the driver seemed only concerned with surveying the potential damage to his car. Irked by this, Mr. Easter remembers saying to the driver: "Hey buddy, are you serious? You just hit this lady, and you're looking at your car?" Mr. Easter deposes that the driver mumbled something in response but says he could not make out what the driver said.

30Within just one to two minutes of the accident, Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter decided to move Ms. Lamb from the parking lot. Mr. Easter deposes that he thought it best to get Ms. Lamb out of the hot sun and off the roadway. Mr. Easter helped Ms. Lamb up, but she could not place any weight on her right leg. Mr. Easter effectively carried her inside Walkers Brew. At the same time, Mr. Lamb picked up her scooter and followed them inside.

31During cross-examination, Mr. Easter agreed that he never asked the driver for his name, address, or insurance information. He also conceded that he did not tell the driver not to leave. Mr. Easter acknowledged he could have done each of these things, but explained that, at the time, "I wasn't worried about him, I was worried about [Ms. Lamb]."

32Mr. Easter strongly disagreed with the suggestion, made to him during cross-examination, that moving Ms. Lamb from the parking lot into the Walkers Brew would have left the driver with the impression that he was free to leave. He explained that: "anybody who hits somebody doesn't usually take off from the scene."

33In his affidavit Mr. Lamb deposes that, during the two minutes they were outside after the accident, he did not have an opportunity to identify the driver. In that short time, he deposes that he was in shock, scared and only concerned about his wife's well-being. He deposes that it was his intention, once Ms. Lamb was safely inside the pub, to go outside and speak with the driver.

34During cross-examination, Mr. Lamb conceded that after the accident, before moving Ms. Lamb inside the pub, there would have been an opportunity to ask the driver for his information or ask him not to leave. However, he also explained that, at the time, "I was more concerned about my wife."

35Inside the Walkers Brew, Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter helped to position Ms. Lamb in a chair and obtained some ice for her leg. It was only then that Mr. Lamb turned his attention to going outside to speak to the driver. By that point, they had only been inside the pub for a couple of minutes. Mr. Easter confirms that, within a few minutes of entering the pub, Mr. Lamb went back outside to speak with the driver of the vehicle.

36According to Mr. Lamb, when he went outside, the driver and his vehicle were gone. Although Mr. Lamb looked all over the parking lot for the driver, he could not find him or his vehicle. Mr. Lamb was surprised that the driver left without speaking with them and exchanging information. Mr. Lamb went back inside the Walkers Brew, where he told Mr. Easter that the driver had left. Mr. Easter confirms that on re-entering Walkers Brew, Mr. Lamb said the driver was gone.

37Ms. Lamb did not call 911 after the accident, nor did she ask either her husband or Mr. Easter to do so. Asked to explain why she did not do so, she responded: "I was in shock. I didn't think of it. It's not the first thing that really hit my mind. ... I guess I should have, but I didn't."

38After remaining at the Walkers Brew for about 15 to 20 minutes, Ms. Lamb's husband drove her home. That evening, she elevated, iced and rested her leg. She explains her failure to go directly to the hospital as resulting from her general apprehensiveness about doctors. (She had not visited her family doctor in more than 10 years.) At the time, she hoped that with rest and ice, her leg would feel better.

c) The days after the accident

39The next morning, however, Ms. Lamb deposes that she was experiencing extreme pain in her leg and decided to go to the hospital. During that visit, she discovered that she had sustained a right tibia plateau fracture and would require surgery.

40Within a week of the accident, Ms. Lamb contacted the police to report the accident. According to her evidence, the police responded by telling her it was too late for them to take a report. In contrast, Mr. Lamb did not think that Ms. Lamb had ever called the police. He testified that he did, about two weeks after the accident, but was told it was too late to do anything because the accident happened on private property.

41After meeting with a lawyer on August 25, 2015, Ms. Lamb learned of her rights under her husband's automobile insurance policy. On August 27, 2015, Ms. Lamb notified Co-operators of the accident and her resulting injuries. That same day, Ms. Lamb's husband filed an Application for Accident Benefits with Co-operators on her behalf.

42In May of 2016, Ms. Lamb met with an adjuster from Co-Operators. On June 15, 2016, Co-operators wrote Ms. Lamb's lawyer, advising that, based on its assessment, the vehicle that struck her had the right of way. On that basis, Co-operators denied Ms. Lamb's claim, asserting that she was 100 percent liable for any damages or injuries. Unlike its position on this motion, in denying her claim Co-operators did not cite Ms. Lamb's failure to identify the driver or the owner of the vehicle that struck her.

III. Is this an Appropriate Case for Summary Judgment?

43The parties disagree regarding the appropriateness of deciding this action by summary judgment. As a result, the court's authority on this motion comes from Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.

44Under Rule 20.04(a), the court shall grant summary judgment if "satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence" (italics added). In deciding whether or not there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, Rule 20.04(2.1) empowers the court to exercise fact-finding powers. The court may utilize these, "unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial": Rule 20.04(2.1)

45In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified these rules and provided essential guidance on their operation. The Court interpreted both Rules 20.04(2)(a) and 20.04(2.1), explained their interrelationship, and gave direction regarding the approach to be employed by judges hearing summary judgment motions. In her reasons for the Court, Karakastanis J. set out the following helpful summary, writing at paragraph 66:

On a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.04, the judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial if the summary judgment process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure, under Rule 20.04(2)(a). If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2). She may, at her discretion, use those powers, provided that their use is not against the interest of justice. Their use will not be against the interest of justice if they will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.

See also Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc. v. Hryniak, 2014 SCC 8, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 126, at para. 22.

46Even with the benefit of the fact-finding powers conferred by Rule 20.04(2.1), summary judgment is appropriate only if the motion record, "gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute": Hryniak, at para. 50.

47In Hryniak, the Supreme Court explained that there would be no genuine issue for trial when the summary judgment process "(1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.": Hryniak, at para. 49.

48With these principles firmly in mind, I turn to the decisive issue on this motion: whether there is a triable issue concerning the reasonableness of Ms. Lamb's failure to identify the driver who struck her or record the license plate of his vehicle.

49In their affidavits filed on the motion, Ms. Lamb, Mr. Lamb, and Mr. Easter, each deposed that they did not have the opportunity to identify the driver who struck Ms. Lamb or record the license plate of his vehicle.

50Nevertheless, during cross-examination on their respective affidavits, each effectively conceded that, after the accident, when the driver exited his vehicle, they could have asked him for his identifying information or recorded his license plate.

51Co-operators points to their failure to seize that opportunity to argue that there is no triable issue concerning its potential liability because Ms. Lamb could have ascertained either the identity of the driver or the owner of the vehicle.

52With respect, Co-operators' position casts the burden on a plaintiff too high. It also ignores much of the evidence concerning the events in the immediate aftermath of the accident.

53The question is not whether it was possible for Ms. Lamb to identify the driver or record his license plate. Instead, it is whether her failure to do so was unreasonable in the circumstances, which necessarily takes into account her condition in the aftermath of the accident: Leggett, at paras. 11-12.

54The uncontradicted evidence on the motion establishes that Ms. Lamb suffered a significant injury in the accident. Unbeknownst to her at the time, a bone in her knee was fractured. Immediately after the accident, she was in considerable pain and very likely in shock. Understandably, during that period, her unavoidable focus was on her condition.

55Based on these facts, to conclude that Ms. Lamb behaved unreasonably by not prioritizing obtaining the driver's identifying information or recording his license plate would entirely ignore the reality of her situation. At the time, Ms. Lamb was rather obviously not in any condition to collect pertinent information regarding the driver who struck her.

56Similarly, assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter would qualify as Ms. Lamb's agents, there was nothing unreasonable in the two of them directing their attention, right after the accident, towards Ms. Lamb. Having just been struck by a car, Ms. Lamb was injured and in immediate need of their assistance. At that point, it would be entirely unreasonable to expect them to resist their instinct to aid an injured person in favour of making efforts to collect information about the driver and his vehicle. In the circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter to remove Ms. Lamb from the roadway and attend to her injuries before turning their minds to the driver who struck her.

57On the uncontradicted evidence, after attending to his injured wife's immediate needs, within less than five minutes of the accident, Mr. Lamb returned to the parking lot to speak with the driver. Unfortunately, by that point, the driver had fled the scene. Based on the facts, I am hard-pressed to conclude that a reasonable person in Mr. Lamb’s circumstances would have done anything differently.

58In that regard, I reject Co-operators suggestion that by moving Ms. Lamb inside the pub from where she was lying on the roadway, Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter implicitly communicated to the driver that he was free to leave. A driver has a legal duty to stop his vehicle after an accident, provide his name and address, and offer assistance to injured persons: see Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.16(1). There is no reasonable basis to suggest that Mr. Lamb and Mr. Easter are somehow responsible for the driver's decision to leave the scene.

59In my view, the various cases that Co-operators relies upon on this motion are all very different. Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, due to her condition after the accident, Ms. Lamb did not have a real opportunity to collect identifying information regarding the driver or vehicle owner. In the circumstances, it would be unfair to conclude that Ms. Lamb behaved unreasonably in failing to take steps to safeguard her legal rights. Ultimately, Ms. Lamb did not have a real opportunity to take such steps because of her physical and emotional condition after being struck and injured, and the driver’s decision to flee the scene within minutes of the accident.

60In the end, acceding to Co-operators' position on this motion would serve to cast the burden on a plaintiff seeking redress for injuries caused by an "unidentified automobile" far too high. If a plaintiff is injured by a motor vehicle, and because of her injury is not in a position to collect information about the driver of that vehicle or record his license plate before that driver takes flight, they are the very sort of claimant the law should protect. To close the door on such a plaintiff's claim would, in practical terms, have the somewhat perverse effect of only ever affording coverage to those injured by "hit and run" drivers who have the misfortune of being rendered unconscious. That would be a rather absurd result. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 36 O.R. (3d) 419, at p. 27.

Conclusion

61Ultimately, for all of these reasons, I am far from satisfied that there is no triable issue concerning the reasonableness of Ms. Lamb's failure to identify the driver who struck her or record the license plate of his vehicle.

62Accordingly, the court dismisses the motion for summary judgment.

63The court invites submissions as to costs from the parties. Ms. Lamb may submit written submissions, no longer than three double-spaced pages in length, not including a Bill of Costs, by no later than September 4, 2020. Co-operators may file written submissions in response, also no longer than three double-spaced pages, by no later than September 18, 2020. Ms. Lamb shall not file reply submissions unless requested by the court.

Signed: Justice J. Stribopoulos