Sossin

The plaintiff sued corporate and individual defendants for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale regarding a retail development.

The individual defendants moved to strike the claim against them under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing that as corporate officers, they could not be held personally liable for inducing the corporation to breach its contract without allegations of separate tortious conduct.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding the pleadings lacked necessary particulars of bad faith or separate interests.

However, the court also granted the plaintiff's cross-motion under Rule 26.01 to amend the statement of claim, as there was no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment for unpaid legal bills obtained by her former legal counsel.

The court found that the defendant moved promptly upon learning of the enforcement steps, had a reasonable explanation for the default due to ongoing settlement negotiations, and raised an arguable defence regarding the amount owed.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was granted, but the defendant was ordered to pay $5,000 in costs to the plaintiff for the motion.

The plaintiff physician brought an action against the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons after it determined he did not meet the eligibility requirements to sit the internal medicine national exam based on his US residency training.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the College's motion and dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding no genuine issue for trial as the plaintiff failed to establish any legal duty breached by the College or any damages suffered.

The self-represented plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against several physicians and hospitals.

After their initial lawyer declined to formally represent them, the plaintiffs emailed defence counsel agreeing to dismiss the action on a without-costs basis.

When the plaintiffs later retained new counsel and sought to continue the action, the defendants brought a motion under Rule 49.09 to enforce the settlement.

The court granted the motion, finding that the email exchange constituted a binding agreement on all essential terms and that there was no evidence of unconscionability to vitiate the settlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant pharmacy for defaulting on an equipment lease for a telemedicine studio.

The defendant argued the lease was unenforceable due to a unilateral mistake, claiming it believed it was contracting solely with the telemedicine service provider, who allegedly perpetrated a fraud.

The third-party lease broker also moved for summary judgment to dismiss the defendant's claim against it.

The court granted both motions, finding the lease enforceable as the defendant accepted the equipment and made payments, and there was no evidence the plaintiff or the broker participated in or knew of the alleged fraud.

The plaintiffs sued their former lawyers for professional negligence and breach of contract arising from their representation in an underlying employment and corporate dispute.

The defendant lawyers brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted the motions, finding no genuine issue for trial because the plaintiffs failed to adduce expert evidence on the standard of care, the evidence showed the plaintiffs were advised of the litigation risks, and there was no evidence that the lawyers' conduct caused the plaintiffs' alleged damages.

The plaintiff mother brought a motion for summary judgment against her defendant son for an outstanding loan debt, specifically seeking to enforce an alleged agreement to increase the interest rate on a portion of the debt from 5% to 10%.

The court reviewed email correspondence between the parties and a third-party lender.

The court found there was no meeting of the minds, as the son agreed to the higher interest rate only in exchange for delayed payment terms, which the mother explicitly rejected.

Consequently, the motion for the increased interest rate was dismissed, and the original 5% rate remained applicable.

The plaintiffs, two lienholders, brought a motion opposing the confirmation of a Master's Report which found that the defendant mortgagees had priority over their construction liens under s. 78(3) of the Construction Act.

The Master had awarded the mortgagees all proceeds from the receivership sale of the contaminated property.

The Superior Court confirmed the Master's finding that the mortgagees had priority for the funds advanced under the vendor take-back mortgage.

However, the Court set aside the portion of the Report granting the mortgagees priority for additional fees, charges, and expenses not directly related to the sale, allowing the lienholders access to the remaining funds to satisfy their liens.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages, arguing the termination clause in his employment contract was unenforceable.

The court found that while provisions regarding health benefits and termination for cause were valid, the clause was ambiguous as to whether it excluded severance pay when providing termination pay.

Due to this ambiguity, the termination clause was held invalid.

The plaintiff was awarded common law damages for the period between his termination and when he mitigated his damages by finding new employment.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion to continue a Mareva injunction freezing the assets of its former employee, who was alleged to have participated in a kickback scheme in Cuba resulting in over $500,000 in misappropriated funds.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing material non-disclosure and lack of risk of asset dissipation.

The court applied the five-part test for a Mareva injunction and found the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case and sufficient risk of dissipation, ordering the injunction to continue.

The plaintiff and defendant by counterclaim brought a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him on a counterclaim.

The original defendant had passed away before the default judgment was granted, and his widow was later appointed estate trustee nunc pro tunc.

The court found that Rule 11 did not bar the enforcement of the default judgment due to the retroactive appointment.

However, applying the test under Rule 19.08, the court set aside the default judgment and the noting in default, finding the moving party moved promptly upon realizing the judgment's consequences, provided a satisfactory explanation for the default, and had an arguable defence based on a prior release.

The applicant lawyer brought a motion to release funds held in trust to his client, a subcontractor who had registered a construction lien.

The respondent contractor had paid the funds into trust to discharge the lien but argued the payment was akin to security paid into court and should be returned since the limitation period for the subcontractor to perfect the lien had expired.

The court found that the funds were paid for the benefit of the subcontractor subject to any claims by the contractor, and since the contractor failed to bring a claim within the limitation period, the funds constituted a trust under s. 8 of the Construction Lien Act and were ordered released to the subcontractor.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages relating to a dispute over sales commissions.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the action based on arbitration clauses in the relevant sales agreements.

The plaintiff argued the clauses were invalid due to vagueness or unconscionability.

The court found the arbitration clauses were binding, unambiguous, and not unconscionable, and stayed the action in favour of arbitration.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion at trial seeking declarations that the plaintiff's claims were barred by issue estoppel based on prior findings of the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB).

The plaintiff claimed an equitable interest and co-ownership in a residential property, while the LTB had previously found him to be a tenant and ordered his eviction.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding that the LTB had no jurisdiction to determine equitable rights of ownership, and therefore the issues before the court were distinct from those decided by the LTB.