Family and Matrimonial Law - SCC

The appellants, a Metis-white couple, took the respondent's infant daughter into their home and cared for her for several years, becoming her psychological parents.

The natural mother, an Indian woman who had struggled with alcoholism, later sought custody.

The trial judge granted the appellants' application for a de facto adoption, finding it was in the child's best interests.

The Court of Appeal overturned the adoption order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the adoption order, holding that the law focuses on the best interests of the child rather than parental property rights.

The Court emphasized that as the bond with prospective adoptive parents grows closer over time, the significance of cultural background and heritage abates.

The appellant father appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that overturned a trial judge's order granting him custody of two young children.

The trial judge had found fault in both parents but determined that awarding custody to the father was in the best interests of the children.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision without detailed reasons, stating only that the trial judge did not consider all proper principles.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an appellate court should not disturb the factual determinations of a trial judge in a custody case absent a marked deficiency.

The trial judgment was restored.

The respondent husband made claims against his deceased wife's estate for contributions made to a duplex owned by the wife.

The parties had an oral agreement that the husband would acquire a half interest upon paying half the purchase price through monthly installments, but the wife died before payments were completed.

The husband also performed extensive maintenance and renovations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the estate's appeal, holding that while the Family Law Reform Act did not apply to deceased spouses, the husband was entitled to the return of his payments in quasi-contract and compensation for his services based on the doctrine of constructive trust and unjust enrichment.

The parties separated after nineteen years of marriage and agreed on an equal division of family assets.

The wife claimed a share of the husband's non-family assets, specifically Bell Canada shares and an RRSP acquired during the marriage.

The trial judge awarded her $20,000 under s. 8 of The Family Law Reform Act, which the Court of Appeal set aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the wife's financial contribution to the pooling of family finances entitled her to a $10,000 share of the non-family assets under s. 8, without needing to rely on constructive or resulting trust doctrines.

The appellants sought to adopt a child who was placed in their home by the Director of Child Welfare.

Seven days before the six-month probationary period expired, the Director removed the child based on unfounded allegations of abuse.

The Adoption Appeal Board refused to hear the appellants' appeal, and the lower courts dismissed their habeas corpus application, finding the statute provided a complete code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the lack of a statutory appeal created a legislative gap.

The Court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to fill this gap and ordered the adoption of the child by the appellants, finding it was in the child's best interests.

The appellant sought to enforce a Nova Scotia child maintenance order in British Columbia.

The respondent argued before the British Columbia Provincial Court that the child was no longer a child of the marriage.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a provincial court enforcing a maintenance order from a superior court of another province does not have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the order.

The power to vary, change, or revoke the order remains solely with the court of original jurisdiction.

The appellants' mother, acting as their tutrix, sold immoveables in which her minor children owned an undivided two-thirds share to her own mother, who shortly thereafter gifted the property back to the tutrix.

The property was later sold to bona fide third party purchasers and subsequently expropriated by the province.

The appellants brought a direct action in nullity to annul the initial sale, the gift, and subsequent deeds, arguing the tutrix's purchase through an interposed party violated the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the sale was irremediably vitiated and that the apparent defect in title could be opposed to the bona fide third party purchasers.

A prior judgment authorizing confirmation of the voidable deeds was also annulled because it unlawfully authorized a confirmation during the minority of the pupils.

The appellant husband appealed a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal regarding the division of matrimonial assets, specifically a joint farming operation and inherited farm land owned separately by the wife.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no ground to set aside the judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal, which held that the husband was not entitled to one half of the inflationary increment of the land's value.

The Attorney General of British Columbia appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which held that provisions of the Family Relations Act conferring jurisdiction on the Provincial Court over guardianship, custody, access, occupancy of the family residence, and non-entry orders were ultra vires the province under s. 96 of the British North America Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that it is within the authority of the province to confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Court respecting guardianship of the person of the child and custody of or access to the child.

However, the Court held that conferring jurisdiction respecting orders concerning occupancy and use of the family residence and the making of non-entry orders was ultra vires.

The appellant, who had been awarded custody of her children, sought to locate them after they were abducted by her husband.

She obtained an order directing the respondent telecommunications company to provide telephone records to the court under s. 26 of the Family Law Reform Act, 1978.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the order went beyond the scope of the statutory authority and the inherent powers of the court, taking on an inquisitional nature beyond the traditional role of courts in inter partes proceedings.

The appellant, who was awarded custody of her children, sought an order compelling Revenue Canada to disclose the address of her former husband, who had abducted the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory confidentiality provisions in section 241 of the Income Tax Act preclude disclosure in civil proceedings.

The Court found no power to qualify these provisions and noted that the exceptions in section 241(4)(c) did not apply.

The respondent, an unmarried mother, voluntarily surrendered her child for adoption.

The day after the surrender was signed, the child was placed for adoption.

The respondent subsequently attempted to withdraw her consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under s. 15(6) of The Child Welfare Act, the right to withdraw a voluntary surrender is conditional upon the child not having been placed for adoption.

Since the child had already been placed, the respondent was not entitled to the return of the child.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellants, residents of Ontario, signed consents for their unborn child to be adopted by the respondents, who were domiciled in Quebec.

After the child was born and placed with the respondents, the appellants changed their minds and sought the return of the child via a writ of habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the child was validly placed for adoption under both Quebec and Ontario law.

Consequently, the Youth Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody and adoption, and the Superior Court correctly quashed the writ of habeas corpus.

The appellant appealed an order of absolute adoption in respect of his two children, initially raising a constitutional question regarding the paramountcy of the Divorce Act over the Child Welfare Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the position taken by the appellant's counsel emptied the appeal of any constitutional issue.

As leave to appeal was granted solely on the constitutional question, the appeal was quashed with no order as to costs.

The appellant and respondent lived together in a common law relationship for almost twenty years.

During this time, the respondent supported the appellant financially while he saved his income, and later she worked extensively in their beekeeping business.

The properties and business were held entirely in the appellant's name.

Upon separation, the respondent sought a declaration of entitlement to a one-half interest in the lands and the beekeeping business.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was entitled to a one-half interest based on the doctrine of constructive trust.

The Court found that the appellant had been unjustly enriched by the respondent's financial support and unpaid labour, and that it would be unjust to allow him to retain the full benefit of her contributions.

The appellants, husband and wife, appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that reduced their damage awards from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge awarded the husband $30,000 in general damages for physical and severe emotional injuries, and the wife $10,000 for loss of consortium under s. 35 of the Domestic Relations Act.

The Court of Appeal reduced these to $15,000 and $100 respectively.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an appellate court cannot interfere with a trial judge's damage award unless there is a palpable error or wrong principle applied.

The Court also held that s. 35 created a new statutory cause of action for loss of consortium that should be assessed realistically, not trivially.