Family and Matrimonial Law - SCC

The parties divorced after 26 years of marriage.

The appellant wife had acquired a restaurant and other assets almost exclusively through her own efforts, while the respondent husband, an alcoholic, contributed virtually nothing to child care, household management, or financial provision.

The trial judge ordered an unequal division of marital property, awarding the husband $6,000.

The Court of Appeal set aside this order, holding that equal division was required.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's order, finding that the husband's negligible contribution justified departing from the general principle of equal division under section 7(f) of the Marital Property Act.

Following the death of their mother, two children refused to live with their father and repeatedly ran away to live with their aunt and uncle.

The aunt and uncle sought custody of the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no serious cause to deprive the father of his parental authority under art. 654 C.C.Q., the paramount consideration under art. 30 C.C.L.C. is the child's interest.

The Court awarded custody to the aunt and uncle, finding that returning the children to their father would compromise their development, but preserved the father's parental authority and granted him visiting rights.

The appellant, a non-custodial father, brought an action against his former wife and her new husband, alleging they deliberately frustrated his court-ordered access to his children.

He claimed damages for conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that no tort action exists for interference with access rights, as the legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme for custody and access.

The Court also declined to recognize a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in this context, finding that such litigation would not be in the best interests of the children.

The parties entered into a separation agreement, incorporated into their divorce decree, which provided that spousal maintenance would cease if the wife cohabited with another man for more than 90 days.

The wife subsequently cohabited with another man, and the husband ceased payments.

The wife, who eventually required social assistance, applied to vary the decree nisi to reinstate maintenance.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the cohabitation clause was valid and enforceable.

Applying the Pelech test, the Court found no radical change in circumstances related to a pattern of economic dependency generated by the marriage that would justify interfering with the settlement agreement.

The parties divorced in 1969 and entered into a maintenance agreement where the wife accepted a lump sum in full satisfaction of future claims.

The agreement was incorporated into a court order.

Years later, the wife's health deteriorated, she depleted her funds, and went on welfare, while the husband became wealthy.

She applied to vary the maintenance order under s. 11(2) of the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where parties have freely negotiated a valid settlement agreement, it should be respected.

The court may only intervene to vary the order if there is a radical change in circumstances that flows from an economic pattern of dependency engendered by the marriage.

Since the wife's hardship was not causally connected to the marriage, the application to vary was dismissed.

The appellant sought spousal maintenance in the divorce proceeding notwithstanding an antecedent settlement agreement that limited support to one year.

The majority held that the same stringent approach governing variation of support orders applied where a court was asked under s. 11(1) of the Divorce Act to depart from a prior settlement agreement, requiring a radical change in circumstances tied to a marriage-related pattern of economic dependency.

On the facts, there had been no relevant change in circumstances, public assistance alone was insufficient, and concerns arising from custody of a child were properly addressed through child support rather than spousal support.

The appeal was dismissed and the escalator clause inserted by the trial judge could not stand.

The mother of a mentally retarded adult daughter applied for court authorization to consent to her daughter's sterilization for non-therapeutic purposes.

The trial judge denied the application, but the Appeal Division allowed it, authorizing a hysterectomy under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the parens patriae jurisdiction cannot be used to authorize the non-therapeutic sterilization of a mentally incompetent person, as it can never be safely determined that such a procedure is for their benefit.

The parties lived together in a common law relationship for forty-two years on a farm owned by the respondent.

The appellant performed all domestic labour, raised their six children, and worked extensively on the farm without remuneration.

After the relationship deteriorated, the appellant sought an interest in the farm.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was unjustly enriched by the appellant's unpaid labour, which preserved and maintained the farm.

The Court expanded the doctrine of constructive trust, holding that a contribution need not be directed to the acquisition of property, but can also relate to its preservation, maintenance, or improvement.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge's order granting the appellant a portion of the farm and a lump sum payment was reinstated.

The parties, members of an Indian Band, separated.

The appellant wife was granted interim possession of the matrimonial home situated on the Band Reserve under section 77 of the provincial Family Relations Act.

The respondent husband had acquired the land by way of a Certificate of Possession under section 20 of the federal Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 77 of the Family Relations Act is not applicable to a family residence located on Indian reserved lands, as it conflicts with the provisions of the Indian Act.

The appellant and respondent, members of an Indian Band, divorced.

The appellant sought a division of family assets under the provincial Family Relations Act, specifically claiming an interest in properties on the reserve for which the respondent held Certificates of Possession under the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial laws regarding the right of ownership and possession of immovable property cannot apply to Indian reserve lands, as this falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the provincial provisions were not referentially incorporated by section 88 of the Indian Act due to actual conflict with the federal statute.

However, the Court affirmed that the appellant could be awarded compensation in lieu of a division of the reserve properties, as a compensation order does not conflict with the Indian Act.

The appellant paid his former wife $360 a month pursuant to a divorce judgment to repay two hypothecs and municipal and school taxes on her property.

The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the deductions claimed for these payments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the payments qualified as an 'allowance' under s. 60(b) of the Income Tax Act because they were limited, predetermined, paid for the maintenance of the recipient, and at her complete disposition for her own benefit.

The appeal was allowed and the deductions were permitted.

The wife applied for a division of matrimonial assets but died before the application was heard.

In her will, she disinherited her husband and son.

Her executrix continued the application.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal ordered an unequal distribution in favour of the husband, citing the wife's death and will as extraordinary circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the death of a spouse and the contents of their will are not relevant factors to justify departing from the presumption of equal distribution under the Matrimonial Property Act.

The appellant husband appealed an order granting the respondent wife exclusive lifetime possession of the matrimonial home under the Family Law Reform Act, arguing it was invalid or inoperative due to paramountcy when joined with a maintenance order under the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an order for exclusive possession is not a support order, and the provisions of the two statutes are not mutually exclusive.

The Court found no conflict between the federal and provincial legislation, as they confer independent jurisdictions in relation to different subject matters that complement each other.

The appellant, an unwed mother, placed her newborn child for private adoption with the respondents.

Shortly after, she changed her mind, revoked her consent, and sought custody.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal dismissed her application, finding that the child had bonded with the adoptive parents and that returning the child would not be in his best interests.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that in custody disputes between a natural parent and adoptive parents, the equitable parens patriae jurisdiction applies, making the welfare of the child the paramount consideration over biological ties.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the division of non-family assets.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that a general release signed in a wrongful dismissal settlement predating The Family Law Reform Act, 1978 did not bar the respondent's claim under section 8 of the Act.

The parties separated and the appellant applied for a division of family assets under the Family Law Reform Act.

Before the court ordered the matrimonial home vested in the appellant, creditors of the respondent filed executions against his interest in the jointly held property.

The appellant sought to have the vesting order apply retroactively to the date of separation to defeat the creditors' claims.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that property does not vest until the court order is made, and the respondent's interest remained subject to the executions filed prior to that date.

The appellant wife appealed a Court of Appeal decision that reduced her share of matrimonial property by applying the 'Capital Base Theory'.

The trial judge had ordered an equal division of the net family assets, which included a large farming operation built from the respondent husband's pre-marital assets.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Capital Base Theory is incompatible with the Saskatchewan Matrimonial Property Act's presumption of equal distribution and its specific rules for valuing pre-marital exemptions.

The Court restored the trial judge's equal division but upheld the Court of Appeal's reduction of the interest rate on the wife's lump sum payment to 5 per cent under the federal Interest Act.

The appellant and respondent, who were unmarried cohabitants, decided to purchase a farm together.

Both signed the offer to purchase, but only the respondent signed the deed of sale.

For five years, the appellant contributed financially and through her labour to the farm's operation and improvement.

After they separated, the appellant brought a pro socio action seeking partition of the farm assets.

The trial judge found a tacit partnership existed and ordered partition.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, finding no partnership.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its findings of fact for those of the trial judge without identifying a determinative error.

The trial judge's finding that the parties intended to purchase the farm together was supported by the evidence and was not unreasonable.

The applicant wife brought a motion to quash an order of the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent husband's appeal.

She contended that because the husband did not obtain leave to appeal or an extension of time within the 30-day period prescribed by section 18(2) of the Divorce Act, the Court had no jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court dismissed the motion, holding that because the Court had fixed a date for the leave application hearing within the 30-day period, this act constituted an extension of time and properly brought the case before the Court.

The parties divorced after twelve years of marriage.

The respondent wife was granted custody of their children and an alimentary pension.

She subsequently completed a Master's degree but was unable to find full-time employment.

The appellant husband applied to vary the corollary relief, seeking to terminate the spousal support on the basis that the respondent was now employable.

The Superior Court ordered the pension to terminate in eight months.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, maintaining the pension.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the husband's appeal, holding that variation of support under section 11(2) of the Divorce Act must be based on actual, present circumstances rather than hypothetical future events such as the prospect of employment.