Sally A. Gomery

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Divisional Court and awarded fixed costs to the respondent.

On panel review under s. 7(5) CJA, the appellant challenged dismissal of a motion to extend time to perfect an appeal.

The panel found justice required an extension because perfection materials had been tendered before dismissal notice and defects were largely technical with no demonstrated prejudice.

The review motion was granted and timelines reset.

On a motion to quash, the court considered whether an appeal from dismissal of a contempt motion was interlocutory.

Applying established principles, it held the order was interlocutory because underlying proceedings remained ongoing and other procedural avenues were available.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant challenged orders in bankruptcy proceedings including standing rulings, estate consolidation, and treatment of approved claims.

The court found no right of appeal under s. 193(a) or (c) of the BIA, declined leave under s. 193(e), and held the appellant had not timely invoked available statutory claim-challenge mechanisms.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from convictions for dangerous driving causing death, five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failure to comply with a term of bail.

The appellant argued the trial judge's jury charge failed to distinguish between the actus reus and mens rea of the dangerous driving offences, risking conflation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the charge generally followed the model instruction in Watt's Manual, clearly instructed the jury on both the objective dangerousness of the driving and the marked departure standard, and when read as a whole equipped the jury to decide the case.

The jury question about the Highway Traffic Act definition of dangerous driving did not indicate confusion about the instructions.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the time from when the second trial date was set until the first offered trial date available to defence counsel should have been apportioned rather than treated entirely as defence delay, but held that the time from the July 2022 proposed trial date to the second trial date was properly defence delay.

With the corrected apportionment, the net delay fell just under 30 months, below the presumptive ceiling, and no stay was warranted.

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence on charges of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a vehicle, possession of MDMA, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in Charter rulings regarding arbitrary detention under s. 9 and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on a driving prohibition, the search of a satchel near the appellant's leg was a valid search incident to arrest, and the trial judge's findings on knowledge and control for possession were supported by the record.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to address anti-Black racism principles from Morris.

The court found the failure did not impact the sentence, which was at the low end of the range for a second firearm offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to luring a child under 16 and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to give adequate weight to his youth and first-offender status.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, given the serious aggravating factors and the requirement to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by finding a proven absence of motive to fabricate or, alternatively, by improperly using the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge did not find a proven absence of motive but rather found no single motive could explain all disclosures, and that the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate was properly considered as one factor among many in the credibility assessment without undue weight.

Appeal from summary judgment granting declaratory relief regarding a mortgage registered as security for a $300,000 consulting fee contingent on the receipt of a cannabis cultivation licence from Health Canada.

The motion judge found that the fee was conditional on licence issuance and, since no licence was ever obtained, the payment obligation never crystallized.

The appellate court upheld the finding that the mortgage was not a standalone unconditional obligation but security for a contingent payment, and that the motion judge properly considered the factual matrix including the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Transfer and Consultancy Agreement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) whether the first case management judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant; (2) whether the second case management judge erred in dismissing the motion to relitigate the cross-examination application; (3) whether the application judge erred in rejecting the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrant; and (4) whether the application judge erred in admitting evidence despite a violation of the appellant's section 10(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

International medical graduates appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract action against the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada.

The appellants sought a declaration that they had passed the Royal College's 2020 qualifying psychiatry exam and were entitled to certification for independent practice.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the Royal College's 6.5% downward adjustment of exam scores was psychometrically justified.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because she failed to meaningfully engage with contradictory expert evidence, did not address the breach of contract claim, and did not analyze whether the parties had entered into an enforceable contract or whether the Royal College breached its duty of good faith performance.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

This motion concerns applications for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an appeal involving a municipal transit authority's refusal to post a political advertisement.

The motion judge considered four proposed interveners: Egale Canada, Free Speech Union of Canada, Charter Advocates Canada, and Association for Reformed Political Action.

The court applied the established test for intervention in constitutional cases, which is more relaxed than in non-constitutional matters.

The motion judge granted leave to Egale Canada and Association for Reformed Political Action, finding they had distinct perspectives and real, substantial interests in the subject matter.

The motions by Free Speech Union of Canada and Charter Advocates Canada were dismissed as they failed to demonstrate how their participation would assist the court or provide perspectives distinct from the immediate parties.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action by summary judgment against the Waterloo Police Board, its chief, and two police officers.

The appellant alleged that the police unlawfully disclosed to her employer that she was married to a federal parolee, causing her to lose her job as a supervisor at a halfway house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in law or principle.

The court found that the police officer's disclosure to the parole officer was made for lawful purposes under the Police Services Act and Municipal Privacy Act, and that there was no breach of duty of care or privacy rights.

The appellant sought a stay pending appeal of an application judge's decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the modified version of its GotSkill? game was not a game of mixed chance and skill under the Criminal Code.

The appellant also sought injunctive orders preventing enforcement of a bulletin issued by the respondent requiring liquor licensees to cease operating the game.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the appellant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the public interest in enforcing gambling and alcohol regulations designed to protect minors and vulnerable individuals.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter involving parenting, child support, spousal support, validity of a separation agreement, equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, and the sale of matrimonial properties.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's equalization calculation regarding loans from his mother, post-separation adjustments to equalization payments, and the commencement date of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting an additional post-separation credit for inheritance funds deposited to a joint account, while dismissing other grounds of appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Damodar Arapakota on a charge of bribing a foreign public official contrary to section 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA).

The respondent had paid for a family vacation in Orlando, Florida for a Botswana government official in exchange for letters confirming the government's intention to award a contract to the respondent's company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that the Crown had failed to prove that the respondent received a material business advantage in return for the trip and that there was insufficient nexus between the trip and the letters.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in requiring proof of a specific act or omission, this error did not affect the outcome because the trial judge correctly found that the respondent received no meaningful business advantage.

Justice Monahan dissented, arguing that the trial judge's interpretation of "as consideration for" was unduly narrow and that the acquittal should be set aside for a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to prove his innocence rather than requiring the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to resolve significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, correctly assessed credibility, and was not required to address every minor contradiction raised by the defence.

The moving party sought to review the Court of Appeal's dismissal of her appeal from a Superior Court order that struck her claim as an abuse of process.

The original claim arose from a 2018 administrative error by Service Ontario that erroneously transferred registered vehicle ownership.

The moving party's motion under Rule 59.06 alleged that the panel made false statements and that one panel member was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that the moving party had already unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under 16 years of age contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant's testimony, which was corroborated by contemporaneous text messages and video evidence.

The Court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of sentencing principles and rejecting the appellant's argument that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the breach of trust involved.