Richard G. Dearden

The appellant, a former university professor, appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for defaming the respondent in his blog posts.

The appellant had abandoned the trial on the second day and called no evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his arguments regarding fair comment, limitation periods, and freedom of expression, noting his failure to lead evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge's order for a broad permanent injunction, finding it justified by the appellant's persistent defamatory campaign and likelihood of continuation.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his defamation action against the author and publisher of a book about a street gang.

The appellant claimed a passage comparing him to a movie character carried defamatory meanings, including that he was a murderer and a psychopath.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the words were not capable of bearing those defamatory meanings and that true innuendo had not been properly pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the motion judge's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding that Rule 49 did not automatically warrant substantial indemnity costs for a successful defendant.

In a defamation action arising from statements published online about a law professor’s review of a university report on systemic racism, the court was required to determine on a voir dire whether certain impugned statements were capable of bearing defamatory meanings.

Applying established defamation principles, including the test from WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, the court assessed whether the words could reasonably lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person.

The court concluded that eight impugned statements were capable of conveying meanings that impugned the plaintiff’s integrity, independence, and professionalism in conducting and authoring the report.

However, the court rejected additional alleged meanings suggesting betrayal of Black people or support for racism, finding those meanings did not naturally arise from the words.

Only the identified defamatory meanings would proceed to the jury.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to stay or dismiss the respondent's defamation action on the basis of maintenance and champerty.

The appellant argued that the respondent's employer funding the litigation and the respondent's pledge to donate punitive damages to a university scholarship constituted maintenance and champerty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the funding arrangement was lawful.

The court also rejected the appellant's claims of bias and inadequate time for submissions.

Following dismissal of a champerty motion brought by the defendant seeking to stay a libel action as an abuse of process, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendant had argued that the plaintiff should not receive costs because her legal fees were funded by her employer, and that the affected party university had no entitlement to costs.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that third‑party funding does not preclude an award of costs and that the university, as an affected party under Rule 37.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was entitled to participate and recover costs.

Applying the Rule 57 factors, including complexity, extensive evidentiary record, and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court fixed partial indemnity costs in favour of both the plaintiff and the university.

Following dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal concerning the defendant’s discovery of the plaintiff, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found the defendant’s motion lacked merit and should not have been brought.

The plaintiff had served a written offer of settlement proposing discontinuance without costs, which the defendant refused.

Because the result exceeded the offer, the court awarded partial indemnity costs until the offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs of $4,500 inclusive of disbursements and tax were ordered payable by the defendant.

The court determined the appropriate costs following a motion in which the defendant sought leave to appeal rulings made during the cross-examination of a witness.

The plaintiff sought costs of approximately $14,000 to $19,000, while the defendant opposed and requested costs against the plaintiff.

The court found that the plaintiff was largely successful because the defendant’s motion for leave to appeal was effectively dismissed after it was determined that litigation privilege did not apply to the witness affidavit in question.

Applying Rule 57 factors, the court held that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity scale but significantly reduced due to concerns about the utility and importance of the pre‑trial examination issue.

The defendant was ordered to pay reduced costs of $5,600 to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a successful refusals motion regarding the defendant's examination for discovery.

The defendant had initially refused to answer 62 questions but answered most of them in writing after the motion was brought.

The court found the defendant's conduct in refusing to answer during oral discovery caused unnecessary delay and expense, but was not so unreasonable as to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $14,678 inclusive of disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

Following a refusals motion arising from examinations for discovery in a libel action, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, alleging the defendant made unfounded accusations of improper interference and insufficient document searches.

The defendant opposed the request and argued the plaintiff should receive no costs because her employer was funding the litigation and because the claimed time and rates were excessive.

The court held that third‑party reimbursement of legal fees does not disentitle a successful party from recovering costs and that the plaintiff had been completely successful on the refusals motion.

Although the defendant’s conduct did not justify substantial indemnity costs, partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

The defendant’s alleged inability to pay was given little weight.

In a defamation action, the defendant sought leave to appeal two interlocutory decisions concerning cross‑examination on an affidavit and a discovery motion.

The court reviewed the scope of permissible cross‑examination on affidavits, including questions relating to credibility, bias, and matters raised in the affidavit.

It held that the motion judge correctly allowed many questions aimed at testing independence and credibility of the deponent but protected certain communications between the defendant and the deponent under litigation privilege.

Leave to appeal was largely denied, with limited conditional leave relating to questions implicating litigation privilege and the drafting of the affidavit.

The defendant’s separate motion for leave to appeal a discovery decision was dismissed after the defendant failed to file a factum or comply with court directions.

The defendant brought a motion to stay or dismiss a defamation action as an abuse of process, alleging that the plaintiff’s employer funding her legal costs constituted maintenance and champerty.

The court excluded supplemental affidavits filed after cross‑examinations as irrelevant and inadmissible under the Rules of Civil Procedure and prior case management rulings.

It held that the employer’s decision to fund the plaintiff’s legal fees was justified because the alleged defamatory statements related to work performed in the course of her employment and the plaintiff had independently decided to commence the action.

The court found no evidence of an improper motive, profit‑sharing arrangement, or trafficking in litigation.

Accordingly, the motion alleging champerty and maintenance was dismissed.

In a defamation action arising from blog posts referring to the plaintiff using a racially charged term, the plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to numerous refusals and undertakings from the defendant’s examination for discovery.

The court considered the scope of permissible discovery under Rule 31.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and assessed the relevance of the disputed questions to issues including malice, fair comment, damages, and publication.

The court ordered the defendant to answer several questions relating to the factual basis for his fair comment defence, communications with media and on social media, potential witnesses, and information relevant to his limitation defence.

Certain questions were not required to be answered where they sought privileged information or were irrelevant to the issues in the libel action.

The defendant brought a refusals motion seeking orders compelling the plaintiff to answer discovery questions, produce additional documents, and permit further examination for discovery in a defamation action arising from statements made in a blog post.

The court reviewed numerous disputed questions relating to alleged communications with university officials, the plaintiff’s interpretation of allegedly defamatory statements, employment records, and other documents.

The court held that many of the questions sought irrelevant information, including the plaintiff’s subjective interpretation of allegedly defamatory words, which is determined objectively by the trier of fact.

The court further found that the plaintiff had adequately answered the discovery questions and produced all relevant documents in her possession.

The motion for further answers, additional production, and further discovery was dismissed.

Following dismissal of three motions for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions in ongoing civil litigation, the court addressed costs.

The responding parties sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the self‑represented defendant had engaged in vexatious litigation and judge‑shopping through numerous unmeritorious motions.

The court accepted that the volume of motions suggested abuse of process but concluded that some of the issues raised were novel and not entirely devoid of merit.

Substantial indemnity costs were therefore not warranted.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded with a 15 percent reduction to reflect limited success by the defendant on certain procedural points and some duplication in the responding parties’ work.

The defendant sought leave to appeal three interlocutory decisions arising from a defamation action, including a ruling dismissing a refusals motion, a case management judge’s refusal to schedule a motion to set aside that ruling, and a subsequent decision dismissing a further refusals motion.

The court granted an extension of time to bring the leave applications but found that none met the stringent requirements under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against a prior judge based on the existence of a scholarship memorializing the judge’s son at the University involved in the litigation and a boardroom named after him by the University’s law firm.

The court held that these circumstances could not reasonably give rise to an apprehension of bias and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

Leave to appeal each interlocutory decision was therefore refused.

In a libel action, the plaintiff brought a refusals motion seeking an order compelling a deponent to re‑attend cross‑examination and answer questions she had refused on instructions from the defendant.

The court considered whether questions relating to the witness’s relationship with the defendant, prior criticisms of the plaintiff, drafting of the affidavit, and communications between the witness and the defendant were relevant.

Applying authorities on cross‑examination to establish bias and credibility, the court held that inquiries aimed at testing a witness’s reliability, independence, and potential partiality are permissible.

Most of the refused questions were found relevant to credibility and weight of the affidavit evidence.

The witness was ordered to re‑attend and answer specified questions and any follow‑up questions.

The defendant sought leave to appeal three interlocutory rulings in a defamation action, including decisions dismissing a refusals motion and a case management decision declining to schedule a motion alleging judicial bias.

The court granted an extension of time to seek leave but held that the defendant failed to meet the stringent requirements under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a memorial scholarship and law firm tribute connected to the judge’s deceased son were rejected as untenable and incapable of grounding an objective concern of partiality.

The court also held that the case management judge properly declined to schedule a motion seeking to set aside another Superior Court judge’s decision.

Leave to appeal all impugned interlocutory decisions was refused.

Following a successful response to a refusals motion, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs arising from the defendant’s extensive and unsuccessful motion materials seeking answers to numerous discovery questions.

The defendant, self‑represented, argued that costs should be reduced due to his status, alleged inability to pay, and the fact that the plaintiff’s legal fees were funded by her employer.

The court applied the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held that self‑representation does not reduce responsibility for costs when a party brings an extensive and unsuccessful motion.

Although the motion materials were excessively lengthy, the conduct did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed with reductions to certain research time and preparation claims.

In a defamation action arising from blog posts criticizing the plaintiff’s report on systemic racism at a university, the defendant brought a motion addressing refusals made during cross‑examination on a champerty and maintenance motion.

The defendant argued that the university’s agreement to fund the plaintiff’s legal fees constituted champerty and maintenance and sought answers to questions concerning the plaintiff’s academic background, financial situation, selection of counsel, and communications with the university.

The court held that most of the questions were irrelevant to the champerty motion because the university had admitted it agreed to fund the litigation and the details sought did not assist in determining whether the arrangement involved improper intermeddling or profit‑sharing.

The court also rejected an attempt to introduce expert opinion evidence regarding email communications as irrelevant and unnecessary.

The refusals were largely upheld and a request to strike re‑examination evidence was denied.

The appellants appealed an order striking portions of their claim against Carleton University and several of its employees.

The motion judge had struck the Charter claims, finding the university was not implementing a specific government program when booking space for non-academic extra-curricular use, and struck the negligence claims against the individual employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the university's actions did not attract Charter scrutiny under the Eldridge test, and that the pleadings failed to establish that the individual employees exhibited a separate identity or interest from the university to attract personal liability.