Wolf Tausendfreund

The parties brought motions concerning custody, access, child support, and equalization.

The respondent sought to set aside a prior consent order withdrawing his claims for spousal support and property.

The court found the consent order binding, noting the respondent was represented by counsel and acknowledged the binding nature of settlement offers.

The respondent's claims for spousal support and property were struck.

The applicant was granted custody of the youngest child, and interim supervised access for the respondent was maintained for the two younger children.

Child support was ordered based on an imputed income for the respondent, and the applicant was to fund a Parenting Capacity Assessment Report with reimbursement from the respondent.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine.

The court applied the co-actor's exception to the hearsay rule (Carter test) to admit intercepted communications.

The court found a common unlawful design to traffic cocaine and that the accused was a participant based on direct and inferential evidence, including surveillance and phone communications.

The accused's arguments regarding the necessity of calling a co-actor witness and the credibility of a police agent were rejected.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The Crown applied to vacate a Justice of the Peace's release order for the accused, Justin Sleeper, and sought his detention pending disposition of charges.

The application was based on new evidence of the accused's non-compliance with prior release conditions and alleged errors in law by the Justice of the Peace regarding the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court found the new evidence sufficient to vacate the release order and ordered the accused's detention, also concluding that the Justice of the Peace erred in assessing the tertiary grounds, particularly concerning the gravity of the offences involving drugs, firearms, and explosives.

This costs endorsement followed a personal injury action that settled for $75,000 shortly before trial.

The court assessed the plaintiffs' claim for costs and disbursements, addressing several contested issues.

Key determinations included the compensability of adverse costs insurance premiums as a disbursement, the recoverability of disbursements related to a defaulted defendant, and the reasonableness of retaining multiple experts given the complexity and anticipated trial.

The court applied the principle of proportionality to fix the final costs and disbursements.

The plaintiff, 6071376 Canada Inc., invested 40% of the closing funds for a commercial property (the "Hull Project") in exchange for 40% of its net income and net value upon sale.

Title was held by defendant 3966305 Canada Inc., whose sole director and shareholder was defendant Mahmood Khedmatgozar.

Mahmood sold the property without the plaintiff's knowledge, using the proceeds to purchase another property, and repeatedly lied to the plaintiff about the project's status for over six years.

The court found that the defendants owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff and that Mahmood was personally liable due to piercing the corporate veil, having used 3966305 Canada Inc. as his alter ego to misappropriate funds.

The plaintiff was awarded 40% of the Hull Project's net sale proceeds and net rental profits, plus prejudgment interest.

The defendants' limitation defence was rejected.

Mahmood was ordered to pay $200,000 in punitive damages for his outrageous and reprehensible conduct.

The applicant sought severance of five criminal charges (two sexual assault, one sexual touching, two child pornography) into three separate trials, arguing potential prejudice if he wished to testify on some counts but not others.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to objectively support his testimonial intention and that a viable similar fact application by the Crown connected the sexual offence counts.

The court also noted that a judge-alone trial significantly reduces the risk of reasoning prejudice from similar fact evidence.

The Martin Defendants sought a stay of action against them in favour of arbitration, relying on s.7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that granting a partial stay would unreasonably bifurcate the proceedings because the fourth defendant, TDL Group Corp., was not a party to the arbitration agreements, and all claims arose from closely related facts.

The court dismissed the motion for a partial stay, finding it unreasonable to bifurcate the action and that doing so would lead to a multiplicity of legal proceedings, contrary to the policy reflected in s. 138 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Following a seven-day trial where the plaintiff's claim for breach of a construction contract, negligent misrepresentation, and punitive damages was dismissed, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff had wrongfully repudiated the contract, entitling the defendants to retain a $175,432.50 deposit.

The defendants had made three offers to settle, all more favourable than the judgment.

While the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, the court found no egregious misconduct by the plaintiff to warrant such an award.

Instead, the defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs.

The applicant sought an order of certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial on charges of possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of trafficking and producing marihuana.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry justice exceeded jurisdiction by committing based on insufficient evidence regarding control over the premises/marihuana and participation in cultivation, amounting to speculation.

The court reviewed the standard for certiorari, which limits intervention to jurisdictional error, and the "scintilla of evidence" test for committal.

It found that the preliminary inquiry judge's inferences were reasonable, supported by circumstantial evidence connecting the applicant to the large-scale grow operation, including her presence, personal belongings, and car keys found within the facility.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer the applicant's involvement.

The plaintiff's house was destroyed by fire, and she entered into a construction contract with the defendants to rebuild it.

Disagreements arose regarding contract terms, pricing, and completion dates, leading the plaintiff to terminate the contract before construction commenced and demand the return of her 25% deposit.

The court found that the plaintiff, not the defendants, repudiated the contract.

The initial payment was determined to be a non-refundable deposit, and the plaintiff was not granted relief from forfeiture, as the deposit amount was not found to be disproportionate to the defendants' damages or unconscionable to retain.

This criminal trial involved two Ontario Provincial Police officers, Jason Redmond and David Vogelzang, facing charges related to obstruction of justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cannabis, stemming from an undercover operation.

The court acquitted both officers on charges of attempted obstruction of justice and breach of trust concerning a meeting where they discussed a rumour about the undercover officer's identity, finding reasonable doubt regarding their intent to obstruct.

Redmond was found guilty of trafficking cannabis (Count 4, admitted) and knowingly dealing with a forged document (Count 5).

He was acquitted of a second trafficking charge (Count 3, withdrawn) and a breach of trust charge related to the forged document (Count 6), as his actions in creating the document were not connected to his official duties.

The plaintiff and defendants brought cross-motions to determine the appropriate forum for resolving the quantum of costs following an accepted offer to settle.

The plaintiff sought assessment by an assessment officer under Rule 57.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, while the defendants argued for resolution by a judge under Rule 49.09, citing non-compliance with the offer.

The court found that Rule 49.09 did not apply as the defendants were prepared to pay costs, and the issue was the method of adjudication.

The court concluded that the resolution of costs and disbursements should proceed before an assessment officer pursuant to Rule 57.04, emphasizing that Rule 58.01 mandates assessment for costs not fixed by the court.

No costs were awarded for this motion due to the ambiguity of rule interpretation.

The plaintiff, a manufacturer of formic acid pest control products for honey bees, brought an action against the federal Crown alleging misfeasance in public office, negligent misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The claims arose from the Pest Management Regulatory Agency's (PMRA) decisions to permit the continued use of unregistered 65% formic acid, grant emergency use registrations for competitor products, and require the plaintiff to register its products.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action.

The court found no evidence of deliberate or unlawful conduct by PMRA officials, no intent to harm the plaintiff, and no private law duty of care owed by the regulatory agency to the plaintiff.

Following summary judgment motions brought by nine defendants, which were largely dismissed but resulted in the narrowing of the plaintiffs' claims, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought $182,725 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendants sought $289,249.

The court found that the plaintiffs were generally successful as the actions were not dismissed, but granted the defendants a 25% credit ($72,000) for their partial success in narrowing the issues.

The plaintiffs were awarded net costs of $100,000.

The plaintiffs, MD Physician Services Inc. and MD Management Limited, sued former employees Duane Wisniewski and Joy Sleeth, and their new employer RBC Dominion Securities Inc., for breach of non-solicitation agreements and confidentiality obligations.

The court found the non-solicitation agreements enforceable, rejecting arguments of lack of consideration, non est factum, ambiguity, vagueness, and unreasonableness.

The court also found that Wisniewski and Sleeth breached these agreements by actively soliciting former clients, despite their claims of merely informing them of their new employment.

RBC Dominion Securities Inc. was found vicariously liable for these breaches.

While a technical breach of confidentiality occurred, it was deemed de minimis and not to attract damages.

The trial was limited to liability, with damages to be addressed later.

The appellant sought a stay of a default order requiring payment of spousal support arrears and ongoing support, or incarceration, pending an appeal.

The motion for a stay was brought under the three-part RJR-McDonald test.

The appellant argued that his s. 35 Constitution Act, 1982 rights were infringed by Justice Malcolm's failure to order a Gladue report at the default hearing.

The court found no serious question to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the support recipient would suffer greater harm if the stay were granted.

The motion to stay was denied.

The applicants sought to clarify a registered Right of Way over the respondents' property, which the respondents contended was limited to winter use.

The court found that the original grant of Right of Way was unambiguous and unrestricted.

A subsequent "Notice of Right of Way," signed only by the grantor and lacking mutual consideration, did not legally limit the Right of Way's use to winter months.

The application was granted, confirming the applicants' right to year-round, uninterrupted ingress and egress, and an injunction was issued against obstruction.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion by the plaintiffs against the GCMC Defendants to establish a discovery plan.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs, while the GCMC Defendants argued for no costs due to alleged non-compliance with a previous court order.

The court found the plaintiffs acted reasonably and were largely successful in their motion, noting the GCMC Defendants had used the discovery plan issue as a tactic to seek dismissal of the action, contrary to the purpose of Rule 29.1.

Applying general costs principles, the court awarded the plaintiffs fixed costs.

I.P.W. was found guilty on two counts involving his stepdaughter, A.H.: touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose (s. 151 CCC) and sexual assault (s. 271 CCC), occurring between 2010 and 2014 when A.H. was 10-14 years old.

The incidents included various forms of inappropriate touching.

The court considered I.P.W.'s personal circumstances, a psychological report assessing him as a low risk to reoffend (though he denied wrongdoing), and a victim impact statement from A.H. The Crown sought a sentence of 1 to 4 years, while the defence proposed 8 to 12 months.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the s. 151 CCC count was stayed, and I.P.W. was sentenced to 18 months in custody for sexual assault.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for a 60-day remand of the respondent for a psychological assessment at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The respondent had been found guilty of two counts of robbery and two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, which are designated serious personal injury offences.

The Crown sought the assessment on the grounds that there were reasonable grounds to believe the respondent might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, citing a pattern of repetitive behaviour based on his extensive criminal record, including prior robberies and a home invasion.

The court found that the threshold of "reasonable possibility" was met, given the respondent's history of criminal activity and the similarities in his past and current offences, which involved planning, co-accused, and threats of violence.

The application for the assessment was granted.