P.N. Bourque

The accused responded to an online escort advertisement placed by an undercover police officer posing as a sex worker.

During text communications the officer disclosed that the escort was under 18, yet the accused negotiated sexual acts, price, and arranged a meeting at a hotel while bringing cash and a drink requested in the messages.

The accused testified that his intention was only to conduct research for a book about self-esteem and sex trade workers and that he suffered from erectile dysfunction.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation as not credible, finding the communications and conduct demonstrated a clear sexual purpose.

The accused was convicted of child luring under s.172.1(2) and communicating to obtain sexual services from a person under 18 under s.286.1(2), while the sexual exploitation count under s.153 was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three child luring offences arising from a police sting operation involving an online escort advertisement.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused was the person exchanging text messages with an undercover officer.

The court found the circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, as there were other plausible theories inconsistent with guilt.

Furthermore, applying *R. v. Morrison*, the court held that even if identity were proven, the conflicting information about age in the advertisement and text messages was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the person was under 18 or was wilfully blind to that fact.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving, driving while prohibited, obstructing police, and failing to surrender an insurance card.

This was the accused's third impaired driving conviction.

The court applied the totality principle and sentenced the accused to 180 days in custody (45 days net after pre-sentence credit), a 5-year driving prohibition, 12 months of probation, and a $1,000 fine.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol.

She challenged the breath test results, arguing that the tests were not taken as soon as practicable due to delays at the police station, and that the presence of gum in her mouth may have affected the accuracy of the readings.

The court found that the delays were reasonably explained by booking procedures and the need to test another subject.

The court also held that there was insufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt regarding the effect of the gum on the test results.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a civilian complaint about erratic driving.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter challenge under sections 8 and 9, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and delayed the breath demand.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the officer had sufficient grounds based on indicia of impairment, including staggering and slurred speech.

The court accepted the breath readings and toxicologist report, finding the accused guilty on both counts.

The defendant was stopped for speeding and subsequently investigated for drinking and driving.

He failed a roadside screening test and later provided breath samples over the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant sought to exclude the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to a delay in administering the roadside test and police allegedly steering him to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding no breaches, and entered a finding of guilt for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The self-represented accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

During the trial, the court raised a Charter issue regarding the accused's right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b).

The accused had requested to speak to a specific lawyer, but the arresting officer failed to properly facilitate this request due to a misunderstanding of the lawyer's name and firm.

The court found that the officer did not take sufficient steps to help the accused contact his counsel of choice before defaulting to duty counsel.

Concluding that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were infringed, the court applied the Grant framework and excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found not guilty.

R.M. and S.T. both brought applications under section 490(10) of the Criminal Code for the return of $2,105.00 seized by police from S.T. upon her arrest for allegedly breaking into R.M.'s home.

The criminal charges against S.T. were withdrawn.

The court assessed the credibility of both parties and found S.T.'s explanation for possessing the cash and her actions on the night of the break-in to be implausible.

On a balance of probabilities, the court concluded the seized funds were the proceeds of the break-in at R.M.'s home and ordered the money returned to R.M.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference with a person under 14, and invitation to sexual touching arising from a secretive sexual relationship with the complainant between 1993 and 1995 when she was aged 11 to 13 and he was 25 to 27.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's blanket denial based on internal inconsistencies including his admitted awareness of the complainant's crush, his capacity for secretive relationships, and implausible claims about limited contact with corroborating witnesses.

The complainant's testimony was found credible and corroborated by her childhood friend.

The accused was convicted on three counts; a fourth count was stayed by the Crown.