Peter-Paul E. Du Vernet

The appellant was the original tenant of commercial leases which it assigned to a subsidiary.

The assignee later became insolvent and repudiated the leases under s. 65.2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The landlords sued the appellant for outstanding rent under the assignment clause.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repudiation of a lease by an insolvent assignee under s. 65.2 benefits only the insolvent and does not relieve the original tenant or assignor of its contractual obligations to the landlord.

The court-appointed interim receiver brought a motion to lift a stay pending appeal of an order approving the sale of the bankrupt companies' assets.

The appellants opposed the sale.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal had questionable merit and that delaying the sale of the business as a going concern would cause manifest prejudice.

The motion was allowed, the stay was lifted, and the receiver was authorized to complete the sale.

The appellant landlords leased commercial space to the respondent, who subsequently assigned the leases.

The assignee became insolvent and repudiated the leases pursuant to s. 65.2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The landlords sued the original tenant for rent arrears.

The motion judge dismissed the actions, finding the repudiation terminated the leases for all purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a repudiation under s. 65.2 only affects the obligations of the insolvent assignee and does not terminate the lease or release the original tenant from its primary liability to the landlord.

The appellant, a lawyer and undischarged bankrupt, pleaded guilty to fraud and breach of trust for misappropriating client funds.

The sentencing judge ordered him to pay compensation to the Law Society, which had partially reimbursed the victims, and to one victim for the balance of his loss.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the compensation order required the prior consent of the bankruptcy court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a compensation order under the Criminal Code is a personal order that does not require bankruptcy court consent to be made, though consent is required before it can be enforced against the bankrupt's property.

The Court also affirmed that the Law Society is a 'person aggrieved' through subrogation.