Perell

The plaintiff sought costs of $26,318.02 on a partial indemnity basis after successfully defeating the defendants' motion to stay the action on jurisdictional grounds.

The defendants did not dispute entitlement but argued the quantum was excessive, suggesting a range of $10,000 to $14,000.

The court found the time expended by the plaintiff was excessive for a partial indemnity award and fixed costs at $21,000 all inclusive.

The Attorney General applied for a forfeiture order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 for $13,900 seized from the respondent during a traffic stop.

The police found the bundled cash, air fresheners, and a faint odour of marijuana in the vehicle, and a drug detector dog later alerted to the presence of cocaine on the currency.

The respondent claimed the money was from his business buying and selling cars, but he was not registered under the Motor Vehicles Dealers Act.

The court found the currency was proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity and ordered its forfeiture, rejecting the respondent's claim for relief.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver.

Eighty-nine days after the accident, the plaintiffs' lawyer notified their insurer of an intent to sue under the uninsured motorist provisions.

The lawyer inadvertently failed to name the insurer as a defendant in the initial action.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the insurer over two years after the initial notice letter.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run when the letter was sent because there was insufficient evidence at that time to determine if the injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order and her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Community Treatment Order expired and was not renewed.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion and quashed the appeals, finding that there was no longer a live controversy and a decision would have no practical effect.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim, the defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $15,419.95.

The plaintiffs argued there should be no order as to costs because the defendants had refused to mediate and the case was a matter of public interest.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no reason to depart from the normal rule that costs follow the event, and awarded the defendants their requested costs payable in any event of the cause.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an order approving a protocol for certain estate claims in a settled class action regarding Hepatitis C infections from blood transfusions.

The settlement agreement stipulated a filing deadline for deceased claimants, but the administrator's website and claim package failed to indicate the implementation date, causing 70 estate claims to be rejected.

The court approved the requested protocol to correct the publication error and ensure class members were not prejudiced, noting that a similar motion was granted in British Columbia.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' action and application, the respondents sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the applicants made unfounded allegations impugning their integrity.

The court held that because the proceedings were dismissed without a determination on the merits of those allegations, it could not be said the applicants failed to prove them.

The court awarded the respondents costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $17,500.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against a mortgage brokerage and two of its brokers for an allegedly unpaid short-term loan made to facilitate a real estate transaction.

The plaintiff claimed the brokers orally agreed to be borrowers and guarantors.

The defendant brokers brought a cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the action against them.

The court applied the Hryniak framework and used its fact-finding powers under Rule 20 to determine that the plaintiff's version of events was implausible and unsupported by documentation.

The court found no contractual relationship existed between the plaintiff and the brokers, and noted that any oral guarantee would be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed and the defendants' cross-motion was granted, dismissing the action against them.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motions for confidentiality orders and the plaintiff's cross-motion for a confidentiality order regarding materials for a pending Mareva injunction, the parties made written costs submissions.

The plaintiff sought $15,000, while the defendants argued for no costs due to the novelty of the legal issues.

The court ordered that costs of the motions be fixed at $5,000 in the cause of the Mareva injunction motion, finding this fair given the exigencies of the proceeding.

The court also awarded the defendants $500 each for the costs of their costs submissions, payable by the plaintiff.

The applicant, a self-represented lawyer facing discipline proceedings, brought an application under Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an interpretation of the investigative powers under s. 49.3 of the Law Society Act.

The respondent Law Society brought a motion to quash the application, arguing it was a disguised and premature application for judicial review of an ongoing administrative process.

The court agreed with the respondent, finding that the material facts were in dispute and that the applicant must first exhaust his remedies before the Law Society Tribunal.

The application was dismissed as premature and the motion to quash was granted.

The moving defendants sought to set aside an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim, and a subsequent default judgment arising from repeated non-compliance with documentary disclosure obligations and other procedural defaults in a commercial lease action.

The court held that relief was unavailable under rr. 37.14 and 59.06 because the evidence did not establish insufficient notice, accident, mistake, fraud, or newly discovered facts.

Applying the default judgment framework, the court accepted promptness and assumed an arguable defence and counterclaim, but found no plausible excuse for the defaults, found prejudice roughly balanced, and held that setting aside the judgment would adversely affect the integrity of the administration of justice.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved to strike a statement of defence and abuse of process counterclaim arising from a solicitor's negligence action against former criminal counsel concerning advice to enter a U.S. plea agreement.

The court held that the defence pleading was replete with evidence, argument, quotations, and scandalous character attacks contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and struck it in its entirety with leave to amend.

The court declined to strike the abuse of process counterclaim under rule 21.01(1)(b), holding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed where the plaintiff had arguably made his innocence and reputational vindication an unnecessary material issue in the negligence action.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

In a slip-and-fall action arising from an icy residential driveway at the plaintiff's workplace, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the tenant as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff knew or ought to have known from the outset that the premises were rented and that the occupier-tenant should have been sued.

The court also dismissed the landlord's third party claim for contribution and indemnity against the actual occupiers and the real estate parties as barred by s. 18, holding that s. 18 creates an absolute two-year limitation period not subject to discoverability.

On the merits, the absentee landlord was held not to be an occupier under s. 1 of the Occupiers’ Liability Act and not liable under s. 8 because the lease placed snow and ice removal on the tenant and no actionable landlord default was established.

The main action and third party proceeding were both dismissed.

The defendants brought a jurisdiction motion seeking to stay an Ontario action arising from a cross-border commercial relationship involving a Nigerian oil and gas opportunity.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the foundational agreements were made in Ontario and one agreement contained an Ontario governing law and attornment clause.

Applying the forum selection and forum non conveniens principles, the court found no rebuttal of the presumptive connecting factor and held that Nigeria was not clearly the more appropriate forum.

The motion to stay was dismissed.

On a summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action, the court held that the employer had not clearly contracted out of the employee's common law entitlement to reasonable notice through its employment offer or internal separation policy.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court fixed reasonable notice at 10 months for a 60-year-old senior managing consultant with approximately eight years of service whose position was eliminated.

The court rejected the employer's mitigation defence, finding the employee's job search and subsequent move to self-employment were reasonable.

Damages were awarded for salary, pension contributions, and replacement benefits, less amounts already paid.

In the administration of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, certain claimants sought to examine under oath the Executive Director of the Secretariat in support of a Request for Directions concerning disclosure obligations and claimant witness notification.

The court held that the applicable Rule 39.03 framework required the moving parties to show that the proposed evidence was relevant and that the witness was in a position to provide it.

The issues raised by the underlying request were primarily interpretive and normative, turning on the scope of disclosure obligations under the settlement agreement rather than on the Secretariat’s internal processes.

Because the proposed examination would not assist in deciding those issues and was unnecessary to the evidentiary record, the request was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order permitting removal of a boundary tree damaged in the 2013 ice storm after arborists reported it was unsafe and a branch had already damaged a neighbouring property.

The respondent opposed removal and relied on a statutory consent requirement under the Forestry Act.

The court held that s. 10(3) of the Forestry Act did not apply as between co-owners of a boundary tree and that the dispute was governed by the common law of nuisance.

Because the tree presented a patent and continuing danger, the respondent was obliged to abate the nuisance and was ordered not to interfere with removal and to pay half the removal costs.

In a civil fraud action accompanied by a pending Mareva injunction motion and related criminal proceedings, certain defendants sought confidentiality or sealing orders over their proposed affidavit and cross-examination evidence on the basis of self-incrimination concerns.

The court held that, as statutorily compellable witnesses in the civil proceeding, they were already protected by the principle against self-incrimination and no further protective order was required.

The plaintiff's cross-motion for a confidentiality order to permit filing of redacted motion materials was also dismissed because the open court principle was not displaced under the sealing-order test.

The court further held that disclosure of personal information in the motion record fell within the PIPEDA exception for compliance with rules of court relating to the production of records.

This was a costs decision arising from a class proceeding settlement approval process involving objectors represented at a third settlement approval hearing.

The court held that the unusual procedural history made the case unsuitable for setting broader principles about costs to objectors, and instead enforced its earlier direction that up to $100,000 had been budgeted for this expense, less $17,500 already awarded in the abandoned appeal.

The objectors' claim for $222,515 all inclusive was rejected as excessive.

The court awarded $82,500 all inclusive, holding that services connected to taking instructions, the abandoned appeal circumstances, and preparation for and attendance at the settlement approval motion fell within the intended scope of compensable work.

The defendant university moved to set aside a default judgment, writ of execution, and garnishment arising from a dispute over a student recruitment and satellite campus arrangement.

Applying the five-factor test for setting aside default judgment, the court held that the defendant had shown an arguable defence, particularly because the judgment had been based on a liquidated contractual claim rather than the pleaded fiduciary duty theory emphasized by the plaintiff.

The court also found a genuine issue for trial as to whether the parties' relationship was contractual or fiduciary in nature.

The motion was granted, the garnished funds were to be returned except for $52,000, and costs were awarded to the defendant.