Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2026-02-11 Docket: M56364 (COA-24-CV-0542)
Miller, Monahan and Pomerance JJ.A.
Parties
BETWEEN
Korede Afolabi, Alson Harold Alfred, Azhar Imdad Ali, Poonam Bhurani, Gargi Singh, Gurveer Singh, Harjeet Kaur, Haleema Zeeshan Kiani, Faiqa Mirza, Qamar Naeem, Justice Agboramaka Nwabuwe, Jacinta Nkemdilim Obinugwu, Nneoma Diana Okoro, Muhammad Asad Rehan Qazi, Syed Hassan Raza Safdar, Natasha Eleen Stewart, Subajanany Subramaniam *, Ishu Talwar, Ali Usman Virk and Faisal Zaman
Applicants (Respondents/ Moving Party*)
and
Law Society of Ontario
Respondent (Appellant/ Responding Party)
Counsel
Jeffrey Haylock and Dayna Christy, for the moving party
Tim Gleason and Megan Phyper, for the responding party
Heard: January 30, 2026
On review of the order of Justice Lorne Sossin of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, dated September 15, 2025.
Reasons for Decision
[1] In late 2021, the Law Society of Ontario ("LSO") became aware of apparent widespread cheating by candidates sitting barrister and solicitor examinations as part of the licensing process. After investigation, the LSO invalidated the exam results of nearly 150 candidates, including the moving party, Ms. Subramaniam. Subsequently, it also voided the licensing registrations of most of those candidates, meaning they could not simply rewrite the examinations, but were required to restart the licensing process from the beginning. Some 22 other candidates, including Ms. Subramaniam, did not face this additional sanction. Ms. Subramaniam would be permitted to resit the barristers' examination without restarting the entire process.
[2] Counsel for Ms. Subramaniam explained in the hearing of this review motion that resitting the examination is not a realistic possibility for her. She has suffered significant health impairments and believes she would now be unable to achieve a passing grade writing under the conditions required by the LSO. She maintains that she did not misconduct herself in writing the barristers' exam, and her only hope to be licensed as a lawyer is if her original examination result is reinstated.
Procedural history
[3] Many of the candidates, including Ms. Subramaniam, sought judicial review at the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court ruled in November 2023 that the LSO's decision to void the examination results was procedurally fair and reasonable: Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727, at para. 20. However, it held that the decision to void the registrations was procedurally unfair. It quashed those decisions and remitted to the LSO for reconsideration.
[4] The LSO appealed to this court. Ms. Subramaniam did not, at that time, bring a cross-appeal to challenge the Divisional Court decision that the voiding of her examination result was procedurally fair and reasonable. She later explained it was because she was incorrectly advised.
[5] This court allowed the appeal, holding that the decision to void the registrations was procedurally fair and reasonable: Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257. Because no one appealed the LSO's decision to void the examination results, including Ms. Subramaniam, this Court did not address that issue.
[6] Thirteen of the candidates, including Ms. Subramaniam, subsequently brought a motion in this court to re-open the appeal: 2025 ONCA 464. The motion was dismissed. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied: [2025] S.C.C.A. No. 203.
[7] Ms. Subramaniam then brought a motion in this court for an extension of time to cross-appeal the November 2023 decision of the Divisional Court, which had upheld the invalidation of her examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.
[8] The motion judge dismissed the motion, primarily on the basis that the appeal appeared meritless.
Analysis
[9] The motion judge set out the correct approach to assessing a motion for an extension of time to perfect an appeal. The jurisprudence requires that the request be assessed according to whether the justice of the case warrants it, with regard to: (1) whether the prospective appellant formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period; (2) the length of, and explanation for, the delay; (3) any prejudice caused to the respondent by the delay; and (4) the merits of the appeal.
[10] Although the motion judge was perplexed at why Ms. Subramaniam did not bring a cross appeal at the same time as the LSO appeal, the key factor in his analysis was that the grounds of the proposed appeal had very little merit. He concluded that for Ms. Subramaniam's argument to succeed, it would require that this court find that candidates who were subject to the lesser sanction of exam invalidation would be entitled to a higher procedural fairness obligation than those candidates who received the more serious sanction of invalidated registration.
[11] Ms. Subramaniam argues that the motion judge failed to adequately grapple with her procedural argument: that she was denied procedural fairness because she was not given a copy of her exam to verify the LSO's allegations, and because she did not have a reasonable period of time to respond to the expert report that was the foundation for the LSO's decision to void the examination. Furthermore, the motion judge erred in concluding the proposed appeal risked an inconsistent result with this court's earlier determination, because on that appeal this court only ruled on whether a hearing was required. It did not consider whether the procedural protections sought by Ms. Subramaniam would have been required.
[12] We do not agree that the motion judge erred. There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that Ms. Subramaniam ever sought the procedural measures she now claims. Litigation is not to be approached in a piecemeal fashion. More significantly, the procedures that she now seeks – disclosure and a right to adduce evidence – are attendant on the right to a hearing. When this court held that the LSO's decision to invalidate the registrations did not attract the right to a hearing, it also entailed that the candidates were not entitled to those procedures that are ancillary to a hearing. And, as the motion judge held, for this court to be consistent with its previous holding in the same proceeding, it cannot be the case that candidates such as Ms. Subramaniam who received a lesser sanction could be accorded procedural protections that those who faced greater sanctions were not.
[13] We understand that Ms. Subramaniam faces, and has faced, great obstacles to her success. We recognize that she has struggled and that the path for her has been much more arduous than it has been for others. Nevertheless, the proposed appeal is not meritorious, and the motion judge made no error in dismissing the motion to extend time on that ground.
Disposition
[14] The motion is dismissed. There is no award of costs.
"B.W. Miller J.A."
"P.J. Monahan J.A."
"R. Pomerance J.A."

