OCA 2011

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent $60,526.99 for unpaid work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent adduced evidence supporting the outstanding amount and the appellants failed to raise a triable issue.

The Court also upheld the judgment against the various corporate entities controlled by the individual appellant, clarifying the specific amounts recoverable against each entity.

The appellants appealed a decision interpreting a right-of-way over their cottage property in favour of the respondent's adjacent property.

The appellants argued the right-of-way only permitted maintaining a water pipeline, or alternatively, that the rights should be exercised on the same side of the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the instrument created two distinct rights: one for recreational lake access on the east side, and another to use a pump in the boathouse on the west side.

The court declined to rewrite the instrument to combine the rights-of-way.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury.

The appellant contended the trial judge failed to review the position of the defence, erred in responding to a jury question about an alternative suspect, introduced a speculative theory of planning and deliberation, and gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning regarding the key Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's failure to explicitly set out the defence position was ill-advised, the charge as a whole conveyed a sufficient understanding of the issues.

The court also found no reversible errors in the response to the jury question, the instructions on planning and deliberation, or the Vetrovec warning.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of driving over 80.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge after misapprehending the qualified technician's evidence, erroneously concluding the Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown's appeal but remitted the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal court lacked jurisdiction to remit the matter for reconsideration.

Finding that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence amounted to an error of law and that a conviction would have necessarily followed but for the error, the Court of Appeal entered a conviction and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, brought a motion under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for the appointment of state-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal raised arguable grounds, including the admissibility of expert evidence on 'honour killings' and the trial judge's refusal to give a modified W.D. instruction.

Given the complexity of the legal issues, the substantial record, and the appellant's limited English language skills, the Court concluded he could not effectively present the appeal without legal assistance.

The motion was granted and counsel was appointed.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to comply with a roadside demand for a breath sample.

At trial, she testified that a panic attack prevented her from providing a sample.

The trial judge rejected her evidence, relying on her failure to mention the panic attack to the officer at the roadside and on inconsistent statements she made before being advised of her right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by using pre-counsel roadside statements to impeach the appellant's credibility and by using her pre-trial silence to draw adverse inferences against her.

The appellant law firm appealed an order allowing the respondent client to assess a paid account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act, a client may apply for the assessment of a delivered account upon requisition from the registrar within 30 days of delivery, regardless of whether the account has been paid.

The court clarified that ss. 3 and 11 of the Act can both apply to paid accounts, with the 30-day period serving as the dividing line for when an assessment can be directed by the Registrar.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge and noting that the appellants' failure to appeal a prior order provided a complete answer to their position.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a defamation claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for reasons given in a related file.

The court also noted that a non-party making allegations against the respondent physician had no standing in the appeal.

The youth appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder after his friend and her sister murdered their mother.

The Crown alleged the appellant joined the conspiracy, suggested using Tylenol 3, provided the pills, and helped establish an alibi.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 18-month custody and supervision sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge's instructions on party liability to conspiracy were inadequate, the curative proviso applied given the overwhelming evidence.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the co-conspirators' hearsay exception, bad character evidence, and the lack of a Vetrovec warning.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

While the court upheld the finding that the crime was a 'violent offence' under the YCJA, it found the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse, intelligence, and supportive family background as aggravating factors.

The sentence was reduced to eight months' custody and four months' supervision.

The appellant appealed an order disposing of a defamation matter on the basis of qualified and common law privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge as there was no triable issue regarding malice, making it unnecessary to determine the truth of the statements complained of.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was charged with possession of child pornography after a school computer technician found explicit images of a student on his work laptop.

The principal seized the laptop and copied the images, and the school board later copied temporary Internet files before handing everything to the police, who searched the laptop without a warrant.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal files on the work computer, though modified by the technician's right to maintain the network.

While the school officials did not breach the Charter, the warrantless police search of the laptop and temporary Internet files violated section 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the laptop and temporary Internet files under section 24(2), but admitted the disc containing the images of the student.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition on charges of conspiracy and trafficking in a narcotic.

He argued there was no evidence he was a party to the conspiracy charge, though he did not resist committal on the trafficking charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior relationship among the alleged conspirators and the frequency of transactions provided a sufficient basis for a trier of fact to reasonably infer the appellant was a party to an ongoing conspiracy.

The appellant was convicted of assault following a confrontation with her landlord.

The trial judge resolved conflicting accounts by relying on the appellant's prior convictions for assault and the lack of criminal records for the complainant and her family.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge improperly used the prior convictions to infer a propensity to commit assault rather than for assessing credibility.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for historical sexual and physical offences committed against his two former wives and two daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to resolve his first daughter's earlier recantation of her allegations and by relying on her evidence to support other complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and was not required to resolve every discrete factual issue.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year and three-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit for an offender in a position of trust who sexually abused children over a substantial period.

The appellant appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding a property assessment dispute.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the Divisional Court and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant did not have a valid notice of appeal as its attempt to appeal the Master's decision was five weeks out of time and no extension of time was sought or granted.

The action was properly dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant argued his proceedings were brought in good faith based on a belief that the respondents misappropriated funds from their late mother, and that the motion judge improperly considered non-judicial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record supported the conclusion that the appellant was unreasonably obsessed with the cause and that extra-judicial proceedings were relevant to assessing the bona fides of his court proceedings.

The appellant, a social worker, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault involving two former patients.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that consent was vitiated by an abuse of trust, that the trial judge's interventions compromised trial fairness, and that improper use was made of a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence and that the trial was fair.

The moving party, Maggie's: The Toronto Sex Workers' Action Project, brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of prostitution-related offences.

The moving party sought to raise a new challenge under s. 15 of the Charter and to argue that the legislation was impermissibly driven by moral views.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene on the s. 15 issue, finding that the evidentiary record was not developed for such a challenge and that allowing it would be unfair to the parties and delay the appeal.

The court also declined to grant separate intervener status on the morality issue, as it was already being raised by others, but permitted the moving party to join an existing intervener group.