M. Faieta

The Attorney General applied for civil forfeiture of $29,900 found in an abandoned suitcase.

The claimant asserted ownership of the cash.

The parties reached a settlement to forfeit $25,900 and return $4,000 to the claimant.

The court found the cash was the proceeds of unlawful activity and the claimant failed to prove legitimate ownership.

The court refused to give effect to the settlement, holding that Rule 49 is not an independent basis for an order under the Civil Remedies Act, and ordered the entire $29,900 forfeited to the Crown.

The Attorney General applied for civil forfeiture of a residential property under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, alleging it was the proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity (marihuana trafficking).

The respondent property owner argued she was a legitimate and responsible owner who purchased the property with an inheritance.

The court rejected the respondent's evidence, finding the property was acquired with proceeds of unlawful activity and used as a marihuana distribution centre.

The court held the respondent was not a legitimate or responsible owner and that forfeiture was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The application for forfeiture was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Board had rescinded a certificate of involuntary admission but upheld the physician’s finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment due to inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review and the test for capacity under s. 4 of the Act, the court found the Board reasonably concluded the appellant’s delusional beliefs and disorganized thinking prevented her from performing a risk–benefit analysis regarding treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the Board equated mental illness with incapacity or failed to ensure the appellant had been informed about treatment options.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant appealed the Chief Building Official's refusal to issue a building permit for interior renovations to convert a commercial building into a day nursery.

The City refused the permit on the basis that the application failed to comply with applicable law, including site plan control, park levies, development charges, and zoning by-law requirements for a landscape buffer.

The court held that the proposed alterations did not constitute 'development' under the City of Toronto Act, as they did not substantially increase the usability of the building when measured against its actual prior commercial use.

Consequently, site plan control, park levies, and development charges did not apply.

However, the court upheld the requirement for a 1.5-metre landscape buffer under the zoning by-law, finding no acquired rights protected the applicant from this requirement.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the City was directed to issue the building permit subject to the landscape buffer and other reasonable building code issues.

The applicant sought to quash a warrant issued under s. 20 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 authorizing Toronto Fire Services to enter and inspect his residence for fire safety concerns after complaints that the home was occupied by a hoarder.

The court treated the proceeding as an application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the applicant effectively sought certiorari to set aside a justice of the peace’s decision.

The court held that the justice of the peace had reasonable grounds to issue the warrant based on an affidavit describing complaints, repeated unsuccessful attempts to inspect, and concerns about combustible materials in a rowhouse dwelling.

The court further found no violation of s. 8 of the Charter because regulatory fire safety inspections involve a reduced expectation of privacy and serve an important public safety purpose.

The application was dismissed and the warrant’s expiry date was extended.

The defendant driver brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against him following a motor vehicle collision involving an unidentified vehicle that turned left across his path.

The plaintiff was a passenger and also sued his insurer under unidentified automobile coverage.

The insurer brought a cross-motion arguing that the driver was at least partially negligent, which would negate the insurer’s liability.

Applying Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the driver failed to exercise reasonable care in poor visibility and slippery winter road conditions.

The court held the driver was at least 1% liable for the collision and dismissed the claim against the insurer.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sued the defendant for a commission of $68,506.25 under a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA) after the defendant purchased a home using another brokerage.

The court found that the BRA had been repudiated by the defendant and that the plaintiff accepted the repudiation by its conduct in failing to provide further services.

Alternatively, the plaintiff repudiated the agreement by failing to assist the defendant in locating a home, which the defendant accepted.

The claim was dismissed.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him in an action alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty regarding his role in managing an estate.

The lawyer argued he ignored the statement of claim because he believed it lacked merit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the lawyer's explanation implausible and noting that his failure to defend showed a careless disregard for the legal process.

The court also found that the prejudice to the plaintiff, due to the death and incapacity of key witnesses, outweighed any prejudice to the defendant.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay, citing a 15-year period since the action was commenced.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to place the action on the trial list.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the delay was due to settlement discussions.

However, the court dismissed the motion because the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice by showing that all documentary evidence was preserved and witnesses were available and had been previously examined.

The defendants failed to show actual prejudice.

The action was ordered to be placed on the trial list.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, seeking to freeze their assets based on an alleged debt owed under a Repayment Agreement.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants were planning to move to the United States and dissipate their Ontario assets to avoid judgment.

The court found that while the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case for the debt, there was insufficient evidence to prove a real risk that the defendants were removing assets from the jurisdiction to avoid judgment.

The motion for a Mareva injunction was dismissed.

The minor plaintiff, who had a pre-existing condition making his bones prone to fracture, was injured while attempting to board a continuously moving amusement park ride.

The plaintiffs sued the amusement park operator for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court found the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to post warning signs, failing to provide verbal instructions that the ride did not stop, and failing to have sufficient staff present.

The court dismissed the defendant's claims of contributory negligence against the minor and his father.

Damages were awarded to the minor plaintiff and his parents, taking into account the minor's pre-existing condition under the crumbling skull rule.

The defendant employer appealed a master's order requiring production of an external investigation report prepared by a lawyer following a fatal incident at a long‑term care facility.

The employer argued the report and related documents were protected by solicitor‑client privilege and that the master erred in ordering disclosure.

The court held the investigation was undertaken for the purpose of providing legal advice and was therefore privileged, rejecting the master’s finding that the lawyer had not been retained in that capacity and rejecting application of the common interest exception.

However, the court concluded that privilege had been waived through fairness considerations and public disclosure of portions of the report’s findings by the employer’s representatives.

The master’s order requiring production was upheld.

The defendant driver of the lead vehicle in a rear-end collision brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and the co-defendant's crossclaim against her.

The co-defendant driver of the rear vehicle opposed the motion, alleging the lead vehicle stopped suddenly.

The court applied the presumption that the rear driver is at fault and found the co-defendant failed to discharge the onus to show the accident did not occur as a result of his negligence.

The motion was granted and the claims against the lead driver were dismissed.

Following an eleven-day jury trial where the jury awarded no damages, the defendant brought a motion for a declaration that the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss and health care expenses was barred by the threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed to suffer from soft tissue injuries, headaches, and neck pain following a minor rear-end collision.

The court found that the plaintiff's impairments did not substantially interfere with her volunteer activities or usual activities of daily living, and preferred the medical evidence indicating no permanent impairment caused by the collision.

The motion was granted, barring the plaintiff's claims.