Meysa Maleki

In a high-conflict family law proceeding under case management, the court conducted telephone case conferences to address disputes relating to parenting scheduling, confidentiality agreements affecting disclosure, and the impending power of sale of the former matrimonial home.

The parties had previously agreed not to bring parenting motions pending completion of a s. 30 assessment, but urgent issues arose concerning mortgage arrears and potential power of sale proceedings.

The court declined to authorize several proposed motions but granted the respondent leave to bring a limited motion concerning the power of sale timeline due to the urgency of the mortgage demand.

The judge maintained strict case management control, requiring leave and a timetable before any motions could be brought and scheduling a further case conference to determine next procedural steps.

On competing family law motions following separation after an 18-year marriage, the court ordered bifurcation so that the validity of the parties’ marriage contract would be tried first.

Applying the bifurcation principles, the court held that the validity issue was discrete, could materially narrow the remaining trust, equalization, and support claims, and would likely reduce cost and delay.

The court also found a triable issue as to the enforceability of the marriage contract’s spousal support waiver, including concerns about timing, disclosure, duress, and unconscionability, and granted interim spousal support of $5,655 per month.

Further disclosure was restricted to what was necessary to determine the validity of the marriage contract, with broader valuation and income-analysis disclosure deferred.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking to vary an interim access order requiring a nanny to accompany the child during access visits.

The nanny had resigned, leading to a stalemate in which the applicant mother refused unsupervised access while the father refused supervision, resulting in the child not seeing the father for several weeks.

The court interpreted the earlier order and held that the term “accompany” did not mean supervision.

In the child’s best interests, the court ordered temporary unsupervised access for the father, with supervised transitions between the parents.

The court also permitted the mother to travel temporarily with the child to California for a limited visit with her family.

Following several family law motions concerning parenting time with a young child, both parties sought full indemnity costs.

The court found that success was divided but that the applicant was successful on the most significant issue—obtaining overnight parenting time.

The respondent had advanced allegations of domestic violence that were unsuccessful, while the applicant succeeded on arguments relating to parental alienation.

The court declined to award full or substantial indemnity costs and instead fixed partial indemnity costs at $4,500 payable by the respondent.

A ruling on a jurisdictional question in a family law matter concerning a motion to change a final consent order regarding custody and access of a child.

The applicant sought to determine whether the Ontario Court of Justice or the Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction to hear the motion to change.

The respondent had brought multiple motions in the Superior Court on grounds of urgency, despite the original application having been commenced in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court held that the Ontario Court of Justice retained exclusive jurisdiction as the court of first instance, and that the Superior Court orders were made per incuriam and had no force and effect.

The appellant, who was in a same-sex union with the biological mother, sought a declaration of parentage for a child conceived with the assistance of a male friend.

The biological father remained involved in the child's life, meaning an adoption order would sever his parental rights.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Children's Law Reform Act only contemplates one mother and one father, a legislative gap existed regarding children born to same-sex parents through reproductive technology.

The Court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to declare the appellant a mother of the child, recognizing three legal parents to protect the child's best interests.