Marc A. Munro

The defendant, an executive of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss a defamation action against him personally.

He argued he was protected by statutory immunity under s. 18(1) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and that he acted as an employee without personal liability.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue of whether the defendant acted in good faith or with malice could not be determined on a summary judgment motion and required a full trial.

The respondent stored food processing equipment owned by the appellant and claimed a storage lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The respondent retained the equipment in breach of his obligation to sell it after receiving a letter from the appellant dated May 30, 2012.

The trial judge ordered the respondent to pay damages of $129,500 USD but reduced this by crediting $27,900 for storage fees at $900 per month for 31 months.

On appeal, the appellant challenged whether credit should have been given and the amount thereof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to grant the credit and the calculation of the storage fees.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion by the plaintiffs against the GCMC Defendants to establish a discovery plan.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs, while the GCMC Defendants argued for no costs due to alleged non-compliance with a previous court order.

The court found the plaintiffs acted reasonably and were largely successful in their motion, noting the GCMC Defendants had used the discovery plan issue as a tactic to seek dismissal of the action, contrary to the purpose of Rule 29.1.

Applying general costs principles, the court awarded the plaintiffs fixed costs.

The mortgagor obtained an ex parte Order for Assessment under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act to assess the legal accounts of the mortgagee's lawyers, Cassels Brock, following a power of sale.

Cassels Brock moved to set aside the order, arguing the mortgagor was not their client, while the mortgagor moved for contempt due to non-compliance.

The court set aside the Order for Assessment, finding the mortgagor was not a 'client' under s. 3 and thus the order was a nullity.

The contempt motion was dismissed as the non-compliance was not deliberate and wilful.

However, the court allowed the mortgagor's alternative motion for an assessment under s. 9 of the Solicitors Act to proceed with viva voce evidence.

Following a status hearing under Rule 48.14(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning potential dismissal for delay, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant had sought dismissal of the action due to delay, while the court instead facilitated an agreement on a timetable for further steps to move the matter toward trial.

The plaintiff, who had previously been self‑represented and had made allegations against opposing counsel, later sought costs.

The court concluded that awarding costs to the plaintiff would reward inappropriate conduct and noted that dismissal was a legitimate request under the rule.

No costs were awarded.

Application concerning the removal of an attorney for property under a continuing power of attorney pursuant to the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The applicant alleged that the co‑attorney breached fiduciary duties through mismanagement of the incapable person's assets, failure to account, risky investments, and lack of transparency.

The court reviewed statutory duties of attorneys under ss. 32, 37, and 39 of the Act and considered evidence of the grantor’s declining cognitive capacity and financial vulnerability.

The court found strong and compelling evidence of misconduct and neglect, including speculative investments, unpaid taxes, failure to keep proper accounts, and disregard of fiduciary obligations.

The respondent was removed as attorney for property and the remaining co‑attorney was left as sole attorney subject to ongoing accounting obligations.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff to strike portions of the statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought $12,816.24 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the discretion to award costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity of the issues, efficiency of the proceeding, and conduct of the parties.

The court noted the breadth of the original motion challenging several tort claims and the preparation required by the plaintiff’s counsel.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendants moved under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging conspiracy, intentional interference with contractual relations, and personal liability of individual defendants, or alternatively for further particulars.

The action arose from an agreement for the acquisition of corporations owned by the plaintiff, followed by allegations that the defendants diverted assets, issued fraudulent invoices, and caused the companies’ insolvency.

The court reviewed the pleading standards applicable to motions to strike and emphasized the low threshold required to sustain pleadings where material facts supporting recognized causes of action are alleged.

It held that the pleadings sufficiently alleged elements of civil conspiracy, intentional interference with contractual relations, and potential personal liability through closely held corporate entities.

The motion to strike was dismissed and the defendants were ordered to deliver a statement of defence.

The moving party sought consolidation of three simplified procedure defamation actions brought by separate plaintiffs against the same defendants, as well as an order striking certain paragraphs of the statements of claim and requiring particulars of allegations of malice.

The court held that the actions arose from the same alleged defamatory statements and involved common issues of fact and law, making consolidation appropriate under Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and consistent with the principle against multiplicity of proceedings.

The court declined to strike impugned paragraphs of the pleadings, finding they provided contextual allegations relevant to the defendant’s alleged mindset in a defamation claim.

However, the court ordered the plaintiffs to provide full particulars of alleged malice pursuant to Rule 25.06(8).

Given the mixed outcome, no order as to costs was made.

The applicants successfully obtained an order for the assessment of their former lawyers’ accounts and subsequently sought $47,000 in costs of the application.

The court held that the claimed partial indemnity costs were excessive and included unreasonable rates and items constituting solicitor overhead.

The court further found that the bulk of the expense resulted from numerous serious allegations of misconduct against the lawyers that were ultimately dismissed and which unnecessarily complicated the proceeding.

In the circumstances, the court declined to award any costs of the application.

The court also clarified that the ordered assessment concerned the original solicitor’s bills rather than a review of a prior assessment and directed that any costs ordered by the assessor against the lawyers be set off against amounts owed by the client.

The applicants sought an order under the Solicitors Act directing the assessment of legal accounts rendered by their former counsel.

The application was brought more than twelve months after the accounts became final and after the accounts had been paid by a court‑appointed receiver pursuant to earlier court orders.

The court held that a prior review by a court‑appointed fee assessor did not bar a statutory assessment under the Act.

Considering the substantial amount of the bills, the relatively short delay beyond the statutory period, and the fact that payment had been made by a receiver rather than the client personally, the court found special circumstances justifying an assessment.

An order was granted directing that the ten monthly bills be assessed in Toronto.